
Class Zfi^T 
Book (; &v? 



PRESENTED BT 



Epochs of Ancient History 

EDITED BY 

REV. G. W. COX, M.A. and CHARLES SANKEY, M. A. 



THE GREEKS and THE PERSIANS. 



REV. G W. COX, M. A. 



MAY 2 7 1904 



Transfer 

D of C&L 



THE 



GREEKS AND THE PERSIANS. 



■:,*&&***»#**■•« 



BY THE 

REV. G. W. COX, M. A. 

JOINT-EDITOR OF THE SERIES 



NEW YOEK: 
CHAKLES SCKIBNEB'S SONS, 

1887. 



PREFACE. 



In the pages of Herodotus the history of the Per- 
sian Wars becomes the history of the world. The 
fortunes of the tribes and nations which were absorbed 
successively into the great mass of the Persian Empire, 
before it came into collision with the only force ca- 
pable of withstanding it, are traced with a fulness of 
detail due probably to the fact that no written history 
either of the Greek tribes or of their Eastern and 
Western neighbors was yet in existence. 

In the present volume the non -Hellenic peoples 
are noticed only in so far as their history bears on 
that of the Greek tribes, or as their characteristics 
illustrate the relations and even the affinity of the 
latter with races which they regarded as altogether 
alien and barbarous. 

In relating the history of that great struggle be- 
tween the despotism of the East and the freedom and 
law of the West, which came practically to an end 
with the discomfiture of the Persian army at Plataia 
and the ruin of the Persian fleet at Mykale, I have 
striven to trace the lines of evidence, sometimes 



vi Preface. 

faintly marked, but seldom broken, which enable us 
to test the traditional stories and with more or less 
clearness to ascertain the real course of events. In 
short, my effort has been to show rather how far the 
history may be regarded as trustworthy than how 
much of it must be put aside as uncertain or ficti- 
tious. That it contains some traditions which are 
not to be trusted and others which are actually false, * 
is beyond question; and in such instances I have 
placed before the reader the evidence which will 
enable him to form his own judgment in the matter. 
But it is more satisfactory to note that with little 
doubt the real course of the events which preceded 
and followed the battle of Marathon or the march 
of Leonidas to Thermopylai may be determined by 
evidence supplied in the narrative of Herodotus him- 
self; and that the history thus recovered throws a 
singularly full and clear light on the motives of all 
the contending parties, and on the origin and nature 
of the struggle which was decided chiefly by Athenian 
energy and heroism. 

The history of this struggle forms a portion of 
that ground which I have had to traverse in the first 
volume of my a History of Greece." But although 
the materials have been necessarily re-arranged and 
much of the history is presented from a different 
point of view, I have given, much as I gave them in 
my larger volume, the descriptions of the most striking 
scenes or the most important actors in the great strife 
which carried Athens to imperial dominion. I felt 
that I could scarcely hope to make these descriptions 



Preface. vil 

more clear or forcible by giving them in different 
words, and that any attempt to write down to the 
capacities of young readers was wholly uncalled for 
in a history which in its vivid pictures and stirring 
interest appeals with equal force to the young and 
to the old alike. 



Note on the Spelling of Greek Names. 

No attempt has been made in this volume to alter the spelling of Greek 
names which have assumed genuine English forms — e. g. Athens, Thebes, 
Corinth, Thrace. It would be well, perhaps, if such forms had been more 
numerous. 

The Latin form has been kept, where it has become so familiar to English 
ears that a change would be disagreeable, e. g. Thucydides, Cyrus. This 
last name is, indeed, neither Latin nor Greek; and the adoption of either 
the Greek or the Latin form is a matter of comparative indifference. 
Probably it would be to the benefit of historical study to revert to the true 
Persian form, and to write Gustashp for Hystaspes. 

But these exceptions do not affect the general rule of giving the Greek 
forms, wherever it may be practicable or advisable to do so. This rule may 
be followed in all instances in which either the name or the person are un- 
known to the mass of English readers. Thus, while we still speak of Alex- 
auder the Great, his obscure predecessor, who acts a subordinate part in 
the drama of the Persian wars, may appear as Aleuandros. 

The general adoption of the Greek form is, indeed, justified, if not rendered 
necessary, by the practice of most of the recent writers on Greek History. 
It is, therefore, unnecessary perhaps to say more than that the adoption of 
the Greek form may help on the change in the English pronunciation of 
Latin, which the most eminent schoolmasters of the day have pronounced to 
be desirable. So long as the Phrygian town is mentioned under its Latin 
form, Celcence, there will be a strong temptation for young readers to pro- 
nounce it as if it were the Greek name for the moon, Selene It is well, 
therefore, that they should become familiarized with the Greek form Kelai- 
nai, and thus learn that the Greek spelling involves practically no difference 
of sound from that of the true Latin pronunciation, the sound of the C and 
K. being identical, and the diphthong ai being pronounced as we pronounce 
at in/azY, while oi and ei have the sound of our ee in sheen. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF GREEK CIVILIZATION. 

PAGE 
General character of Oriental history . . I 

Rapid extension of the Roman Empire . . 2 

Hindrances to the extension of Persian power in the 

West . , . . . .2 

Political growth of the Greek race . . • 4 

Isolation of the Greek cities . . • 4 

General character of the early Greek civilization . 5 
Religious character of the Greek state . . 7 

Causes retarding the growth of the civil power . 8 
The city the ultimate unit of Greek society . . 9 

National characteristics of the Greeks . .10 

Comparison between the Greeks and the subjects of 

Eastern empires . . . .12 

Influence of the great festivals on the education of 

the Greeks . . . . . 13 

Rise and growth of Greek philosophy . . 14 

CHAPTER II. 

SETTLEMENTS AND GOVERNMENT OF THE GREEKS. 
Extent of the Hellenic world . . .16 

Geography of Northern Greece . . .18 

Geography of the Peloponnesos . . 19 



Contents. 



B.C. 



The coast-line of Greece 
The Thessalians 
The Boiotians 
The Spartans 
The Spartan constitution 
The population of Lakonia 
The military system of Sparta 
Character of the Greek colonies 
Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily 
Corinth and Korkyra 

Epeirots and other tribes of Northern Hellas 
Greek settlements on the northern coast of the 
Egean sea ..... 

The Asiatic Greeks . 
Physical geography of Asia Minor . 
The Kingdom of Lydia . 



PAGE 

, 20 

, 21 

. 22 

. 22 

. 23 

. 24 

• 25 

. 26 

. 27 

. 28 
29 

32 
32 
33 
35 



?545 



CHAPTER III. 

THE PERSIAN EMPIRE UNDER CYRUS, KAMBYSES, 
AND DAREIOS. 

Cyrus and Astyages . . . 36 

The Median empire . . . • 37 

Connection of the Median, Lydian, and Assyrian 

Empires . . . . . 38 

The Median people . . . • 39 

Geography of Persia . . . • 39 

The Lydian Kingdom and the Asiatic Greeks . 41 

History of the war between Kroisos and Cyrus . 42 

Popular stories of the reign and fall of Kroisos . 43 
Sources of the popular accounts of the reign of 

Kroisos . . . . • 47 

Events in Asia Minor after the fall of Kroisos . 49 

Expedition of Cyrus against Babylon . . • 49 

Siege and fall of Babylon . . . • 5 2 



Contents. xi 

b. c. PAGE 
Death of Cyrus, and invasion of Egypt by Kam- 

byses ... . . .53 

The formation of Egypt . . . . 54 

Character of the Egyptian people . . . 56 

Opening of Egypt to the Greeks . . . 58 

Reigns of Nekos, Amasis, and Psammenitos . 59 

? 525 Conquest of Egypt by the Persians . . .61 
Failure of the expedition into Ethiopia and the 

desert . . . . . .61 

Failure of the proposed expedition against Carthage 62 

The last days of Kambyses . . .64 

The record of Behistun . . . .66 

? 520 Revolt of the Medes . . . .67 

Revolt of Babylon . . . . -67 

Despotism of Polykrates at Samos . . • 68 
Organization of the Persian Empire under Dareios 69 

The story of Demokedes . . . . 70 

? 516 Expedition of Dareios to Scythia . . • 73 

The Ionians at the bridge across the Danube . 75 

Operations of Megabazos in Thrace . . 76 

CHAPTER IV. 

HISTORY OF ATHENS IN THE TIMES OF SOLON, 
PEISISTRATOS, AND KLEISTHENES. 

Growth of hereditary sovereignty among the Greeks 77 

Origin of Greek tyrannies . . . . 79 

Early history of the Athenian people . . 80 

New classification of the citizens by Solon . . 82 

Results of the legislation of Solon . . .84 

560-525 Usurpation of Peisistratos . . .85 

Subsequent fortunes of Peisistratos . . . 85 

Despotism of his sons, Hippias and Hipparchos . 86 

510 Expulsion of Hippias from Athens . . . 88 

The reforms of Kleisthenes . . . .89 



xii Contents, 



b. c. page 



The new tribes .... 

The Ostracism .... 

Opposition of Isagoras, ending in the triumph of 

Kleisthenes .... 

509 Embassy from the Athenians to Artaphernes, satrap 

of Sardeis .... 

Failure of the efforts of the Spartans for the resto 
ration of Hippias 

Discomfiture of the Spartan king, Kleomenes, at 
Eleusis .... 

Invitation to Hippias to attend a congress of Spar- 
tan allies 

Return of Hippias to Sigeion . 

CHAPTER V. 



9* 
9i 

93 

94 

94 

95 

96 
97 



THE IONIC REVOLT. 

Intrigues of Hippias at Sardeis . . . 99 

Embassy from Athens to Artaphernes . .100 

? 502 Revolt of Aristagoras against the Persian king . 100 

Mission of Aristagoras to Sparta and Athens . 102 

The burning of Sardeis . , . .105 
Extension of the revolt to Byzantion and other cities 106 
Causes of the revolt in Kypros (Cyprus) and Karia 107 

Defeat of the Ionian fleet at Lade . . .108 

Disunion and weakness of the Asiatic Greeks . no 

495 Siege and capture of Miletos . . .111 

Suppression of the revolt . . . .111 

Retreat of Miltiades to Athens . . .in 

CHAPTER VI. 

THE INVASION OF DATIS AND ARTAPHERNES. 

Administration of Artaphernes in Ionia . .112 

?493 Measures of Mardonios . . . . 113 



Conte7tts. xiii 

b. c. page 

? 492 Discomfiture of Mardonios in Thrace . . 1 1 \ 

Mission of the envoys of Dareios to the Greek cities 115 

? 496 War between Argos and Sparta . . .117 

Deposition of Demaratos . . . . "8 

Expedition of Datis and Artaphernes against Naxos 

and Eretria . . . . .118 

490 Landing of the Persians at Marathon . .120 

Early career and character of Aristeides and The- 

mistokles . . . . .121 

Preparations of the Persians at Marathon . .123 

The Plataians and the Athenians . , .125 

Real designs of Hippias and the Persians . .125 

March of the Athenians to Marathon . . .127 

The plain of Marathon . . . .128 

Victory of the Athenians . . . .128 

Importance of the battle of Marathon . .130 

Popular traditions of the fight . . .130 

Closing scenes of the reign of Dareios . .131 

Charges brought at Athens against the Alkmaionidai 132 

489 Expedition of Miltiades to Paros . . . .133 
Trial and death of Miltiades . . . . . 134 

Conduct of the Athenians in the case of Miltiades . 135 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE INVASION AND FLIGHT OF XERXES. 
General character of the narratives relating to the 

expedition of Xerxes ..... 140 

484 Preparations for the invasion of Europe . . .140 

481 Progress of Xerxes from Sousa to Sardeis . . 143 

Bridges across the Hellespont . . . .144 

480 March of Xerxes from Sardeis . . . .145 

Passage of the Hellespont . . . . .147 

Conversation of ^erxes with Demaratos . . 150 



XIV 



Contents. 



March of the Persian army to Therme . 

Arrival of the Persian fleet off the Magnesian coast 

Development of the Athenian navy 
483 Ostracism of Aristeides .... 

Growing wealth of Athens 
480 Congress at the isthmus of Corinth 

Interpretation of the Delphian oracles . 

Neutrality or indifference of the Argives, Korky 
raians, and Sicilian Greeks 

Abandonment of the pass of Tempe 

Occupation of Thermopylai by the Greeks 
Leonidas ..... 

Importance of the conflict at Thermopylai 

Damage of the Persian fleet by a storm off the 
nesian coast 

The struggle in Thermopylai 

Value of the traditional history of the struggle 

The Greek fleet at Artemision 

Arrival of the Persian ships at Aphetai 

Victory of the Greeks at Artemision 

Second battle off Artemision . 

Victory and Retreat of the Greeks 

The Greek fleet at Salamis . 

Building of the Isthmian wall 

Depression of the allies .... 



ans to Argolis, Aigina, 



Migration of the Athen: 

Salamis . 
Success of Xerxes 
Ravages of Phokis 
Attack on Delphoi 

Traditions relating to the attack on Delphoi 
Occupation of Athens by Xerxes . 
Resolution of the Peloponnesians to retreat to the 

Isthmus ....... 



under 



Mag- 



and 



PAGE 

153 
153 
154 
154 
155 
156 



158 
160 

161 
162 

l6 3 
164 
168 
170 
171 
172 
172 
173 
173 
174 
174 

175 
175 

175 
176 
176 
177 

178 



Contents. xv 

PAGE 

Opposition of Themistokles 179 

Message of Themistokles to Xerxes . . .180 

The battle of Salamis 181 

Determination of Xerxes to retreat . . .182 

Engagement of Mardonios to finish the conquest of 

Greece 183 

Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassos . . .184 

The pursuit of the Persian fleet by the Greeks aban- 
doned at Andros . . . . . .185 

The retreat of Xerxes 187 

Operations of Artabazos in Chalkidike . . .189 

Capture of Olynthos, and blockade of Potidaia . 189 
Exactions of the Greek allies at Andros and else- 
where ........ 190 

Honors paid to Themistokles by the Spartans . 190 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE BATTLES OF PLATAIA AND MYKALE, AND THE FORMATION 
OF THE ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY. 

479 Efforts of Mardonios to win the friendship of the 

Athenians ....... 191 

192 

193 
194 

195 

196 
196 
196 
197 
198 
198 



Alarm of the Spartans .... 
Second occupation of Athens by the Persians 
Departure of the Spartan army for Attica 
Paction of Mardonios with the Argives . 
Ravaging of Attica, and burning of Athens 
Retreat of Mardonios into Boiotia . 
The feast of Attaginos .... 
March of the allies towards Plataia 
Death of the Persian general Masistios . 
Inaction of both armies .... 
Athenian traditions relating to the preparations for 

battle 199 

B 



XVI 



Contents. 



B.C. 



478 



The battle of Plataia .... 
Storming of the Persian camp 
The gathering of the spoil . . . 
Privileges granted to the Plataians 
The retreat of Artabazos 

Siege of Thebes 

Punishment of the Thebans . 

Voyage of the Greek fleet to Samos 

Retreat of the Persian fleet to My kale . 

Battle of Mykale .... 

Burning of the Persian ships . 

Desire of the Spartans to be freed from further 

cern in the war .... 
The allies at the Hellespont . 
The siege of Lesbos .... 
Death of the satrap Artayktes 
Expedition of the allies to Kypros (Cyprus) 
Reduction of Byzantion 
Formation of the Athenian Confederacy 
Practical end of the struggle with Persia 



PAGE 

. 200 
. 203 
. 203 
. 204 
. 205 
. 205 
. 206 
. 206 
. 207 
. 207 
. 209 

L- 

. 209 
. 209 
. 2IO 
. 211 
. 211 
. 211 
. 212 
. 212 



MAPS. 

Greek and Phenician Colonies . 
Greek Settlements in Asia Minor 
Thermopylai . . . 
Battle of Salamis , 
Battle of Plataia . 



to face Title-page 

to face page 33 

" 160 

" 181 

« 181 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



B. C. 

7630 
? 



?570 

560 

? 



?559 
? 

545 



544 



? 

527 
?525 



? 522 

?520 



93 

58 

59 
85 
36 



38 
4i 

85 
88 

42 

49 

52 
86 

53 
61 



66 



6 7 



Athens . . Conspiracy of Kylon. 
Egypt . .. Founding of Naukratis in the reign of 
Psammitichos. 
Dethronement of Apries by Amasis. 
Athens . . Seizure of the Akropolis by Peisistratos. 
Media . . Defeat and dethronement of Astyages (?) 
by Cyrus, who establishes the Persian 
Empire. 
Assyria . Conquest of Nineveh by Kyaxares and 

Nabopolassar. 
Asia Minor Conquest of the Asiatic Hellenes by 
Kroisos (Croesus), King of Lydia. 
(?) First conquest of Ionia. 
Athens . . Death of Solon. 

Miltiades sent by Hippias as governor of 
the Thrakian Chersonesos. 
Asia Minor Fall of Kroisos The Lydian empire ab- 
sorbed in that of Persia. (?) Second 
conquest of Ionia. 
Revolt of Paktyas against Cyrus. 
Conquest of Lykia by the Persians. (?) 
Third conquest of Ionia. 
Babylon . Siege and capture of Babylon by Cyrus. 
Athens . . Death of Peisistratos. 
Egypt . . Invasion of Kambyses, King of Persia. 

Failure of the Persian Expedition to 
Amoun and Ethiopia; and abandon- 
ment of the expedition against Car^ 
thage. 
Samos . , Death of Polykrates, tyrant of Samos. 
Persia . . Election or accession of Dareios to the 
Persian throne. 
Suppression of the Magian rebellion. 
Babylon . Revolt and conquest of Babylon. 

xvii 



XV111 



Chronological Table. 



PAGE 

73 
77 

86 

28 
84 



93 

94 



125 
95 



96 



105 



106 

108 
106 
108 
117 



Scythia . 
Lemnos . 
Athens . 

Korkyra 
Athens . 



Plataia . 
Eleusis . 



Boiotia , 
Sparta . 



Naxos 



Asia Minor 



Argos . . 



Scythian expedition to Dareios. 

Conquest of Lemnos by Miltiades. 

Conspiracy of Aristogeiton, and death of 
Hipparchos. 

Foundation of the Colony from Corinth. 

Invasion of Kleomenes, king of Sparta, 
who expels Hippias. Fall of THE 
Petsistratidai. 

Factions between the Alkmaionid Kleis- 
thenes, and Isagoras, who is aided by 
Kleomenes. 

Reforms and expulsion of Kleisthenes, 
followed by his return. 

Embassy from Athens to Sardeis, 
to ask for an alliance with the Persian 
king. 

Alliance between Plataia and Athens. 

Demaratos deserts Kleomenes, who is 
compelled to abandon his attempts 
against Athens. 

Victories of the Athenians in Boiotia and 
Euboia. 

Hippias pleads his cause before a congress 
of Peloponnesian allies. 

The Corinthians protest against all inter- 
ference with the internal affairs of inde- 
pendent cities; and Hippias returning 
to Sigeion, busies himself with intrigues 
for the purpose of precipitating the 
power of Persia upon Athens. 

Some oligarchic exiles from Naxos ask 
help from Aristagoras of Miletos, at 
whose request Artaphernes sends Mega* 
bates to reduce the island. 

Ionian Revolt. On the failure of the 
expedition, Aristagoras revolts against 
Dareios, and seeks help first at Sparta, 
where he gets nothing; then at Athens, 
where the people dispatch twenty ships 
in his service. 

Burning of Sardeis by the Ionians and 
Athenians. 

Extension of the Ionian revolt to Byzan- 
tion and Karia. 

Defeat and death of Aristagoras. 

Capture and death of Histiaios 

Defeat of the Ionian fleet at Lade. 

War between Sparta and Argos. 



Chronological Table. 



xix 



B. C. 

? 49 6 
?495 



?492 
? 49 i 

490 



PAGE 
Il8 



489 
486 



485 
484 

48I 
483 



480 



II 4 
115 

II 9 

I20 
I3O 

133 

132 

I40 

158 
141 
I42 

154 

155 

159 
144 

148 
152 
160 

161 
163 



Sparta . . Deposition and exile of Demaratos. 
Death of Kleomenes. 

Miletos . . Fall of Miletos in the sixth year of the 
Ionian Revolt. 
Suppression of the Ionian Revolt. 
Third (? fourth) conquest of Ionia. 

Ionia . . Political reforms of Artaphernes and 
Mardonios. 

Thrace . . Destruction of the fleet of Mardonios by 
a storm on the coast of Athos. 

Athens ") The Persian heralds sent by Dareios are 

and \ said to be thrown into the Barathron at 

Sparta J Athens and into a well at Sparta. 

Naxos . . Artaphernes and Datis, the latter claiming 
to be king of Athens, takes Naxos. 

Euboia . . The town of Eretria is betrayed to the 
Persians. 

Marathon . Landing of Hippias with the Persians at 
Marathon. 
Defeat of the Persians and departure of 
their fleet. 

Paros . . Expedition of Miltiades to Paros. On 
its failure he is sentenced to a fine of 
fifty talents, but dies before it is paid. 

Persia . . Death of Dareios, who is succeeded by 
Xerxes. 
Xerxes makes preparations for the inva- 
sion of Egypt. 

Sicily . . Gelon becomes master of Syracuse. 

Egypt . . Re-conquest of Egypt by Xerxes. 

Persia . . The invasion of Hellas resolved upon by 
Xerxes, who marches to Sardeis. 

Athens . . Ostracism of Aristeides. 

Congress of allies at the isthmus of 

Corinth. 
Mission to Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse. 

Hellespont Construction of the bridges of boats for 
the passage of the army. 

Thrace . . Review of the Persian army at Doriskos. 

Thessaly . Xerxes at the Tempe. 

Abandonment of the pass by the Greeks, 
and consequent Medism of the Thes- 
salians. 

Sparta . June. Departure of Leonidas for Ther- 
mopylae 

Magnesia Destruction of a large portion of the Per- 
sian fleet by a storm on the Magnesian 
coast. 



XX 



Chronological Table. 



B. C. 

480 



479 



PAGE 
I70 



168 



171 



172 



174 
175 



177 

l80 



l8l 
182 

185 
I87 

I89 



I9O 
193 

195 



I96 
197 
200 



Attica . 

Phokis . 

Athens . 
Salamis 



Artemision The Greek fleet takes up its station on 

the northern coast of Euboia. 
Thermopylai March of Hydarnes over Anopaia for the 

purpose of cutting off the Greek army. 
Victory of the Persians, and death of 

Leonidas. 
Euboia . . A Persian squadron sent round Euboia 

to take the Greek fleet in the rear. 
Action off Artemision. The Greeks take 

thirty ships. 
A second storm does further damage to 

the Persian fleet. 
In a second sea-fight the Greeks have the 

advantage, but resolve to retreat to 

Salamis. 
Fortification of the Corinthian isthmus. 
Migration of the people to Argolis, Sala- 
mis, and Aigina. 
Devastation of Phokis by the Persians, 

who are defeated, it is said, at Delphoi. 
Occupation of Athens by Xerxes. 
Themistokles, by sending a message to 

Xerxes, prevents the intended retreat of 

the allies. 
Battle of Salamis. 
Xerxes determines to go home, leaving 

Mardonios to carry on the war. 
Departure of the Persian fleet. 
March of Xerxes through Thessaly and 

Thrace to the Hellespont. 
Siege and capture of Olynthos by Arta- 

bazos, who fails in his attempt on 

Potidaia. 
Siege of Andros by Themistokles. 
Mardonios offers specially favorable terms 

to Athens. 
On their rejection he occupies Athens, but 

abstains from doing any injury to the city 

or country, until he learns, from the 

entrance of the Spartan army into Attica, 

that there was no hope of carrying out 

his plans successfully. 
Boiotia . . Retreat of Mardonios to Thebes after the 

burning of Athens. 
Advance of the allies into the territory of 

Plataia. 
Battle of Plataia. Defeat and death 

of Mardonios. 



Thrace , 



Andros . 
Attica . 



Chronological Table. 



xxi 



PAGE 
205 
203 
205 

207 

207 

2O9 
2IO 



Retreat of Artabazos. 
The Persian camp stormed. 
Siege of Thebes. The Theban prisoners 
put to death at the Corinthian isthmus. 
Mykale . Probably midsummer. The allied fleet 
sails first to Samos, then to Mykale. 
Battle of Mykale. Ruin of the Per- 
sian fleet. 
Foundation of the Athenian empire. 
Lesbos . . Siege of Lesbos. Crucifixion of Ar- 

tayktes. 
Asia Minor Victories of Pausanias at Kypros (Cy- 
prus). 
Byzantion . Reduction of Byzantion. Formation of 
the Athenian confederacy. Practical 
end of the struggle between the Greeks 
and the Persians. 



THE PERSIAN WARS. 



CHAPTER I. 

ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF GREEK CIVILIZATION. 

In all ages of the world's history Eastern empires have 
been great only so long as they have been aggressive. 
In every instance the lust of conquest has 
been followed by satiety, and the result of character of 
luxurious inaction has been speedy decay, history^ 
No other result seems possible where there 
is, in strictness of speech, no national life, no growth 
of intellect, no spirit of personal independence in the 
individual citizen. A society of rude and hardy warriors 
banded together under a fearless leader must crush the 
subjects of a despot who can look back only to the con- 
quests of his forefathers as a pledge for the continuance 
of his prosperity ; but this infusion of new blood brings 
with it no change in the essential condition of things so 
long as the dominion of one irresponsible ruler merely 
gives way to that of another. The rugged mountaineers 
who lay the foundations of empire for their chief become 
the contented retainers of his children or his grand- 
children, and in their turn pass under the yoke of some 
new invader. 



2 The Persian Wars. [ch. i. 

In the sixth century before the Christian era this law 

of growth and decay had made the Persians masters of 

the Eastern world. The lords of Nineveh, 

teM?on d of e *" who h ad P ull ed down from their seat the 

the Persian ancient sovereigns of Babylon, had fallen 

empire. ° ■,- 

beneath the sway of the Median monarch 
and his more vigorous clansmen, and these again had 
found their masters in the hardy followers of the Persian 
Cyrus. Bursting with the force of a winter's torrent 
from the highlands which yielded them but sorry fare, 
the warriors of Iran had overthrown the empires of 
Media and Lydia, and added the wealth of Babylon and 
Egypt to the riches which their fierce enthusiasm had 
won for their kings. 

The conquest of Lydia brought the Persians into 
contact with tribes whose kinsfolk to the west of the 

Egean Sea were to read a stern lesson to the 

Hindrances haughtiest of earthly potentates, to show 

tension 5 them what a spirit of voluntary obedience 

Persian j- i aw can achieve against the armies of a 

power in the ° 

west. despot who drives his slaves to battle with 

a scourge, and to prove that the force of 
freedom may more than counterbalance the evils 
involved in a confederation of cities held together by 
the laxest of bonds. The struggle thus brought about 
between Europe and Asia was, in fact, the struggle be- 
tween orderly government and uncontrolled despo- 
tism,- between law which insures freedom of thought, 
speech, and action, and the license of a tyrant whose 
iniquities can be cut short only by the dagger of the 
assassin. Had the Persian king succeeded here as he 
had succeeded before the walls of Agbatana [Ecbatana], 
of Babylon, and of Memphis, his hordes must have 
spread over the lands lying between the gates of the 



ch. I.] Character of Greek Civilization. 3 

Euxine and the Pillars of Herakles, and have fastened 
on all Europe the yoke which has now for more than 
four hundred years crushed out such freedom as yet 
remained to the subjects of the Byzantine Caesars. The 
Persian King may well be pardoned if he failed to see 
that any obstacles could arrest his progress. The hin- 
drances which first checked and finally foiled him came 
not from any lord of armies as huge as his own, but from 
the citizens of an insignificant town, who were rather 
hampered than aided even by those of their kinsfolk in 
other cities who professed to be most earnest in the desire 
to beat off the invader. The approach of the Persian 
hosts had caused in the Greek cities generally a very 
paralysis of fear. The people of one city only were proof 
against the universal panic, and that city was Athens. 
That the issue of the conflict depended wholly on the 
conduct of the Athenians is the emphatic judgment of 
the only historian who has left to us a narrative of the 
struggle which may almost be regarded as contemporary. 
Herodotus was about six years old when the fall of Sestos 
left the way open for the establishment of the Athenian 
empire, and his life was passed in the disinterested search 
for the evidence which should enable him to exhibit in 
their true light the incidents and issues of the Persian 
wars. Hence the causes of these wars must, it is mani- 
fest, be sought in the previous history of Athens ; and 
this history makes it plain that the incident directly lead- 
ing to the great struggle was the expulsion of the dynasty 
of the Peisistratids, whose downfall was owing to the blow 
struck by Solon against the exclusiveness of the nobles, 
who, styling themselves Eupatridai, had secured to their 
order the whole power of the state. 

This revolution, the most momentous which the world 
has ever yet known, had long been going on among not 



4 The Persian Wars. [ch. i. 

a few of the tribes which gloried in the title 
growth of the of Hellenes or Greeks. The results thus 
Greek race. f ar ma y h ave been uncertain ; but although 
the flow of the title had in some cases been followed by 
an ebb which left them further from the goal aimed at, 
the whole movement marked an uprising of the human 
mind which no other age or country had ever witnessed. 
It was, virtually, the protest that a caste which formed a 
mere fraction of the body politic had no right to usurp 
the government of the whole, and that each citizen was 
entitled to have a share in the making of the laws which 
he was to obey. If the Athenians came to be foremost 
in carrying out this great change, it was not because they 
had been the first to begin it, still less because they pos- 
sessed a power capable of coercing their neighbors, or 
because they were recognized as leaders of the Hellenic 
people generally. 

In truth, the Hellenic or Greek world existed not as 
one of the organized and compact societies to which we 
give the name of nations, but as a set of in- 
the Greek dependent units, animated by feelings of 

Clties - constant suspicion, jealousy, and dislike of 

all except the members of their own city-community. 
Beyond this stage which made the city the final unit of 
society the Greeks, as a whole, never advanced. The 
result of the Persian Wars forced Athens into a position 
which compelled her to carry out a larger and a wiser 
policy : but the history of her empire was simply the 
history of a fierce and unwearied opposition by the 
Spartan confederacy to all efforts tending to substitute a 
common order for the irregular action of individual cities. 
This antagonism brought about the ruin of her confe- 
deracy, and from that time onward Greek history became 
little more than a record of wars directed against each 



CH. I.] Character of Greek Civilization. 5 

city as it attained a degree of power which seemed likeiy 
to threaten the independence of its neighbors. It had 
indeed been little more than this in the times which pre- 
ceded the Persian Wars ; but those times were marked 
by a vigorous intellectual and political growth which 
gave promise of better things than the Greeks themselves 
ever realized, and which has yielded its largest fruits on 
the soil of Britain. 

There was, then, no Greek or Hellenic nation ; and if 
we take into account the conditions under which the 
Hellenic tribes grew up, we shall see that it 

r General 

could not be otherwise. All the forms of character of 
Aryan society, whether these have assumed Greek r Y 
the shape of arbitrary despotism or of con- civilization, 
stitutional freedom, had one starting point, and that 
starting point was the absolute isolation which cut off 
the owner or lord of one house from the owner of every 
other. We may, if we please, speak of this state as little 
better than that of the beast in his den, and perhaps in so 
speaking of it we may not be far wrong. At the least 
we cannot shut our eyes to the evidence which traces 
back the polity of all the Aryan tribes or nations to the 
form of village communities, in which each house is not 
merely a fortress but an inviolable temple. The exclu- 
siveness which survived as a barrier between one Greek 
or Latin city and another had in earlier ages cut off the 
individual house as completely from every other ; and 
thus we are carried back to a time when beyond the 
limits of his own family the world contained for a man 
nothing but his natural and necessary enemies. For 
these, as his foes by birth, he would have no pity, nor 
could he show them mercy in war. In peace he 
could grant them no right of intermarriage, nor regard 
even the lapse of generations as any reason for relaxing 



6 The Persian Wars. [ch. i. 

these conditions. But if elsewhere he was nothing, in 
his own house he was absolute lord. He was master of 
the lives of his children, and his wife was his slave. 
Such a life may present strong points of likeness to that 
of the beast in his den ; but an impulse which insured a 
growth to better things came from the belief in the con- 
tinuity of human life, a belief which we find at work in 
the earliest dawn of human history as read not from 
written records but from the rudest monuments of 
primaeval society. If the owner of the den died, he 
remained not merely its lord as he had been ; he was 
now the object of its worship, its god. He felt all the 
wants, the pains, the pleasures of his former life ; and 
these must be satisfied by food, by clothing, and by the 
attendance of his wife or his slaves, who must be slaugh- 
tered to bear him company in the spirit land. But in 
that land there can be for him no rest, if his body be 
not duly buried ; and the funeral rites can be performed 
only by his legitimate representative — in other words, 
by his son born in lawful wedlock of a woman initiated 
into the family religion. This representative exercised 
his absolute power simply as the vicegerent of the man 
from whom he inherited his authority, and it was con- 
sequently of the first importance that the line of descent 
should be unbroken ; hence the sacredness and the duty 
of marriage, and the penalty of disfranchisement in- 
flicted on the man who refused to comply with it. Hence 
also the necessity of a solemn adoption in cases where 
the natural succession failed. But this adoption, we 
have to note, was essentially religious. The subject of 
it, like the wife on her marriage, renounced his own 
family and the worship of its gods to pass to another 
hearth and the worship of other deities. In fact, the 
master or father of each house or temple knew nothing 



Cii. i.] Character of Greek Civilization. 7 

of the ritual of other families, and acknowledged no 
religious bond connecting him with any one beyond the 
limits of his own house. But with the growth of sons, 
and with their marriage, these limits were necessarily en- 
larged, and thus there came into existence groups of 
houses, the members of each having the same blood 
in their veins and worshipping according to the same 
ritual. These groups formed the clan, — or, in Greek 
phrase, the Phratria or brotherhood with its subordinate 
Gene or families. The process which had thus developed 
the clan from the house showed the possibility of form- 
ing an alliance with other clans without doing violence 
to the religious sentiment. The union was based not on 
the admission of the stranger to the private worship of 
the clan or the house, for this would have been unpar- 
donable profanation, but in adopting a common ritual to 
be followed by the confederates in their character as 
allies. The adoption of this common worship converted 
the group of clans into a tribe ; and one step further, the 
union of tribes in the polis or city on precisely the same 
religious and therefore exclusive principle, marked the 
limit of political growth beyond which the Greeks per- 
sistently refused to advance. 

The fabric of all ancient Aryan society was thus in- 
tensely religious. The sacred fire, not to be tended by 
aliens or foreigners, was maintained perpet- « ,. . 

r r Religious char- 

ually in the Prytaneion, or holy place of the acter of the 
city. Each tribe, or, as the Greek called 
it, each Phyle, had likewise its own altar, its own ritual, 
and its own priests. The same rule was followed by the 
subordinate phratries or clans, while in each house the 
father of the family remained, as he had always been, 
its priest, its lord, and its king. Thus for strangers or 
aliens the state had no more room than the private fam- 



8 The Persian Wars. [ch. i. 

ily. The foreigner had, in strictness of speech, no right 
to protection whether of person or property ; and of real 
property he could have none. His very presence in the 
city was merely a matter of sufferance ; his enfranchise- 
ment would be an insult to the gods, his admission to a 
share in the government a profanation. 

It is clear that these conditions are not likely to pro- 
mote the rapid growth of states, and that the latter could 
not grow at all except at the cost of constant struggle 
and conflict between the possessors of power and those 
who were shut out from it. Nor in these conditions 
could the state find the materials most convenient for 

establishing its own authority. All states 
tarding the ar ^ necessarily intolerant of independent 
civiTpower 116 jurisdictions within their own borders ; and 

the absolute authority of the father or mas- 
ter over all the members of his household was as much 
an alien jurisdiction as any which the Popes have ever 
attempted to exercise in Christendom. It is certain, 
therefore, that the "patria potestas " or the father's 
power, in the old Roman law, far from being a creation 
of the state, was one of those earlier social conditions 
which the state was content to modify only because it 
had not the strength to do away with it ; and thus we 
see that two contests were going on side by side — the one 
in which the civil power sought to rough-hew to its own 
purposes materials by no means promising, — the other in 
which that part of the people who had no political rights 
strove to secure to themselves a due share of them. It 
is the latter struggle which distinguishes Greek History 
and in a more marked degree that of Rome from the 
monotony of Oriental annals in which even rebellion 
against intolerable tyranny ends only in exchanging one 
despot for another. But for the noble families who were 



ch. I.] Character of Greek Civilization. 9 

possessed of power this strife was essentially one of re- 
ligion. The sanction which constituted the authority of 
the magistrate bearing rule over a city, that is over an 
aggregate of families, was precisely the sanction by which 
the head of each family ruled over his own household. 
The first duty of both was, therefore, to the gods, whose 
priests they were by virtue of birth and blood : and the 
plebeian who on the strength of votes given by his fellow- 
plebeians claimed to share their power was in their eyes 
not only giving strength to a movement which might 
end in the rule of the mob, but offering a direct insult to 
the majesty of the gods. 

But if the Polis, or City, as an organized society, was 
of slow growth, the barriers which separated one city 
from another were never thrown down at 
all; and when in the days of her greatness ultimate unit 
Athens established or sought to maintain an sodeity k 
empire which could not, if it lasted, fail to 
soften and remove these ancient prejudices, she did so 
at the cost of trampling conventional notions under foot 
and setting up an admitted tyranny. She was attempt- 
ing to weld in some sort into a single society a number 
of units for whom isolation was as the breath of life, 
and to extend to all the members of her confederacy the 
benefits of an equal law. The very attempt was an 
offence to men who regarded all except their own citizens 
as beyond the pale of law, and for whom exile became 
therefore a penalty not less terrible than death. Happily, 
even the worst principles of action become modified in 
the course of ages ; and the evils of this religious ex- 
clusiveness were in some degree mitigated by the union 
of the small demoi, or boroughs, in the immediate neigh- 
borhood of the great cities. For Attica this change for 
the better was effected by the consolidation ascribed to 
c 



io The Persian Wars. [ch. I. 

Theseus, and Athens thus became the political centre 
of a territory occupying a space equal to that of one of 
the smaller English counties. But the general condition 
of the country remained what it had been before. Men 
as closely allied in blood as the inhabitants of York and 
Bristol, Sheffield and Birmingham, still regarded the 
power of making war upon each other as the highest of 
their privileges, and looked upon the exercise of this 
power not as a stern necessity but as a common incident 
in the ordinary course of things. The mischief lay 
wholly in the theory that the city was the ultimate unit 
of society ; and with this theory it was inevitable, for 
according to this hypothesis the city was an aggrega- 
tion of men each one of whom must have his place in 
the great council and take his share in the work of legis- 
lation and government. Such parliaments are known 
as Primary Assemblies ; and with such parliaments the 
population of such a city as that of Liverpool became an 
unmanageable multitude. In the opinion of Aristotle 
ten myriads were as much in excess, as ten men were in 
defect, of the numbers needed for the fit constitution of a 
city ; and as it was impossible for the Greeks to conceive 
that a body of men might give their votes through a 
common representative, it followed that those who had 
no place in the primary assembly had no political rights, 
and were as much aliens, though they might not be 
foreigners, as the savage who wandered with his wife 
and children over the Scythian deserts. 

But in spite of this exclusiveness and isolation between 

city and city, a certain feeling of kinship had sprung up 

before the dawn of contemporary history 

charaaerfs- between the tribes which were in the habit 

Greeks*" °^ ca ^ nn g themselves Greeks, or rather 

Hellenes ; and in the customs and usages 



CH. I.] Character of Greek Civilization. n 

which distinguished them from other tribes we have 
characteristics which may broadly be regarded as na- 
tional. The most powerful of the bonds which thus 
linked them together was probably that of language. It 
is quite possible that the religion of any given tribe might 
bear the closest resemblance to that of the Hellenes ; 
but if the former worshipped the same gods under dif- 
ferent names, it is certain that the Greeks would fail to 
see and would refuse to admit the likeness. Educated 
travelers like the historian Herodotus might feel in- 
terested in the stories of Egyptian priests who assured 
him that the Greek name Athene for the dawn-goddess 
was but their Neith read backwards ; but by his country- 
men generally such statements would be received with a 
dull incredulity. If neither the names nor the language 
in which they occurred were intelligible to them, the 
Greek would at once assume their complete diversity. 
Of any mode of determining the affinities of dialects be- 
yond the fact that he either could or could not under- 
stand them, he had, of course, not the faintest concep- 
tion. Those who spoke a tongue which had for him no 
meaning were barbarous speakers of barbarous lan- 
guages, although grammatically their dialect might be 
more nearly akin to the Greek than were some of those 
which passed as Hellenic. Knowing nothing of the laws 
which regulate phonetic changes, the Greeks were 
naturally guided wholly by sound ; and as identity of 
sound between words in different languages is in general 
conclusive evidence of their diversity, it follows that their 
judgments in such matters were of extremely little worth. 
But the distinctions thus ignorantly drawn were politically 
of the utmost importance ; and the conflict of the Per- 
sian Wars thus becomes a struggle of the Greeks against 
barbarians, or, to put it more strictly, of men speaking 



12 The Persia?! Wars. [ch. I. 

an intelligible language against shaggy and repulsive 
monsters whose speech resembled the inarticulate utter- 
ances of brutes. 

Even with these points of likeness in their language 
and their religion, it might be thought that the vast 
social and intellectual differences between 
between the the lowest and the most advanced of the 
the ee S ubjects Greek tribes rendered all general compari- 
of eastern sons impossible. Yet if we contrast them 

empires. r 

with the subjects of the great Asiatic em- 
pires, we must at once mark distinctions which fully jus- 
tify us in speaking of a Greek national character. For 
the Assyrian or the Persian, the human body was a thing 
to be insulted and mutilated at his will, to be disgraced 
by servile prostrations, or to be offered in sacrifice to 
wrathful and bloodthirsty deities. For him woman was 
a mere chattel, while his children were possessions of 
which he might make profit by selling them into slavery. 
Of these abominable usages the Greek practically knew 
nothing ; and as he would have shrunk from the goug- 
ing out of eyes and the slitting of ears and noses, so on 
the other hand the sight of the unclothed body which 
carried to the Oriental a sense of unseemliness and 
shame filled him with delight, and the exhibition of this 
form in games of strength and skill became, through 
the great festivals of the separate or collected tribes, 
bound up intimately with his religion. Yet further this 
respect for the person was accompanied by a moral self- 
respect, which would submit to no unseemly humilia- 
tions. The Greek despot might be guarded by the 
spears of foreign mercenaries, but his subjects would as 
soon have thought of returning to primitive cannibalism 
as of approaching him with the slavish adoration of 
Persian nobles. 



ch. I.] Character of Greek Civilization. 13 

When we turn to the social and intellectual education 
of the Greeks, we can realize better the vast differences 
which separated them from their non- Influence f 
Hellenic neighbors. In the earlier ages the the great 
hearth and altar of each family had been t he education 
the spots where its members had met to of the Greeks. 
hold their common festivals. With the union of the 
clans in a tribe and of the tribes in the Polis or City, 
these feasts were thrown open to larger numbers. As 
these gatherings were purely religious, there were no 
hindrances to the union, at such times, of all clans and 
tribes recognized as sprang from the same stock ; and 
thus from the insignificant celebrations of the family or 
the clan sprang the magnificent assemblies which made 
the names of Olympia and Pytho, of Delos and of 
Nemea famous, while the guardianship of the great 
temples reared at these places, furnished yet another 
bond of religious union. The full influence of these 
splendid festivals on the education of the people at 
large cannot easily be realized ; but to some extent we 
may understand the charm which attracted to them, all 
that was noble and generous through the wide range of 
Greek society, as we read the stirring strains of the great 
Delian Hymns, and throw ourselves into the feelings of 
the men who heard from the lips of the poets them- 
selves, the exquisite music of lyric songs, such as no 
other age or land has ever equalled. But although from 
these great religious gatherings, the Greek returned 
home ennobled by the stirring associations with which 
these festivals were surrounded, he was brought none 
the nearer to that English feeling which would regard as 
treason the mere thought of war between neighboring 
cities or villages. He took pride in being a Hellen; but 
he was as far as ever from wishing to merge the sover- 



14 The Persian Wars. [ch. I. 

eign authority of his city under a central government 
which should substitute common action in behalf of the 
general good for incessant faction, rivalry, and open 
war. Nor, although he had for the most part learnt to 
look with contempt on anything wider and narrower 
than the Polis, can we say that all relics of a ruder state 
of society had wholly passed away. In various portions 
of Hellas the system of village communities still held its 
ground. The Spartan boasted that his city had no walls, 
and the historian, Thucydides, pointed to the four ham- 
lets of which it was composed, with the remark that 
Sparta in ruins would never tell the tale of its former 
greatness. This life of villages was kept up not merely 
throughout Epeiros, where it has continued to our own 
day, but generally throughout the northwestern half of 
the peninsula of Peloponnesos. 

But the great characteristic which distinguished the 
most advanced of the Greeks from all other tribes or 
peoples was their assertion of intellectual 
growth 1 of independence. By them first the powers of 

losophy 111 " ^ e mm d were resolutely used for the dis- 
covery of truth ; and the fact that any such 
attempt was made at the cost of whatever failures and 
delusions marked the great chasm between the eastern 
and western Aryans, and insured the growth of the 
science of modern Europe. The Greek found himself 
the member of a human society with definite duties and 
a law which both challenged and commended itself to 
his allegiance. But if the thought of this law and these 
duties might set him pondering on the nature and source 
of his obligations, he was surrounded by objects which 
carried his mind on to inquiries of a wider compass. He 
found himself in a world of everlasting change. Dark- 
ness gave place to light ; winter to summer. By day the 



ch. i.] Character of Greek Civilization. 13 

sun journeyed alone across the heaven : by night were 
seen myriads of lights, some like motionless thrones, 
other moving in intricate courses. Sometimes living 
fires might leap with a deafening roar from the sky, or 
the earth might quake beneath their feet and swallow 
man and his works in its yawning jaws. Whence came 
all these wonderful or terrible things ? What was the 
wind which crashed among the trees or spoke to the 
heart with its heavenly music ? These and a thousand 
other questions were asked again and again, and all in 
one stage of thought received an adequate answer. All 
things were alive ; most things were conscious beings ; 
and all the phenomena of the universe were but the ac- 
tions of these personal agents. If in autumn the leaves 
fell and the earth put on a mourning garb, this was be- 
cause Persephond, the summer child, had been stolen 
from the Great Mother, and because her sorrow could 
not be lightened until the maiden could be brought back 
to the joyous trysting place of Eleusis. These mytho- 
logical explanations might be developed to any extent ; 
but they amount to nothing more than the assertion that 
all phenomena are the acts of individual beings. The 
weak point of the system lay in the forming of cosmo- 
gonies. It might be easy to say that the mountain and 
the sea, that Erebos and Night, were all the children of 
Chaos : but whence came Chaos ? In other words, 
whence came all things ? The weakest attempt to 
answer this question marked a revolution in thought ; 
and the Greek who first nerved himself to the effort 
achieved a task beyond the powers of Babylonian and 
Egyptian priests with all their wealth of astronomical 
observations. He began a new work, and he set about 
its accomplishment by the application of a new method. 
Henceforth the object to be aimed at was a knowledge 



1 6 The Persian Wars. [ch. ii. 

of things in themselves, and the test of the truth or 
falsity of the theory must be the measure in which it ex- 
plained or disagreed with ascertained facts. The first 
steps might be like the painful and uncertain totterings 
of infants : but the human mind had now begun the 
search for truth, and the torch thus lit was to be handed 
down from one Greek thinker to another, and from these 
to Galileo, Copernicus, and Newton. 



CHAPTER II. 

SETTLEMENT AND GOVERNMENT OF THE GREEKS. 

The Hellenic tribes, so far as they were held together at 
all, were held together by bonds which were purely re- 
ligious : and as there was no reason why this 
Extent of religious bond should be weakened by geo- 

the Hellenic ,.',,. , , \ , 

world. graphical distance, so there was absolutely 

none why geographical nearness should give 
to this union of thought, feeling, and worship a political 
character. The colonists sent out from Sparta, Corinth, 
or Athens remained as strictly Hellenes as those who 
stayed at home ; and the spots which they chose for their 
abode became as much (and for the same reason) a por- 
tion of Hellas as the soil which contained the sacred 
hearth of the mother city. Hence at no time was Hellas 
a strictly defined geographical term. Its bounds might 
expand or contract with the fortunes of the race : and 
although the whole country between the range of the 
Kambounian (Cambunian) mountains and the south- 
ernmost promontories of the Peloponnesos was in the 
possession of Hellenic tribes, or of tribes supposed to 



CH. II.] The Hellenic World. 17 

be Hellenic, the southern half of the Peninsula of Italy 
boasted even a prouder designation, and the splendid 
cities which studded its beautiful shores constituted the 
Great Greece, (Megale Hellas or Magna Graecia), which 
in its magnificent ruins has left ample evidence of its 
ancient wealth and grandeur. Not less rich and power- 
ful were the Greek colonies which contested with Car- 
thage the dominion of Sicily, and which but for the 
political disunion which was the bane of Greek society 
must have raised an almost insuperable barrier to the 
growth of imperial Rome. But far beyond these limits 
the Greeks carried with them both their name and their 
country, in some places compelled to content themselves 
with a scanty domain on the coast, in others inserting 
themselves like a wedge and winning a large extent of 
territory, yet never losing the consciousness that, not less 
than the citizens of Athens or of Sparta, they belonged 
to a race which stood in the front ranks of mankind. 
From the distant banks of the Tanais on the north- 
eastern shore of the Euxine, from Trapezous and Sinope 
on its southern coast to the island of Sardinia and the 
mouths of the Rhone, from the colonies planted on 
Iberian territory, which we now call Spain, to the magnifi- 
cent cities which rose on the coasts of northern Africa, 
the Greek might be seen, everywhere presenting the 
same characteristics with his near or his distant kinsmen, 
and everywhere marked off by language, religion, 
thought, and law from the tribes which he had conquered 
or driven from their homes. The measure of this affinity 
was expressed in the Greek mythical genealogies which 
traced the several tribes to Doros, Ion, and Aiolos 
[yEolus], and through these to their father or grandsire 
Hellen ; but these genealogies assumed many shapes, 
and most of the names occurring in them tell their own 



l8 The Persian Wars. [ch. n. 

tale. The tribesmen who boasted that they belonged 
to the Dorian, Ionian, or Aiolian races believed undoubt- 
edly in the historical existence of these mythical pro- 
genitors ; but the belief of one tribe or race contradicted 
more or less the belief of the rest, while a comparison 
of the traditions makes it clear that the Hellenes are by 
their name simply the children of the light and the sun, 
and that the Hellespont marks their pathway. They 
who claimed for themselves this title would naturally 
speak of their westward neighbors as the grey folk or 
people of the gloaming, — in other words as Graioi, 
Grasci, or Greeks. With these western tribes the Romans 
first came into contact, and thus the name became a 
designation for the whole Hellenic race. 

It was then only for the sake of convenience that geo- 
graphers spoke of the country lying between the Kam- 

r, , bounian mountains and the southern pro- 

Geography r 

of northern montories of the Peloponnesos as Continu- 

Greece 

ous or Continental Hellas : and so thoroughly 
were the scattered Greek settlements regarded as parts 
of Hellas that the name Hellas Sporadike (Dispersed 
Hellas), to denote these cities, was very rarely used. 
But there can be little doubt that the physical features of 
the country called by geographers Continuous or Con- 
tinental Hellas, as being their earlier home in Europe, 
had very much to do with determining the character and 
shaping the history of the Hellenic tribes. Throughout 
its area, the whole of which scarcely exceeds that of 
Ireland, the geography is singularly distinct and marked. 
In the extreme north-east the stream of the Peneios car- 
ries through the far-famed vale of Tempe, which sepa- 
rates mount Ossa from Olympos and the Kambounian 
range, the waters of the great Thessalian plain, a square 
60 miles in length and breadth, with the mighty mass of 



ch. ii.] The Hellenic World. 19 

Olympos, nearly 10,000 feet in height, for its northern 
wall, with the huge chain of Pindos running at right 
angles to the Kambounian range for its western ram- 
part, and shut in to the south by Tymphrestos and 
Othrys, which jut off eastwards from Pindos and end in 
the highlands between the Malian and Pagasaian gulfs. 
From the latter gulf northwards, the eastern wall of 
Thessaly is formed by the masses of Pelion and Ossa, 
to the east of which lies the narrow strip of Magnesia, 
terrible for its rugged coast and the storms which were 
to bring disaster to the fleets of the Persian king. Sepa- 
rated from Thessaly by the barrier of Tymphrestos and 
Othrys, the fertile valley of the Spercheios is shut in on 
its southern side by the great chain of Oita, which, ex- 
tending to the Malian gulf, leaves between its base and 
the sea only the narrow pass of Thermopylae To the 
southwest of Oita the lands to the north of the Corinthian 
gulf are for the most part occupied by the wilderness of 
mountains which formed the fastnesses of Aitolian and 
Akarnanian tribes. To the southeast the range extends 
with but little interruption under the names of Parnas- 
sos, Helikon, and Kithairon (Cithaeron), leaving to the 
north the rugged territory of Phokis and the more fertile 
region of Boiotia. 

With the chain of Parnes to the east, from which it 
is separated by the pass of Phyle, Kithairon forms the 
northern wall of Attica, which stretches 

Geography 

from the eastern end of the Corinthian gulf of the Peio- 
to the headland of Rhamnous and rises up P° nnesos - 
as the background of the plain of Marathon. To the 
southwest of Kithairon the ridges of Aigiplanktos and 
Geraneia, forming the backbone of the Corinthian isth- 
mus, are connected by the Akrokorinthos with that 
labyrinth of mountains which, having started as a con- 



zo The Persian Wars. [ch. ii. 

tinuation of the Aitolian highlands from the western end 
of the gulf, rise up as an impregnable fortress in the 
heart of the Peloponnesos, leaving to the north the long 
and narrow region known as the historical Achaia. To 
the south of this mass of mountains and dividing the 
southern half of Peloponnesos into two nearly equal 
portions, the rugged chain of Taygetos runs on to its ab- 
rupt termination in cape Tainaros. Following a nearly 
parallel course about 30 miles to the east, another range 
leaves between itself and the sea a strip of land not un- 
like the Thessalian Magnesia, and ends with the formida- 
ble cape of Maleai, to reappear in the island of Kythera, 
and again as the backbone of mountains running along 
the island of Krete. 

Of all this country, which consists generally of grey 
limestone, less than half is capable of cultivation, and 
even at the best of times a large portion of 
line of " this land lay idle. Of the mountains many 

Greece. are altogether barren : others, if not well 

wooded, supply pastures for flocks when the lowlands 
are burnt up in summer. Nor are the difficulties which 
the multitude of mountains raises in the way of inter- 
course between the inhabitants removed by the presence 
of any considerable rivers, the Greek streams being for 
the most part raging torrents in winter and dry beds in 
the summer. There was in fact one circumstance only 
which kept the Greeks from remaining on a level with 
the half-civilized or wholly savage tribes of Thrace or 
Epeiros [Epirus]. Not only were they every where within 
reach of the sea, but in a country less in area than Por- 
tugal they had a seaboard equal in extent to that of Por- 
tugal and Spain together. The island of Euboia, with 
an area of less than 1,500 square miles, furnishes with 
the opposite shores of Lokris, Boiotia, and Attica, a 



ch. il] The Hellenic World. 21 

coast-line of not less than 300 miles. Still more im- 
portant was the isthmus which separated by a narrow 
neck, only three miles and a half in breadth, the waters 
of the Corinthian from those of the Saronic gulf, thus 
affording to merchants and travelers the advantages of a 
transit across the isthmus of Panama as compared with 
the voyage round Cape Horn. Pre-eminently favored 
in situation, Attica was practically an island from which 
ships could issue in all directions, while the Athenians 
could cut orTaccess through the narrow strait of the Euripos. 
Of the several tribes which held possession of this 
country in the ages immediately preceding the Persian 
wars we need notice those only whose his- The xhessa- 
tory has a bearing on the incidents and for- lians - 
tunes of that great struggle. Foremost geographically, 
and formidable unhappily only to the weaker side in any 
contest, came the Thessalians, as dwelling in a land 
which must be the highway for all invaders of southern 
Hellas. Lords of the rich plains watered by the Peneios, 
the Thessalian nobles, drawing their revenues from the 
lands in the neighborhood of their cities, spent their time 
in feuds and feasting and the management of their 
splendid breed of horses. From these turbulent oli- 
garchs, who held in subjection, under the name of 
Penestai or working-men, the earlier inhabitants of the 
country, not much unity of action was to be expected. 
The Thessalian Tagos answered to the English Bret- 
walda or to the dictator chosen, like Lars Porsena, to 
head the Etruscan clans ; but fierce feuds often made 
the election of this officer impossible. In short, the 
normal condition of Thessaly was much like that of the 
savage Thrakian tribes of the Balkan islands whom in the 
judgment of Herodotus union would have rendered in- 
vincible but who for lack of it did little or nothing. 



22 The Persian Wars. [ch. n. 

In historical importance the Thessalians are far sur- 
passed by the Boiotians, whose theory even from prehis- 
toric times seems to have been that the 
The Boio- whole country stretching from the base of 

the Parnassos to the Euboian sea, and from 
the lands of the Opountian Lokrians to the Corinthian 
gulf was the inalienable possession of their confederacy, 
of which during the historical ages Thebes was undoubt- 
edly the head. The affairs of the autonomous or inde- 
pendent cities leagued together in this alliance were man- 
aged by magistrates annually chosen under the title of 
Boiotarchs ; but the tyrannical oligarchies which ruled 
in these towns were, we are told, like the Thessalian 
nobles, the headers of an indifferent, if not of an actually 
hostile, commonalty. If the statement be true, the con- 
duct ascribed to the Boiotians during the struggle with 
Persia is in great part explained. 

If from these communities to the north of the Corin- 
thian gulf we turn to the Peloponnesos at the beginning 
of the historical age, we find that the prepon- 
The Spar- derant state is Sparta. Her territory includes 
nearly the southern half of the peninsula. 
She has thus swallowed up all Messene to the west and 
no small portion of land which had once been under the 
dominion of Argos. There had indeed been a time in 
which the name Argos had denoted not merely the city 
which held aloof from the struggle with Xerxes but the 
whole of the Peloponnesos and many a district lying be- 
yond its limits ; and therefore the power of Argos was 
already shrunk when she was deprived of that strip of 
land, which stretching from Thyrea to the Malean cape, 
is cut off, like Magnesia, by the range of Thornax and 
Zarex from the valley of the Eurotas. Both here and else- 
where the fortune of war had favored Sparta. The power 



CH. II.] The Helle7iic World. 23 

of Argos had gone down before her arms ; two wars had 
sufficed to bring ruin on Messene and the conquerors, 
having extended their borders to the eastern and 
western seas, not merely became the head of the Dorian 
tribes, but acquired a power which made itself felt 
throughout Hellas, and to a certain extent succeeded in 
enforcing a common law. Forming strictly an army of 
occupation in a conquered country, they filled a position 
closely analogous to that of William the Conqueror and 
his Normans in England, and maintained it with an as- 
cetic discipline which William would have found it diffi- 
cult to impose upon his followers. To the Spartan citi- 
zen the freedom and independence of home life were 
forbidden privileges. His life must be passed under 
arms, he himself must be ready for instant battle, his 
meals must be taken in public messes, in which the 
quantity and quality of the food were determined by 
strict rule, and to which he must contribute his yearly 
quota on pain of disfranchisement. The monastic se- 
verity of this system has caused Sparta to be regarded 
by some as the type and model of a Doric state ; but 
such a reputation would probably have carried with it no 
compliment to the Spartans themselves. Not even in 
Krete, from which these peculiar institutions are said to 
have been derived, could those characteristics be seen 
which made Sparta an encampment of crusading knights 
and compelled her to wage war not only against luxury, 
but generally against art, refinement, and philosophy. 

The internal government of this singular people was 
a close oligarchy, at the head of which, rather in nominal 
than in real pre-eminence, stood the two co- 
ordinate kings, both professedly having in £ he s .P ar . tan 
their veins the blood of the peerless hero 
Herakles, and representing severally the twin sons of 



24 The Persian Wars. [ch. ii. 

his descendant Aristodemos. If constant jealousy and 
opposition be an evidence of lineage, the kings were 
certainly of no spurious birth ; but by the Spartans these 
dissensions were cheerfully tolerated, as a security against 
any violent usurpation of despotic authority by either of 
the two. Nor were other checks wanting to curb a power 
which originally had been great. The Gerosia, or senate 
of twenty-eight old men, was entrusted with the task of 
preparing, in concert with the kings, the measures which 
were to be submitted for the acceptance or rejection of 
the popular assemblies held periodically in the open air ; 
but the executive board of the five Ephors or overseers, 
elected by the general body of Spartiatai or full Spartan 
citizens, exercised a more important control in the state. 
By an oath interchanged every month, the kings under- 
took to exercise their functions in accordance with the 
established laws, while on this condition the Ephors 
pledged themselves to uphold their authority. In earlier 
ages the kings had had the right of declaring war at 
will ; but this power had been gradually usurped by the 
Ephors, two of whom always accompanied the kings on 
military expeditions, thus still further tying their hands, 
even while they appeared to strengthen them by giving 
effect to their orders. 

The population of the Spartan territories was marked 

off into three classes, the Spartiatai, the Perioikoi, or 

"near dwellers," and the Helots. Of these 

The popula- t h e fi rst j n relation to the other inhabitants 

tion ot 

Lakonia. were, like the Thessalian nobles, feudal 

lords, supported entirely from their lands, 
and regarding all labor, whether agricultural or me- 
chanical, as derogatory to their dignity. In relation 
to one another they were soldiers whose equality was 
expressed by their title of Homoioi or peers ; but the 



CH. II.] The Hellenic World. 25 

penalty which inflicted disfranchisement on those who 
failed to pay their yearly contributions to the public 
messes was constantly throwing off a number of landless 
and moneyless men, known as Hypomeiones or inferiors, 
and answering closely to the " mean whites " of the late 
slave-holding states of the American union. These 
degraded citizens were thus placed on the same level 
with the Perioikoi who, like the Helots, had fallen under 
the dominion of the Dorian invaders, and who retained 
their personal freedom while they forfeited all political 
power. Less fortunate than the Perioikoi, their former 
masters, the Helots sank a step lower still, and became 
serfs attached to the soil, their lot being in some measure 
lightened by the fact that they were the property not of 
individual owners but of the state, which could at any 
time call upon them for military service and which they 
served sometimes as heavy-armed but most commonly 
as light-armed troops. Of these two classes, the Perioi- 
koi acquired wealth through the various trades on which 
the Spartan looked down with contempt ; the Helots, as 
cultivators of the soil, gained strength with the increase 
of their numbers, while the degraded Spartan citizens 
formed a body more discontented perhaps and more 
dangerous than either. 

Such a state of things was not one to justify any strong 
feeling of security on the part of the rulers ; and thus 
we find that the Spartans regarded the sub- 
ject population with constant anxiety. The The military 
ephors could put Perioikoi to death without Sp S arta.° 
trial; crowds of Helots, it is said, dis- 
appeared for ever when their lives seemed to endanger 
the supremacy of their masters ; and in the police insti- 
tution called the Krypteia, the young citizens were 
employed to carry out a system of espionage throughout 
D 



26 The Persian Wars. [ch. ii. 

Lakonia. But with all its faults the Spartan constitu- 
tion fairly answered its purpose and challenged the 
respect of the Hellenic world, while the geographical 
position of the four hamlets which according to the old 
system of village communities made up the unwalled 
city of Sparta secured it practically against all attacks 
from foreign enemies. Built on a plain girt by a rampart of 
mountains broken only by the two converging passes 
of the Eurotas and the Oinos, Sparta could, in fact, afford 
to dispense with walls, while the retention of unfortified 
villages was the best guarantee for the maintenance of a 
drill and discipline more strict than that of any other 
Hellenic state. Bringing obedience to perfection, this 
system at the same time so exercised the sagacity of the 
individual citizen that no disaster in the field could 
prevent the Spartan companies from returning, if broken 
to their proper order. The Athenian fought among the 
men of his tribe, an unwieldy mass imperfectly under 
the control of their Taxiarchos or captain : the Spartan 
system, caring nothing for social or political distinctions, 
distributed the citizens into small groups in which every 
man knew his place and his duty. With these conditions 
there is nothing to surprise us if in the earliest historical 
age we find Sparta not merely supreme in the Pelopon- 
nesos but tacitly or openly recognised as the head of the 
communities which bore the Hellenic name. Her 
marked superiority was of benefit to the Greek tribes 
generally so far as it supplied a bond of union to societies 
which would never have coalesced with or submitted 
themselves to one another. 

To the refinements of art Sparta made no pretension, 

and the splendor which afterwards made Athens a 

wonder of the world was still a thing of the 

the Greek future when Greek colonies in Italy, Sicily, 

colonies. 



ch. ii.] The Hellenic World. 27 

and Africa had risen to magnificence, and were 
already declining or had fallen into ruin. Regarded 
thus, the history of the Persian wars is, it might be 
urged, the history of Greece in its decline ; but riches and 
prosperity constitute of themselves but a poor title to 
the memory of after ages, and there is by comparison 
little to instruct or to interest us in the fortunes of a 
number of independent and isolated societies which 
might go on for ever without adding a jot to the sum of 
a common experience. Yet it is impossible to re- 
gard without admiration that wonderful energy and bold- 
ness which encompassed the Mediterranean with a gir- 
dle of Hellenic colonies, and raised up cities rich with the 
grandest works of art and graced with the refinements 
of a luxurious civilization in the midst of savage or half- 
barbarous tribes destitute for the most part of all powers 
of self-discipline and lacking all faculties for political 
growth. 

But in reference to the great conflict between the 
Greeks and the Persians it is especially remarkable that 
in this golden age of Hellenic colonization „ , 

a 1 ■ -1 1 • , -. , Greek colo- 

Athens is altogether in the background, and nies in Italy 
but for the foundation of one or two settle- an 1C1 y * 
ments, as of Amphipolis on the north of the Strymon, 
might almost be regarded as invisible. Chalkis and 
Corinth, Eretria and Megara outstrip her in the race 
whether in Italy or Sicily, or on the coasts of Thrace 
and the Propontis. It might almost seem that these 
states, which had reached their maturity before Athe- 
nian citizens had awakened to a sense of their political 
duties, exhausted themselves in the multiplication of iso- 
lated units, while the strength of Athens was reserved 
for the great conflict which determined the future course 
of European history. But isolated though these units 



28 The Persian Wars. [ch. ii. 

may have been, cf their astonishing splendor and wealth 
there can be no question whatever. In Sicily the Greeks 
found a land of singular fertility, the resources of which, 
especially in its eastern and southern portions, had never 
been systematically drawn out. The neighboring Italian 
peninsula had for them even greater attractions. On 
either side of the mountain range which forms its back- 
bone magnificent forests rose above valleys of marvel- 
ous fertility, and pastures green in the depth of summer 
sloped down to plains which received the flocks and 
herds on the approach of winter. The exuberance of 
this teeming soil in wine, oil, and grain, veiled the perils 
involved in a region of great volcanic activity. This 
mighty force has in recent ages done much towards 
changing the face of the land, while many parts have 
become unhealthy and noxious which five-and-twenty 
centuries ago had no such evil reputation. When we 
allow for the effects of these causes, and subtract further 
the results of misgovernment, if not of anarchy, ex- 
tended over centuries, we may form some idea of the 
wealth and splendor of the land in the palmy days of 
Kroton and Sybaris, of Thourioi [Thurii], Siris, Taras 
[Tarentum], and Metapontion. Possessing the only per- 
fect harbor in southern Italy, Taras not merely grew into 
a democracy as pronounced as that of Athens, but fur- 
thered, in a greater degree perhaps than any other Greek 
colony, that spreading of the new element into the in- 
terior which obtained for this portion of the Italian pe- 
ninsula the name of Megale Hellas (Magna Graecia, Great 
Greece). 

Nearer to the old country was planted the Corinthian 
colony which converted the beautiful island of Korkyra 
Corinth and (Corcyra) into a battle-ground of blood- 
Korkyra. thirsty and vindictive factions. Severed from 



ch. ii.] The Hellenic World. 29 

the mainland by a strait at its northern end, scarcely- 
wider than that of Euripos, it had the advantage of an 
insular position against attack from without, while its 
moderate size, not exceeding forty miles in length, by 
half that distance in width, involved none of the diffi- 
culties and dangers of settlement on a coast-line with 
barbarous and perhaps hostile tribes in the rear. No- 
where rising to a greater height than 3,000 feet, the high- 
lands of the northern end, which give to the island its 
modern name of Korupho (Corfu), subside into abroken 
and plain country, now covered in great part with olive 
woods planted under Venetian rule, but capable of yield- 
ing everywhere abundant harvests of grain and wine. 
Here, it might be thought, a colony would have sprung 
up to be classed among the most peaceful of Hellenic 
communities : here, in fact, grew up perhaps the most 
turbulent and ferocious of Greek societies. Alliance 
with Athens did little to soften the violence of their pas- 
sions ; and the rapid development of the feud between 
the Korkyraian colony and the mother city of Corinth, 
may be attested by the tradition that the first naval battle 
of the Greeks was fought by the fleets of these two cities. 
The mainland facing Korkyra was the habitation of a 
number of tribes, some of which were regarded as be- 
longing in some sort to the Hellenic stock, Epeirotsand 
while others were looked upon as mere bar- ^northern 
barians. Nay, their claim to be considered Hellas. 
Hellenes was admitted by some and rejected by others, 
a fact sufficiently proving the looseness of the theories 
which sought to define the limits of the Hellenic world. 
Socially and morally these tribes stood much on the 
same level. The physical features of the country, 
broken up throughout by hills and mountains, made the 
growth of cities impossible ; and even the village com- 



30 The Persian Wars. [ch. n. 

munities scattered over this wild region were linked to- 
gether, if joined at all, by the slenderest of bonds. Of 
these tribes the most reputable were the Akarnanians, 
whose lack of cunning gave to their brutal Aitolian 
neighbors a decided advantage over them. The tribes 
to the north, known to the southern Greeks under the 
common name of Epeirotai, or people of the mainland, 
were distinguished among themselves as Chaonians, 
Thesprotians, Molossians, or by other names ; and to 
some of these also, we find one historian denying the 
Hellenic character which is conceded to them by 
another. Still further to the north and the east stretched 
a vast region occupied by races more or less nearly akin 
to each other, and all perhaps having some affinity with 
the ruder Hellenic clans, although even by the latter, 
the kindred would probably have been denied. Of these 
tribes the most prominent are the Illyrians, Makedo- 
nians, and Thrakians, each of these being subdivided 
into several subordinate tribes, and all contributing 
characteristics common to the dwellers in countries 
which present an effectual barrier to political union and 
the life of cities. By far the larger portion of this enor- 
mous region is occupied by mountains often savage in 
their ruggedness, and almost everywhere presenting im- 
passable barriers to the march of armies. At best, there- 
fore, we find the inhabitants dwelling in village commu- 
nities ; and of some we can scarcely speak as having 
attained to any notions of society whatever. Many were, 
as in these regions they are still, mere robbers. Some 
made a trade of selling their children for exportation : 
many more were ready to hire themselves out as mer- 
cenaries, and were thus employed in maintaining the 
power of the most hateful of the Greek despots. The 
more savage Illyrian and Thrakian clans tattooed their 



CH. II.] The Hellenic World. 31 

bodies and retained in the historical ages, that practice 
of human sacrifice which in Hellas belonged to a com- 
paratively remote past. Without powers of combination 
in time of peace, they followed in war the fashion which 
sends forth mountaineers like a torrent over the land 
and then draws them back again, to reap the harvest or 
to feast and sleep through the winter. Like the warfare 
of the Scottish Highlanders, their tactics were confined 
to a wild and impetuous rush upon the enemy. If this 
failed, they could only retreat as hastily as they had 
advanced. More fortunate in their soil and in the posses- 
sion of comparatively extensive plains watered by consid- 
erable streams, the Makedonians, although in the time of 
Herodotus, they had not extended their conquests to the 
sea, were still far in advance of their neighbors. Popular 
tradition represented them as a non-Hellenic race, 
governed by sovereigns of pure Hellenic blood; but the 
belief had, it would seem, but slight foundation, if it be 
a fact, as Herodotus states, that one of these kings, 
seeking to compete in the Olympic games, had his claim 
disallowed on the score of his non-Hellenic descent. 
A few generations after the time of Herodotus, the 
Makedonians were to be lords of Hellas, and almost of 
the world; but in his own they were not the most 
formidable of the tribes to the north of the Kambounian 
hills. In his belief, the Thrakians might with even 
moderate powers of co ibination, have carried every- 
thing before them ; but there was no fear of such united 
action on the part of these heartless savages. The 
Thrakian was a mere ruffian who bought his wives, 
allowed his children to herd together like beasts, and 
then sold them into slavery. 

The coast-line of the regions occupied by these bar- 
barous tribes was dotted with Hellenic settlements ; but 



32 The Persian Wars. [ch. ii. 

„ , , the foremost in the planting of these colo- 

Greek settle- \ & 

ments on the nies was neither Athens nor Sparta, the 

northern coast ■, j ■, r .-r T jta 

of the Egean heads respectively ol the Ionian and Do- 
sea - rian Greeks. These were outstripped in the 

race by the Euboian towns of Chalkis and Eretria, and 
the activity of the former, from which had gone forth 
the earliest colonists of Sicily, was attested by the name 
Chalkidike given to the whole country lying to the south 
of a line drawn from the head of the Thermaic to that 
of the Strymonic gulf. On Akte, the easternmost of the 
three peninsulas which jut out between these gulfs, the 
magnificent mass of Athos, casting its shadow as far as 
the island of Lemnos, rises sheer from the coast to a 
height exceeding 6,000 feet, the ridge connecting it with 
the mountains at the base being about half that height. 
The intermediate or Sithonian peninsula has more of 
open ground ; and on these spaces rose, among other 
Chalkidian cities, the towns of Olynthos and Torone, 
while at the neck of the third or Pallenian peninsula was 
placed the Corinthian colony of Potidaia. Further to 
the east, near the mouth of the Strymon, we shall find in 
the history of the invasion of Xerxes the Edonian town- 
ship of Ennea Hodoi [the Nine Roads], where, after dis- 
astrous failures, the Athenians succeeded in establishing 
their colony of Amphipolis. Finally, on the European 
side of the Hellespont and the Propontis lay the Aiolic 
Sestos, and the Megarian settlement of Byzantion, the 
future home of Roman emperors and Turkish sultans. 

On the Asiatic continent, if we consider the number 
and magnificence of the Greek cities, the results of Hel- 
The Asiatic lenic colonization were splendid indeed ; 
Greeks. ^^ ^q centrifugal tendencies (the phrase 

must be used for lack of a better) which marked the 
Hellenes everywhere, left them exposed to dangers, 




Thera 



&mwll $ Struthers^NX* 



ch. ii.] The Hellenic World. 33 

against which political union would have furnished an 
effectual safeguard. In Sicily and Africa they had to 
deal with tribes which it would be no great injustice to 
describe as savages : in Asia they came into contact with 
powerful and organized empires, and the circumstances 
which made them subjects of the Lydian monarch in- 
sured their passing under the harder yoke of the Persian 
despot. 

The Lydian kingdom, against which the Asiatic Greeks 
were thus unable to maintain their independence, had 
grown up in a country inhabited by a num- 
ber of tribes, between most, and perhaps Geography 
all, of whom there existed some sort of affi- Minor* 
nity. These tribes, whatever may have 
been their origin, were spread over a region of whose 
loveliness Herodotus speaks with a proud enthusiasm. 
The beauty of climate, the richness of soil, and the 
splendor of scenery, which for him made Ionia the most 
delightful of all earthly lands, were not confined to the 
exquisite valleys in which for the most part the Hellenic 
inhabitants of Asia Minor had fixed their homes ; and the 
only drawback even to the colder parts of this vast pe- 
ninsula, which Turkish greed, corruption, and misrule are 
now fast reducing to a howling wilderness, was that, 
while they yielded grain, fruits, and cattle, they would 
not produce the olive. These colder parts lay on that 
large central plain to the north of the chain of Tauros, 
which runs off towards the north, west, and south into a 
broken country, whence the mountains slope down to 
the sea, bearing in their valleys the streams which keep 
up its perpetual freshness. Stretching in a southwester- 
ly direction from the mouth of the Hellespont, the moun- 
tains of Ida form the southern boundary of the lands, 
through which the Granikos and other streams find their 



34 The Persian Wars. [ch. ii. 

way into the Propontis or sea of Marmora. Striking to 
the southeast until it meets the great range of Tauros, 
runs a mountain chain which sends out to the southwest 
a series of almost parallel ridges, between which lie the 
most celebrated plains of Asia Minor, each watered by 
its own stream and its tributaries. The first of these, 
called the Kaikos, flows into the Elaiatic gulf in the tri- 
angle formed by the mountains of Gargarosand Temnos 
on the north and mount Pelekas on the south. Again, 
between mount Pelekas and the more southerly masses 
of Sipylos and Tmolos lies the valley of the Hermos, 
which, a few miles to the north of the citadel of Sardeis, 
receives the waters of the Paktolos, and runs into the 
Egean midway between Smyrna and Phokaia. To the 
east of Smyrna rise the heights of Olympos, between 
which and mount Messogis the Kaystros [Cayster] finds 
its way to the sea near Ephesus. Finally, between the 
southern slopes of Messogis the winding Maiandros 
[Meander] goes on its westward way, until, a little below 
the Maiandrian Magnesia, it turns, like the Hermos, to 
the south and discharges itself into the gulf which bears 
its name. From this point stretch to the westward the 
Latmian hills where, as the tale went, Selene came to 
gaze upon Endymion in his dreamless sleep. Thus, 
each between its mountain walls, the four streams, Kai- 
kos, Hermos, Kaystros, and Maiandros, follow courses 
which may roughly be regarded as parallel, through 
lands than which few are richer in their wealth of histo- 
rical association. Round the ruins of Sardeis gather the 
recollections of the great Lydian kingdom, while from 
Abydos on the north to the promontory which faces the 
seaborn island of Rhodes, every bay and headland of 
this glorious coast brings before us some name sacred 
from its ancient memories, not the least among these be- 



CH. il] The Hellenic World. 35 

ing Halikarnassos, the birthplace of the historian Hero- 
dotus, and among the greatest that spot on the seashore 
beneath the heights of Mykale, where, as fame would 
have it, the fleet of the barbarian was destroyed at the 
very time when Mardonios underwent his doom at Plataia. 
Against the isolated communities of Greeks scattered 
throughout this lovely region Kroisos [Crcesus], the last 
of the Lydian sovereigns, determined, we 
are told, to put forth the full strength of his dom of ng * 

kingdom. His hand fell first on Ephesus, Lydia. 

and after it all the other Hellenic cities were reduced to 
the payment of tribute, the result being that Kroisos be- 
came master of all the lands to the west of the Halys 
except the country of the Lykians and Kilikians who 
were protected by the mountain barriers of Tauros. This 
conquest wrought a momentous change in their position. 
They were now included in a vast empire which was at 
any time liable to the sudden and irreparable disasters 
which from time to time changed the face of the Asiatic 
world. If these Hellenes could so far have modified 
their nature as to combine with the firmness of English- 
men, their union might have broken the power of Xerxes 
before he could set foot on the soil of Europe. But no 
danger could impress on them the need of such a sacri- 
fice as this ; and the whips of Kroisos were therefore 
soon exchanged for the scorpions of the Persian despot. 



36 The Persian Wars. [ch. hi. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE PERSIAN EMPIRE UNDER CYRUS, KAMBYSES, AND 
DAREIOS. 

Among the many histories told of the founder of the 
Persian monarchy Herodotus regarded as the most trust- 
Cyrus and worthy the version which represented Cyrus 
Astyages. as t h e grandson of the Median king Asty- 
ages, who, frightened by a prophecy that his daughter's 
child should be his ruin, gave the babe on its birth to 
Harpagos with orders that it should be forthwith slain. 
By advice of his wife, Harpagos instead of killing the 
child placed it in the hands of one of the royal herds- 
men, who carried it home, and finding that his wife had 
just given birth to a dead infant exposed the corpse of 
the latter and brought up Cyrus as his own son. Years 
passed on. In the village sports the boy played king so 
well that a complaint was carried to Astyages ; and the 
severe judge was found to be the child who had been 
doomed to die but who turned out to be " the man born 
to be king." In his terror and rage Astyages took ven- 
geance on Harpagos by inviting him to a banquet at 
which the luckless man feasted on the body of his own 
son. His fears were quieted on learning from the sooth- 
sayers that the election of Cyrus as king by the village 
children had adequately fulfilled the prophecy ; but 
Harpagos had resolved that there should be a second 
and more serious fulfilment, and he therefore drove Cyrus 
into the rebellion which ended in the dethronement of 
the despot. To achieve this end Cyrus convoked the 



ch. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 37 

Persian tribes, whom the story manifestly regards as the 
inhabitants of a small canton, and held forth to them the 
boon of freedom, in other words, of immunity from taxa- 
tion, if they would break the Median yoke from off their 
necks. The contrast of a costly banquet to which they 
were bidden after a day spent in severe toil so impressed 
them that they at once threw in their lot with Cyrus and 
presently changed their state of oppression for the 
pleasanter power of oppressing others. 

The same idea of a scanty territory inhabited by a few 
disorderly clans marks the institutional legend of the 
Median empire which Cyrus was to over- 
throw. The founder of this empire, Deiokes, ™^ edian 
aiming from the first, it is said, at despot- 
ism, set himself to administer justice amongst the law- 
less men by whom he was surrounded, and having at 
length won a high name for wisdom and impartiality 
withdrew himself from them on the plea that he was un- 
able to bear without recompense the continued tax on 
his time. The seven Median tribes, meeting in council, 
asked him therefore to become their king ; and Deiokes, 
having made them build him a palace with seven con- 
centric walls, took up his abode in the centre and be- 
came henceforth a cruel and avaricious tyrant. So came 
into existence the Median city of Agbatana under a 
sovereign who asserted the independence of the Median 
tribes against the Assyrian kings of Nineveh. The story 
may point to some change in the relations of the Medes 
and Assyrians ; but it describes the origin of eastern 
monarchy not as it would be conceived by the Medes, 
but as it would present itself to Greeks acquainted only 
with the arts by which their own tyrants had worked 
their way to power. The turbulence and factiousness 
of the Median clans, the rigid justice under which 



$S The Persian Wars. [ch. in. 

DeTokes masks his ambitious schemes, the care which he 
takes to build himself a stronghold as soon as possible, 
and to surround his person with a body-guard, are all 
features which belong to the history of Greek rather than 
of Oriental despots. The Greek ideal is still more re- 
markably shown in the ascription to Dei'okes of a severe, 
laborious, and toilsome administration which probably 
no Asiatic government ever sought to realize. 

But whatever may have been the political changes 

effected by Deiokes, Nineveh, the capital of the Assyrian 

,. kines, had, according: to Herodotus, under- 

Connection of ° ° . 

the Median, gone no disaster when his son Phraortes, 
Assyrian 11 a fter a reign of two-and-twenty years, met 
empires. ^jg death, before its walls. His successor 

Kyaxares sought, it is said, to avenge his father by again 
besieging Nineveh : but an irruption of Scythians com- 
pelled him to abandon the blockade. In his own land 
some of these Scythians, we are told, became his tribu- 
taries ; but a default of payment was visited with harsh 
punishment, and the fugitives found a refuge in the 
kingdom of the Lydian sovereign Alyattes, the father of 
Kroisos, the last monarch of his dynasty. The refusal 
of Alyattes to surrender the Scythians led to a war which 
after six years, was brought to an end partly by an eclipse 
which took place while a battle was going on, and in 
part by the mediation of Labynetos king of Babylon 
and the Kilikin chief Syennesis. These sovereigns de- 
termined that the doubtful peace should be strengthened 
by a marriage between Astyages, the heir to the Median 
throne, and the daughter of Alyattes. The Median al- 
liance with Babylon was further cemented by the mar- 
riage of Nebucadnezzar, the son of the Babylonian king 
Nabopolassar, with the daughter of Kyaxares. Thus 
Kroisos became the brother-in-law of Astyages, and 



CH. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 39 

Astyages the brother-in-law of Nebucadnezzar. The 
chain might well have seemed strong ; but the links 
broke, when Cyrus deprived Astyages of his throne. 
The duty of avenging his wife's brother seems not to 
have troubled Nebucadnezzar : according to Herodotus 
it furnished to the Lydian Kroisos the strongest motive 
for measuring his strength against that of the Persian 
king. Kyaxares himself, we are told, achieved a bril- 
liant triumph, when with the aid of the Babylonian Na- 
bopolassar, he overthrew the ancient dynasty of the 
Assyrian kings, and made Nineveh a dependency of the 
sovereigns of Media. 

Over the vast territory thus brought under Median 
rule the Persian Cyrus became the lord ; but in the Con- 
dition of the Medians themselves the over- 
throw of Astyages made no material change. p Jk p e i e Median 
They remained the second nation in the em- 
pire and were so closely associated with their conquerors 
that the Greeks spoke of their great enemy as the Mede 
rather than the Persian, and branded as Medizers those 
of their kindred who ranged themselves on the side of 
the invading despot. Agbatana also still continued a 
royal city, and the summer abode of the Persian kings. 

The supremacy in Asia thus passed into the hands of 
a sovereign whose chief strength lay in that comparatively 
small country which still bears the name of 
Fars or Farsistan. By Herodotus this region of Persia, 
is called a scanty and rugged land, — a de- 
scription not unbefitting a country which, with the ex- 
ception of the hot district lying between the mountains 
and the coast-line, consists chiefly of the high plateau 
formed by the continuation of that mountain-system 
which, having furnished a boundary to the Mesopota- 
mian plain, turns eastwards and broadens out into the 



40 The Persian Wars. [ch. in. 

highlands of Persia proper. Of the whole of this coun- 
try it may be said that where there is water, there is 
fertility ; but much that is now desert may have been 
rich in grass and fruits in the days when Cyrus is said to 
have warned his people that, if they migrated to a 
wealthier soil, they must bid farewell to their supremacy 
among the nations. Strong in a mountain barrier pierced 
by astonishingly precipitous gorges, along which roads 
wind in zigzag or are thrown across furious torrents on 
bridges of a single span, this beautiful or desolate land 
was not rich in the number of its cities. About sixty 
miles almost due north of the present city of Shiraz are 
the ruins of Pasargadai, probably in its original form 
Parsa-gherd (the castle of the Persians, or the Persian- 
garth). On a larger plain, about half-way between these 
two towns, rose the second capital, Persepolis. The two 
streams by which this plain is watered maintain the ex- 
quisite verdure which a supply of water never fails to 
produce in Persia. But rugged in parts and sterile as this 
plateau may be, it must be distinguished from that vast 
region which, at a height varying between 3,000 and 
5,000 feet, extends from the Zagros and Elbruz ranges 
on the west and north over an area of 1,100 by 500 miles 
to the Suliman and Hala mountains on the east, and on 
the south to the great coast chain which continues the 
Persian plateau almost as far as the Indus. Of this im- 
mense territory nearly two-thirds are absolute desert, in 
which the insignificant streams fail before the summer 
heats. In such a country the habits of a large propor- 
tion of the population will naturally be nomadic ; and 
the fresher pastures and more genial climate of the hills 
and valleys about Agbatana would draw many a roving 
clan with their herds and tents from regions scorched by 
a heat which left them no water. 



CH. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 41 

Into the vast empire ruled by the lord of these Aryan 
tribes there was now to be absorbed that great Lydian 
kingdom to the west of the river Halys, of „,, T ,. 

The Lydian 

which Kroisos was the king. The conquests kingdom and 
which had brought the Lydian monarch Greeks*" 
thus far placed him in dangerous proximity 
with a power not less aggressive and more formidable 
than his own. But the relations which existed between 
Kroisos and the Asiatic Greeks imparted to the catastro- 
phe at Sardeis a significance altogether beyond that 
which could be attached to the mere transference of 
power from the Median despot Astyages to the Persian 
despot Cyrus. Beyond the loss of their political inde- 
pendence — a doubtful boon for cities so averse to common 
action — the Hellenic colonies had suffered but little by 
falling under the sway of the Lydian king. Their bur- 
dens were confined probably to the payment of a fixed 
annual tribute and to the supply of a certain number of 
troops for the Lydian armies. By way of precaution 
also it would seem that Kroisos gave orders to some of 
the cities to breach their walls, for Herodotus mentions 
that they were obliged to rebuild them when they began 
to form the design of revolting from the Persian king. 
Otherwise the yoke of the Lydian monarch seems to 
have been light indeed ; and he was himself to undergo 
a harder subjection than that which he had inflicted on 
the conquered Hellenes. 

The motives or causes tending to bring about the war 
between Kroisos and Cyrus are distinctly stated to have 
been first, the ambition of Kroisos, next his desire to 
avenge the wrong done to his brother-in-law Astyages, 
and, thirdly, the greed and covetousness of the Persian 
king. These causes may seem not altogether consistent, 
and they may further appear to be contradicted by va- 
E 



42 The Persian Wars. [ch. ill. 

„. . , rious portions of the wonderful popular tra- 

Historyofthe . r . i_ j. «. ■ , *, 

war between dition which has embodied m the drama of 

Cyrus? S an the life of Kroisos the religious philosophy 
of the age. But the meagre chronicle of his 
conquests along the Egean coasts sufficiently attests the 
active ambition of the Lydian king, while the uninter- 
rupted career of victory ascribed to Cyrus is at least 
proof of the aggressiveness of his enemy. The two 
causes thus assigned for the war involve no inconsistency, 
while the alliance between the Lydian and the Median 
sovereigns would be with Cyrus a sufficient reason for 
crippling the power of a chief whose vengeance might 
seriously affect his own empire. That Kroisos, if he 
could have induced the Greeks to act with energy on his 
behalf, might have checked or destroyed the Persian 
supremacy, there can be little doubt or none. The tra- 
dition that Cyrus did all that he could to detach the 
lonians from their conqueror may be taken as adequate 
testimony for this fact, while it further shows the gene- 
rally mild and beneficent character of the Lydian rule. 
In short, Kroisos seems fully to have seen the paramount 
need of Greek aid. He entered into alliance with some 
of the cities in the Egean islands, and made a compact 
with the Spartans from which he looked for great advan- 
tages ; but the islanders were indifferent, while the Spar- 
tans failed him in the hour of need, and thus his Hellenic 
subjects passed along with himself into the hands of the 
Persian conqueror. Beyond this general sketch of the 
struggle, which ended in the overthrow of a kingdom far 
in advance of any other Eastern monarchies, there are 
few, perhaps no details which we can add with any feel- 
ing of confidence that we are registering historical inci- 
dents. The warning which at the outset of the enter- 
prise he is said to have received against attacking 



ch. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 43 

enemies so beggarly as the Persians, shows how far the 
popular versions of the story wandered from the true ac- 
count which has been preserved to us rather in hints and 
incidental statements than in consecutive narration. It 
is simply ludicrous to suppose that any one would have 
represented to Kroisos that in a contest with Persia he 
had nothing to gain and everything to lose. The con- 
queror of Media and lord of Nineveh could not without 
absurdity be described as a ruler of a poverty-stricken 
kingdom ; nor without even greater absurdity could the 
gods be thanked as not. having put into the minds of the 
Persians to go against the Lydians, when the whole 
course of the narrative implies that the one absorbing 
dread which oppressed Kroisos was the fear of that in- 
satiable spirit of aggression which marks Asiatic empires 
until they pass from robbery to laziness. 

In the life of this man, enlightened no doubt and 
generous for his age, the religious feeling cf a later gene- 
ration found a signal illustration of the sad 
and stern lesson that man abides never in stories of the 
one stay and that he is born to trouble as fail of 
the sparks fly upward. It saw in the catas- Kr01S0S - 
trophe of Sardeis the fall of a righteous king and a 
righteous man, and on this issue of a life so splendid 
framed a drama singularly pathetic and touching. The 
heir of immense wealth and master of a stronghold in- 
vulnerable, like Achilleus, except at one point, living under 
the brightest of skies and amid the most beautiful of 
earthly scenes, he is depicted from the first as animated 
by the ambition of being a happy man and by the con- 
viction that he had really attained to the state at which 
he aimed. The golden sands of the Paktolos, or, as 
others said, the produce of his gold mines at Pergamos, 
speedily filled his treasure-houses, and throughout the 



44 The Persian Wars, [ch. hi. 

world the fame spread that Kroisos was the wealthiest 
and the happiest of men. Time went on and at length 
in the great Athenian lawgiver Solon [we must note here 
that the tale extends his life for more than forty years 
after his death] he found one on whom his riches and 
splendor produced no .impression. No man, said the 
stranger, can be rightly called happy until his life has 
been happily ended. For Kroisos these simple words 
were as the handwriting on the wall foreboding the coming 
catastrophe. Thus far not a cloud had shadowed the 
radiance of his prosperity except the dumbness of his 
younger son ; but this evil was more than compensated 
by the beauty and vigor of Atys the brave and fair, the 
pride and the hope of his life, until word came from the 
divine oracle that this peerless child must be smitten by 
a spear and die. In vain Kroisos put all weapons out of 
the lad's reach, and wedded him to a maiden whose love 
might turn away his thoughts from any tasks involving 
the least danger. A suppliant came to his court praying 
for absolution from the guilt of involuntary homicide. 
Kroisos welcomed him as king, and as priest absolved 
him from his sin : and when other folk came beseeching 
that Atys might be sent to hunt and slay the boar which 
was ravaging their land, he charged the suppliant, whose 
very name, Adrastos, carried with it the omen of inevit- 
able doom, to guard his son from harm. But the god 
spake of no other spear than that of Adrastos ; and when 
the exile in his unutterable agony slew himself on the 
tomb of Atys, Kroisos owned that the instrument of the 
divine will is not to be condemned for a result over 
which he has no control. Roused from his long and bitter 
mourning by the tidings of the fall of his brother-in-law 
Astyages, he resolved, with a slowness of faith not easily 
explicable after the verifying of the prediction which fore- 



ch. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 45 

warned him of the death of Atys, to test the oracles be- 
fore he put to them the question which should determine 
him to fight out the quarrel with Cyrus or to lay it aside. 
Two only stood the test ; and of these two that which 
satisfied him best was the oracle of Delphoi, from which 
he learnt that if he went against the Persians he would 
destroy a great power. Not yet wholly at ease, he asked 
further whether his empire would last long, and received 
by way of answer a warning to flee and tarry not when a 
mule should be king of the Medes. Fully satisfied that 
such an event was impossible, he crossed the Halys. 
The engagement which followed was a drawn battle, and 
Kroisos, falling back on Sardeis, dismissed his army with 
orders to join his standard again in the spring. But 
Cyrus, having learnt the intentions of Kroisos, timed his 
march so as to reach Sardeis after the dispersion of his 
troops. Trusting to the tried valor of his Lydian cav- 
alry, Kroisos went out boldly to meet him : but Cyrus had 
placed his camels in the front line, and the Lydian 
horses in dismay carried their riders from the field. 
Kroisos had reigned fourteen years ; and the siege which 
ensued had lasted fourteen days when an accident led to 
the capture of the city, and Kroisos, with fourteen other 
Lydians, bound in chains, was placed on a great pile of 
wood, either by way of offering to the gods the first-fruits 
of victory or of seeing how they would deal with a man 
who had greatly honored them. Then to Kroisos in his 
agony came back the words which Solon had spoken to 
him that no living man could be called happy ; and as 
he thought on this, he sighed and after a long silence 
thrice called out the name of Solon. Hearing this, 
Cyrus bade the interpreters ask him whom he called, 
and after much pressing received for answer that Solon 
had thought nothing of all his wealth while he sojourned 



46 The Persian Wars. [ch. hi. 

with him, and how the words had come to pass which 
Solon spake, not thinking of him more than of any others 
who fancy that they are happy. Hearing the tale, Cyrus 
remembered that he too was but a man and that he was 
giving to the flames one who had been as wealthy as him- 
self; but his order to take Kroisos down from the pile 
came too late. The wood had been already kindled, 
and the flame was too strong ; but Kroisos, seeing that 
the mind of Cyrus was changed, prayed to Phoibos 
Apollon to come and save him, if ever he had done 
aught to please him in the days that were past. Then 
suddenly the wind rose, and clouds gathered where none 
had been before, and there burst from the heaven a 
great storm of rain which put out the blazing fire. So 
Cyrus knew that Kroisos was a good man and that the 
gods loved him ; and when Kroisos came down from the 
pile, Cyrus asked him "Who persuaded thee to march 
into my land and to become my enemy rather than my 
friend?" "The god of the Greeks urged me on," an- 
swered Kroisos, " for no man is so senseless as of his own 
pleasure to choose war in which the fathers bury their 
children rather than peace in which the children bury 
their fathers." Meanwhile the city was given up to plun- 
der, and Kroisos, standing by the side of Cyrus, asked 
him what the Persians were doing down below. " Surely," 
said Cyrus, "they are plundering thy city and spoiling 
thy people." " Nay," answered Kroisos, " it is thy wealth 
which they are taking, for I and my people now have 
nothing. But take heed. The man who gets most of 
this wealth will assuredly rise up against thee ; so place 
thy guards at all the gates and bid them take all the 
goods, saying that a tithe must first be paid of them to 
Zeus." Pleased with this advice, Cyrus bade Kroisos 
ask him a favor, and the captive replied by praying to 



ch. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire, 47 

be allowed to send his fetters to the god of the Greeks 
and to ask if it were his wont to cheat those who had 
done him good. So the messengers of Kroisos put his 
question to the priestess at Delphoi, and listened to the 
stately response. " Not even a god," she said, " can es- 
cape the lot which is prepared for him, and Kroisos in 
the fifth generation has suffered for the sin of him who 
at the bidding of a woman slew his lord and seized his 
power. Much did the god strive that the evil might fall 
in his children's days and not on Kroisos himself; but 
he could not turn the Fates aside. For three years he 
put off the taking of Sardeis, for this much only they 
granted him ; and he came to his aid when the flame 
had grown fierce on the blazing pile. Yet more, he is 
wrong for blaming the god for the answer that if he 
went against the Persians he would destroy a great 
power, for he should then have asked if the god meant 
his own power or that of Cyrus, Neither, again, would 
he understand what the god spake about the mule, for 
Cyrus himself was the mule, being the son of a Median 
woman, the daughter of Astyages, and of a man born of 
the meaner race of the Persians." This answer the Ly- 
dians brought back to Sardeis : and Kroisos knew that 
the god was guiltless and that the fault was all his 
own. 

Thus was the story of Kroisos made to justify the 
religious philosophy of the time. The all-absorbing idea 
running through the tale is that of a com- 

f Sources of 

pensation which takes no regard of the the popular 
personal deserts of the sufferer, and of a the°reign of 
divine jealousy which cannot endure the Kroisos - 
sight of overmuch happiness in a mortal man. The sin- 
ner may go down to his grave in peace ; but his fifth de- 
scendant, a righteous man who fears the gods, is to pay 



4.8 The Persian Wars. [ch. hi. 

the penalty of his iniquity. It is a doom which clearly 
does not affect the spiritual character of the man. The 
prosperity of Gyges, the founder of his dynasty, and the 
disaster of Kroisos are no evidence that the former is 
approved, and the latter rejected, by the righteous Being 
whose justice runs in a different groove from that of the 
Fates. To Kroisos the catastrophe brings wisdom and 
humility ; he is the better and purer for his troubles. 
This theological purpose must, of itself, deprive the 
story of its historical character. The artless remark of 
Herodotus that until Kroisos was actually taken no one 
had paid the least attention to the plain warning, uttered 
five generations before, that the fifth from Gyges should 
atone the old wrong, proves at the least that the predic- 
tion grew up after the catastrophe ; and the fabrication 
of one prophecy does not tend to establish the genuine- 
ness of the rest. Nor is this all. Unless when a literal 
acceptation of oracular responses is needed to keep up 
a necessary delusion, the recipients of these answers 
take it for granted that these utterances are, or are likely 
to be, metaphorical ; and to Kroisos himself the facts 
shrouded under the guise of the mule-king were better 
known than they could be to any other. The Median 
sovereign was his brother-in-law ; and the very matter 
which had stirred his wrath was that Cyrus, the son of 
the Persian Kambyses, had dethroned his grandfather 
and thus brought Medes and Persians under one sceptre. 
The sequel of the tale Herodotus admits that he had ob- 
tained from Lydian informants. The story of the rescue 
of Kroisos from the flames is not to be found in the 
Persian chronicle of Ktesias. No Persian could repre- 
sent his king as profaning the majesty and purity of fire 
by offerings of human bodies ; and the one fact to which 
the whole story points is that by some means or other 



ch. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 49 

the great Lydian empire was absorbed in the mightier 
monarchy of Persia. 

The fall of Kroisos was followed, it is said, by a re- 
quest of the Ionians to be received as tributaries of Cy- 
rus on the same terms which had been im- 
posed on them by the Lydian king. The Asia 1 Minor 
petition was refused, and the dread of op. of e Krofsos U 
pression was so great as to induce many of 
the Ionian cities to repair their fortifications which had 
been breached by the orders of Kroisos and to send to 
Sparta a pressing entreaty for aid. The Spartans would 
take no active measures on their behalf; but they sent 
one ship to ascertain generally the state of affairs in 
Ionia, the result being that one of their officers named 
Lakrines went to Sardeis and warned Cyrus that any at- 
tempt to injure an Hellenic city would provoke the anger 
of the Lakedaimonians. To this warning Cyrus replied 
by asking who the Lakedaimonians might be ; and on 
hearing some account of them he added that he had 
never feared men who set apart a place in their city 
where they came together to buy, sell, and cheat. But 
Cyrus himself could tarry no longer in the West, and his 
deputies were left to complete the task which he had left 
unfinished. This result was for a time hindered by the 
revolt of the Lydian Paktyas who had been charged to 
bring to Sousa the plundered treasures of Sardeis, then 
by the opposition of the Karians, and lastly by the ob- 
stinate resistance of the Lykians, who, it is said, slew their 
wives and children, and then rushing out on the enemy 
fought till not a man of them remained alive. 

But while these isolated states, whose civilization was 
far beyond that of their conquerors, were Expedition 
being absorbed in the vast mass of Persian al a hf s r t us 
dominion, that dominion was being extended Babylon. 



50 The Persian Wars. [ch. hi. 

to the east and south by Cyrus himself, who swept like 
a whirlwind over all Asia, subduing, as the historian tells 
us, every nation without passing over one. Of the de- 
tails of these conquests, with a single exception, we 
know nothing; and even in this solitary instance, we 
can assert nothing positively beyond the fact that the 
sceptre of the old Babylonian or Assyrian kings was 
broken by the despot of Persia. But as the historical 
scene changes from Ionia to Babylon, we are driven to 
note the contrast between the intense individual energy 
of the Hellenic communities with their lack of political 
combination and the iron system of Asiatic centraliza- 
tion, which could accomplish the most gigantic tasks by 
sheer manual labor, the multitude as a political machine 
being everything, the individual man nothing. Long 
before the Greeks, and the tribes akin to them, had 
emerged from the savage exclusiveness of the primitive 
family life, long before the idea of the Polis or City or 
State had dawned upon their minds, the Syrian sover- 
eigns could mass and move myriads at their will, could 
raise huge cities, and rear sumptuous temples for a reli- 
gion which prescribed to each man, not merely the rou- 
tine of his daily life, but his social and political duties, 
and for a creed which left no room whatever, for the in- 
dependent exercise of thought and reason. But if 
Asiatic civilization, regarded as its worst enemy, the 
temper which, without a single secondary motive, or the 
selfish desire of maintaining an established system : 
seeks wisdom from the study of things as they are, still 
in turning to account the physical resources of a country 
it has not seldom achieved a splendid success. The 
plains of Bagdad and Mosul are now a dreary and deso- 
late waste : but these arid sands were thrice in the year 
covered with a waving sea of corn, in the days when 



CH. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 51 

Sennacherib or Nebuchadnezzar ruled at Nineveh or 
Babylon. Pitiless as may have been their despotism, 
they yet knew that their own wealth must be measured 
by the fertility of the soil, and thus they took care that 
their whole country should be parcelled out by a net- 
work of canals, the largest of which might be a high- 
road for ships between the Euphrates and the Tigris. On 
the soil thus quickened the grain of corn, of millet, or 
of sesame was multiplied, as the more cautious said, fifty 
or an hundredfold, or, as Herodotus believed, in years 
of exceptional abundance even three hundred fold. 
Scarcely less dazzling than this picture of cereal wealth, 
produced in a land where rain scarcely ever fell, is the 
description which Herodotus gives of the magnificence 
of Babylon : and he saw the great city after it had been 
given up to plunder by Dareios, and robbed of its cost- 
liest treasures by Xerxes. The coloring of his sketch 
must be heightened if we would realize the grandeur of 
that royal town enclosed amidst exquisite gardens, sur- 
rounded by walls which rose to a height, it is said, of 
300 feet, each side of the square extending to 15 English 
miles, and giving the means of egress and ingress by 
five-and-twenty brazen gates. Within this wall rose at 
some distance another, less huge, but still very strong ; 
and within this were drawn out the buildings and streets 
of the city in rectangular blocks, reaching down to the 
wall which was carried from one end of the town to the 
other along the banks of the river, broken only by the 
huge brazen gates, which at the end of each street gave 
access to the water. High above the palaces and houses 
around it, towered the mighty temple of Bel, story above 
story, to a height, it is said, of 600 feet, from a base ex- 
tending over more than 1,200 feet on each side, while 
the stream was spanned by abridge, the several portions 



52 The Persian Wars. [ch. hi. 

of which were drawn aside at night, but which was used 
during the day by those who did not care to enter the 
ferry-boats stationed at each landing-place along the 
river walls. 

This mighty city was surprised and taken by Cyrus, — 

how, we cannot venture positively to say. For a year his 

coming was delayed, we are told, by the 

Siege and ° r . ' J , 

fail of Baby- grave duty of avenging on the river Gyndes 
lon * the insult which it had offered to one of the 

sacred white horses. This stream which joins the Tigris 
near the modern Bagdad had dared to drown the animal 
which had plunged into it, and the flat of the king went 
forth that the river should be so lowered by the disper- 
sion of its waters through a hundred canals, that women 
should henceforth cross it without wetting their knees. 
This seeming freak has been ascribed to a wise and deli- 
berate design by way of preparing his army for the more 
momentous task of diverting the Euphrates as the means 
for surprising Babylon. But it may well be asked how 
Cyrus could know, a year before, that he would have 
either the need or the opportunity of putting this plan 
into action, or why with his unbounded command of 
labor, insuring the same results at one time as at an- 
other, he should find it necessary thus to rehearse the 
most troublesome scene in the coming drama. The 
story runs that Cyrus had made his preparations for lay- 
ing bare the bed of the Euphrates while the inhabitants 
of Babylon remained wholly ignorant of all that was 
going on, and that his men marching along the bed of 
the stream entered the town and took possession of it 
during a time of festival when the people had relaxed the 
vigilance needed in the presence or neighborhood of a 
watchful enemy. But the whole design assumes that the 
feast would be accompanied by the incredible careless- 



ch. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 53 

ness of not merely withdrawing all the guards (a few 
would have sufficed for the discomfiture of the Persians) 
from the river walls, but of leaving open all the gates in 
these walls, — a carelessness moreover which made the 
whole task of canal-digging for the purpose of diverting 
the Euphrates a superfluous ceremony, for, the gates 
being open and the guards withdrawn, boats would have 
furnished means of access for the assailants far more 
easy, rapid, and sure, than the oozy bed of an alluvial 
stream which, if the slightest alarm had been given, must 
have insured the destruction of the whole army. Indeed, 
it is perfectly possible that boats may have been the 
means employed, and that thus, whatever struggle there 
may have been at the gates, the Persians would not be 
in the helpless plight which would have left them at the 
mercy of the enemy as they plunged through the slime 
of the river-bed. If by boats or in any other way the 
Persians contrived to effect an entrance through the open 
river-gates, the tale might very soon run that Cyrus had 
outdone all former exploits, and made the bed of the 
Euphrates a highway for his troops. 

So fell the ancient and mighty city. It was treated 
much like the Hellenic cities of Asia Minor. Its walls, 
it is said, were breached and a tribute was Death of 
imposed ; but it underwent no spoliation, and Cyrus, and 

r ' r invasion of 

the population remained probably undis- Egypt by 
turbed. From Babylon the thirst of conquest am yse ' 
led Cyrus, according to Herodotus, against the hordes 
which wandered through the lands to the east of the 
Araxes : in the picture of Xenophon, Cyrus dies peace- 
fully in his bed. In the former story the savage queen 
Tomyris, whom he sought in marriage, defied the man 
who desired not herself but her kingdom, and fulfilled 
her promise of satisfying his lust for slaughter by thrust- 



54 The Persian Wars. [ch. hi. 

ing his severed head into a skin tilled with human blood. 
But if the career of Cyrus ended with defeat, the impulse 
which his energy had given to the Persian tribes re- 
mained as strong as ever. For them freedom, as they 
called it, meant immunity from taxation in time of peace 
and unbounded plunder in time of war. The motive 
thus supplied would account for the invasion of Egypt as 
readily as for the campaigns in Lydia and Babylonia. 
The stories which ascribed the enterprise to personal 
affronts offered to Kambyses who had succeeded to his 
father Cyrus are scarcely worth notice; but another 
cause has been assigned for it which is more consonant 
with the ancient majesty of the lords of the Nile. Egyp- 
tian tradition delighted to tell of an invincible king who 
led his army of 700,000 men from the walls of Thebes, 
and, during nine years unclouded by a single disaster, 
made himself master of an empire extending from the 
cataracts of Syene to Bokhara, and from the Indus to 
the Egean Sea. It also loved to tell of the merciless 
fury of his warfare as his armies harried the vast regions 
of Ethiopia and Libya, of Media and Persia, of Baktria 
and Scythia. The memory of such tremendous massacres 
might well set the hearts of nations on fire for many a 
generation, and arouse in Cyrus, or any other king, an 
insatiable craving for revenge. But Persian tradition 
knew nothing of this great Egyptian inroad; and the 
traditions of Egypt are in like manner silent on those 
conquests of Semiramis which Assyrian legend extended 
over the valley of the Nile. 

But the true interest and significance of Egyptian 
history may happily be disconnected from the fortunes 

, , and the exploits of its individual kings. What- 

The forma- ^ _ & . 

tion of ever be the sequence of its dynasties, one 

Egypt * fact remains unshrouded by the mists which 



CH. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 55 

float about its traditional chronicles. Long before the 
first feeble notions of a settled order were awakened 
among the Aryan tribes of the West, long even before 
Mesopotamian civilization showed its ungainly propor- 
tions, the inhabitants of the valley of the Nile presented 
in their wealth and organization, in their art and science, 
a marvelous sight which, more than the vastness of 
Babylon, excited in after ages the astonishment of Hero- 
dotus. This wonderful exuberance of life, at a time 
when every other land was sunk in barbarism, was the 
result of the fertility of the Nile valley ; and the Nile 
valley was the creation of the great river which first 
scooped out its channel and then yearly filled it up 
with mud. The low limestone hills, which serve as a 
boundary to the narrow strip of luxurious vegetation on 
either side of the stream, mark the course of the river 
as it has been thrust hither and thither in its path accord- 
ing to the strength of the material with which it came 
into conflict. Where this material was soft, its channel 
is wide : where it presented a less yielding front, the 
stream narrows, until in the granite districts of Assouan 
it forces its way through the rock by plunging down a 
cataract. In all likelihood these falls which the traveler 
now faces in the upper part of its course have receded 
gradually southward from Cairo : and thus the Nile has 
only been beforehand in the process which is now slowly 
but surely eating away the ledge of rock which forms 
the barrier of Niagara. These cliffs, it is true, are now 
far above the level of the stream ; but the markings which 
Egyptian kings have left at Semneh in Nubia show that 
at a time long preceding the visit of Herodotus to Egypt 
the river rose to a height exceeding by 24 feet that 
which it ever reaches now, while the deserted bed of a 
still earlier age proves that the inundation rose at least 



56 The Persian Wars, [ch. in. 

tj feet above its highest mark at the present day. 
Hence it may be said with literal truth that Egypt is the 
creation of the Nile. Throughout its long journey of 
more than 1,000 miles after entering the region of the 
cataracts, this mysterious stream, receiving not a single 
affluent, lavishes its wealth on the right hand and on the 
left, not only affording to the people of each spot an easy 
and sure maintenance which called for the use of neither 
spade nor plough nor any nourishment beyond that, of 
its life-giving waters, but furnishing the materials for an 
active commerce by the difference of its products in the 
northern and southern portions of its course, and by the 
long prevalence of northerly winds which enable vessels 
to overcome the force of the descending current. All 
this it did, and even more. The ease and rapidity with 
which the crops were sown and the harvest gathered 
insured to the people an amount of leisure which to the 
barbarians of Europe toiling for bare subsistence was an 
unknown luxury. It is no wonder, therefore, that the in- 
habitants of the Nile valley should have grown into a 
well-ordered state while even the beautiful banks of the 
Hermos and the Maiandros (Meander) were still a soli- 
tude or peopled only by rude and isolated tribes. But 
more than this, the river which gave them wealth 
guarded them against their enemies. The strip of 
verdure which marks its course stretches to no greater 
width than two miles and a half on either side : and this 
happy region is shut in by arid deserts in which an 
abundance of nitre would render all rain water, if any 
fell there, unfit for drinking. 

But if the river insured the rapid development of the 
people who might dwell on its banks, it also determined 
r , . r the character of their civilization. Allow- 

Cnaracter of 

the Egyp- ance being made for some variation of 

tian people. 



CH. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire, 57 

climate in its long course, the physical conditions 
of their existence were throughout much the same. 
Everywhere there was the river with its nourish- 
ing stream, and the strip of verdure which was literally 
its child. Everywhere were the low hills girding in this 
garden and marking off the boundless burning desert, 
and over all by day and by night hung the blue unclouded 
sky, across which the sun journeyed in his solitary chariot, 
to be followed by his bride the moon, with the stars, her 
innumerable sisters or children. When to this we add 
that from one end of the land to the other there was no 
stronghold where a discontented or rebellious chief might 
defy the king of the people, and no spot which gave ac- 
cess to an invader across the fiery barrier to the east or 
the west, we have a series of conditions which must pro- 
duce a great people, but which will keep all on a dead 
level of submission to the one governing power. But 
this people, so shut off from all other nations and thus 
rising into an astonishingly early greatness, exhibited 
few, if any points of resemblance to the tribes of the vast 
continent in which their river ran. In color less dark 
than the Arab, in features little resembling any Semitic 
tribe and displaying often a strange resemblance to the 
Greek, in habit utterly opposed to the roving Bedouin, 
the Egyptians embellished their life with arts which no 
negro tribe has ever known. They were spinners and 
weavers, potters and workers in metals, painters and 
sculptors. Their social order harmonized in its system 
of castes with that of India, and, it may very safely be 
added, with that of the Greek and Latin tribes ; and their 
castes were united in a firm and centralized polity in 
which the king ruled conjointly with, if not in submission 
to, the priestly order which surrounded his life and that 
of the people with a multitude of ceremonial rules invested 

F 



58 The Persian Wars. [ch. HI. 

with an appalling power by the terrors of an unseen 
world. The manifest imperfection of man in the present 
life, the palpable injustice which it is impossible for any 
system of human laws at all times to avoid, the conscious- 
ness of powers which here have but small and fitful 
scope, the impulses of affection which here seem to be 
called into being only to be chilled and crushed, the 
tyranny of a ruling order which demanded the toil and 
slavery of the many for the idle luxury of the few, — all 
these were things which could not fail to impress them- 
selves with singular force upon the Egyptian mind, and 
in this impression to furnish a basis on which a vigorous 
priestly order might found an ascendency at once over 
the people and over their rulers. It is impossible to look 
at the art and the literature of ancient Egypt, as they 
have come down to us, without seeing that, whatever 
might be the outward splendor of the land, the power 
and luxury of the nobles, or the general comfort of the 
people, the mind of the Egyptians turned naturally and 
dwelt most constantly on the land which lies beyond the 
grave. Sins and offences which lay beyond the reach of 
human law were not therefore beyond the reach of 
punishment. The Greek tribunal of Minos, Rhadaman- 
thys, and Aiakos was seen in that august assembly be- 
fore which every Egyptian from the Pharaoh to the 
meanest slave must appear for the great scrutiny. This 
belief exhibited itself in the magnificent temples which 
mark the Egyptians pre-eminently among all other 
ancient nations. 

To the Greeks this country with its ancient and mys- 
terious civilization remained, it is said, altogether un- 
known down to a time preceding the battle of Marathon 
O enin of ^y about 180 years. At that time, we are 
Egypt to the told, Egypt was divided among twelve kings 

Greeks. 



en. in.] Growth of the Persian E?npire. 59 

who had been warned that the man who should 
offer a libation out of a brazen vessel in the temple 
of the God of Fire would become lord of the whole land. 
This prophecy was fulfill ed when the priest brought 
eleven golden vessels only for the use of kings at the 
sacrifice, and Psammitichos, one of the twelve, made his 
brazen helmet serve the purpose of the ewer. The 
eleven in panic terror drove him away : and the banished 
prince, as he lurked in the marshes, learnt from an oracle 
that aid would come to him from brazen men. Such 
men, the tidings soon came, were ravaging the coasts of 
the Delta. They were Ionian and Karian marauders, 
whose help by dint of large promises he succeeded in 
securing and through whom he became master of all 
Egypt. These mercenaries Psammitichos placed as a 
kind of standing army in places called the Camps near 
Boubastis, while it is also said that in his reign a fleet of 
Milesians took possession of a harbor on the eastern 
shore of the Kanopic mouth of the Nile, and there built 
the city of Naukratis, which became the great seat of 
trade between Egypt and Europe. 

Four sovereigns come between this successful leader 
and the luckless Psammenitos in whose reign Egypt was 
swallowed up in the vast dominion of Persia. 
Psammitichos himself had to spend, it is Neifos 5 , ° 
said, nearly thirty years in the siege of p^menitos 
Azotos or Ashdod, and his presence there 
was so far fortunate that it enabled him to arrest the 
march of the Scythian hordes which would otherwise 
have found their way into Egypt. His son Nekos, the 
Pharaoh Necho of the Jewish historians, had to contend 
with more formidable enemies for the possession of 
Judaea and Phenicia. The Median king Kyaxares had, 
it is said, taken the city of Nineveh, while the Babylonian 



60 The Persian Wars. [ch. iit. 

sovereign, Nebuchadnezzar, claimed the submission of all 
the lands lying to the north of the desert of Sinai. The 
campaign of Nekos in Palestine was at the 
outset successful. Josiah, the Jewish king, 
fell at Magdolon (Megiddo) ; and Jerusalem, known to 
Herodotus as Kadytis (it still bears the name El 
Khoddes), became the prize of the conqueror. But the 
fruits of his victory were lost, when he encountered 
Nebuchadnezzar on the field of Kirkesion (Carchemish). 
From his son after a short and uneventful reign the sceptre 
passed to Apries, the last of the line of Psammitichos. 
An expedition of Apries, the Hophrah of the Jewish 
Books of Kings against the Greek colonies of Barke and 
Kyrene, ended in a failure which led the men of the 
Egyptian military caste to suspect that he had purposely 
led them into disaster in order to establish his own power 
by the diminution of their numbers. The suspicion led 
to their revolt under Amasis, who became king in spite 
of the efforts of the Greek mercenaries on behalf of 
Apries. The four-and-forty years of the reign of Amasis 
were for Egypt a breathing-time of comparative tran- 
quility before the storms of Persian invasion and con- 
quest. For the Greek settlers in the Delta it was a period 
of great prosperity. Their settlement of Naukratis re- 
ceived the privilege of a stringent monopoly. Foreign 
merchants, arriving at any other mouth of the Nile, were 
compelled to swear that they had been driven thither 
by stress of weather and to depart at once for the Kan- 
opic mouth, or in default of this their goods were sent to 
Naukratis by one of the inland canals. The leanings of 
Amasis towards the Greeks were still further shown by 
his marriage with a Greek woman, and by his alliance 
with Polykrates the despot of Samos. 

This ancient kingdom with its wonderful cities and its 



ch. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 61 

teeming soil was now in its turn to become a prey to 
Persian conquerors. Had Amasis lived, the - 

•11 i i i-i Conquest of 

struggle might have been prolonged, and Egypt by the 
the results might have been different ; but ersians - 
he died a few months before the invasion, and his son 
Psammenitos seems to have inherited neither his wis- 
dom nor his vigor. The army of Kambyses, the son 
of Cyrus, marched across the desert which protects 
Egypt from the north-east, while his fleet, supplied by 
the Phenician cities and the Greeks of Asia Minor, 
blockaded the Egyptian king in Memphis. A herald 
sent in a Greek vessel demanded the surrender of the 
city. By way of reply the Egyptians seized the ship and 
tore the crew to pieces ; and the first fuel was thus sup- 
plied for the great conflagration which was to follow. 
The capture of Memphis after an obstinate resistance led 
to the submission of the Lybian tribes and also of the 
Greek colonies which Apries had vainly sought to sub- 
jugate. 

Thus had Kambyses carried to its utmost bounds the 
Persian empire, as it was conceived by the Greek his- 
torian Herodotus. The Persian King was 

i i r ii i • r i • i Failure of the 

lord of all the nations from Baktna to the expeditions in- 
Nile, and he must now pay the penalty for a nd the Pla 
overweening wealth and grandeur which desert - 
had been already inflicted on Kroisos. The Egyptians 
would have it that he was smitten by a divinely sent 
madness ; the facts related seem rather to point to a 
scheme carefully laid and deliberately carried out. The 
first symptoms of the disease were shown, as they thought, 
in the insults heaped on the memory of Amasis, and in 
the infatuation which led him from Thebes to march 
against the Ethiopians and to send an army of 50,000 
men to destroy the shrine of Amoun (Zeus Ammon) in 



62 The Persian Wars. [ch. in. 

the desert. Scarcely more than a fifth part of his march 
was to be accomplished towards the land of that mys- 
terious people, who lay far beyond the Nile cataracts. 
His men thought that they were going to a region where 
the earth daily produced like the wonderful napkins 
and pitchers of our popular stories, inexhaustible ban- 
quets of luscious and ready-cooked meats. But before 
they could cross the zone of burning sand which lay be- 
tween them and those luxurious feasts, the failure even 
of grass for food drove them to decimate themselves ; 
and this outbreak of cannibalism warned Kambyses that 
some tasks were too hard even for the Great King. Pro- 
bably before he could reach Memphis, he had heard of 
another disaster. The men whom, perhaps in his zeal 
for Zoroastrian monotheism, he had sent to destroy the 
temple of Amoun, were traced as far as the city of Oasis ; 
but from the day on which they left it, not one was ever 
seen again. The guardians of the shrine asserted (and 
the guess was in all likelihood right) that they had been 
overwhelmed by a dust storm and their bodies buried 
beneath the pillars of fiery sand. 

A third enterprise by which Kambyses proposed to 
extend his empire as far as the Tyrian colony of Carthage 
Failure of was fr ustrate d by the refusal of the Phenician 

the proposed sailors to serve against their kinsfolk. With 
against Babylon Tyre which had been conquered 

Carthage. ^ Nebuchadnezzar had come under the 

Persian yoke ; but Kambyses felt perhaps that he could 
not afford to quarrel with men who had practically the 
whole carrying trade of the Mediterranean in their hands, 
and whose treachery on the distant shores of Africa 
might involve worse disasters than any which had thus 
far befallen his own arms or those of his father. Like 
the Egyptians, the inhabitants of the great Phenician 



ch. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 6$ 

cities on the eastern costs of the Mediterranean had ac- 
quired a reputation which carries their greatness back 
to ages long preceding the dawn of any history. So 
soon as we have any knowledge of Europe at all, we 
find the Phenicians prominent as the navigators of the 
great inland sea. From the earliest times in which we 
hear of them they inhabit the strip of land which, no- 
where more than 20 miles in breadth, lies between mount 
Lebanon and the sea for a distance stretching not more 
than 120 miles northwards from the Bay of Carmel. At 
the extreme north and south, on two small islands, lay 
Arados and the great city of Tyre. Between these came 
Sidon nearest to Tyre on the South, then Berytos (Bey- 
rout) and Byblos, with Tripolis which served as a 
centre for the confederation. The disposition of this 
town was a singular proof of the isolating or centrifugal 
tendencies which marked these great mercantile states 
not less than the Greek cities. It was divided into three 
distinct portions, separated from each other by the space 
of a furlong, set apart severally for the three cities of 
Tyre, Sidpn, and Arados. The singular energy of the 
individual communities, as contrasted with their scanty 
power of combination, is in close accordance with the 
Hellenic character; and in fact the Greek and Phenician 
tribes, whatever may have been the moral or religious 
influence exercised by the latter on the former, come 
mainly before us as powers which check each other in the 
most important stages of their development. But the 
Phenicians had always been foremost in the race ; and 
while the most daring of the Greeks scarcely ventured 
further westward than Massalia (Marseilles) and the 
Corsican Alalia, Phenician colonies, like Gades (Cadiz), 
had risen to eminence on the shores of the mysterious 
Atlantic Ocean beyond the Pillars of Herakles. 



64 The Persian Wars. [ch. hi. 

The refusal of these hardy mariners to serve against 
Carthage, secured the freedom of the great city which 
The last days under Hannibal was to contend with Rome 
of Kambyses. f or fog dominion of the world ; but in Kam- 
byses this disregard of his wishes, following on the dis- 
asters which had befallen his army, stirred up, we are 
told, the tiger-like temper which must slake its rage in 
blood. The opportunity was supplied by the jubilant 
cries which reached the ears of Kambyses on his return 
to Memphis. The people were shouting because they 
had found the calf in whom they worshipped the incar- 
nation of the god Apis ; but the tyrant would have it that 
they were making merry over his calamities. In vain 
the natives whom he had left to govern Memphis strove 
to explain the real cause of the rejoicing; they were all 
put to death. The priests, who were next summoned, 
gave the same explanation ; and Kambyses said he 
would see this tame god who had come among them. 
The beast was brought, and Kambyses, drawing his dag- 
ger, wounded him on the thigh. " Ye fools, these are 
your gods," he cried, " things of flesh and blood which 
may be hurt by men. The god and his worshippers are 
well-matched ; but you shall smart for raising a laugh 
against me." So the priests were scourged; an order 
was issued that every one found in holiday guise, should 
forthwith be slain ; and the feast was broken up in ter- 
ror. The calf-god pined away and died in the temple, 
and the priests buried it secretly with the wonted rites. 
From this time the madness of Kambyses, so the Egyp- 
tians said, became frenzy ; but it is possible that his mad- 
ness may not have lacked method, and that these insults 
to Apis and his worshippers, were only part of a delibe- 
rate plan for crushing the spirit of the conquered nation. 
It is to this period that Herodotus assigns the murder of 



ch. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 65 

his brother Smerdis, whom Kambyses, in a dream had 
seen sitting on a throne, while his head touched the 
heaven. Putting on this dream the only interpretation 
which would suggest itself to a despot, Kambyses at 
once sent off an officer named Prexaspes, with orders to 
slay the prince. But his army on its homeward march 
had not advanced beyond the Syrian village of Agba- 
tana, when a herald, coming from Sousa, bade all per- 
sons to own as their king, not Kambyses, but his brother 
Smerdis. Prexaspes on being questioned, swore that he 
had slain and buried the prince with his hands ; and 
the despot, now seeing that the dream had showed him 
another Smerdis, wept for his brother whom he had so 
uselessly doomed to death. Then bidding his people 
march on at once against the usurper, he leaped on his 
horse ; but the sword from which the sheath had acci- 
dentally fallen off, gashed his thigh, the part where he 
had wounded the calf-god. Then asking the name of 
the place, he learnt that he was at Agbatana : and at 
Agbatana the oracle of Bouto had declared that he was 
to die. Thus far he had indulged therefore in pleasant 
dreams of an old age spent among the Median hills; 
but he knew now that the Syrian village was to be the 
limit of his course. His remaining days or hours were 
spent in bewailing his evil deeds to his courtiers, and in 
exhorting them to stand out bravely against the usurper 
who intended to transfer to the Medes the supremacy of 
the Persians. His words were not much heeded, for 
Prexaspes now swore as stoutly that he had never 
harmed Smerdis, as he had to Kambyses declared that 
he had buried him with his own hands ; and thus the 
Magian Smerdis became king of the Persians. But his 
reign was to be soon cut short. The usurper, who had 
had his ears cut off, was discovered to be an impostor by 



66 The Persian Wars. [ch. hi. 

the daughter of Otanes, who passed her hands over his 
head as he slept ; and her father taking six other Persian 
nobles, Dareios, the son of Hystaspes being the last, 
into his counsels, first devised a plan for slaying the 
usurper and his followers, and after their massacre, held 
a second counsel, to determine the form of government 
which it would be wise to set up. Otanes proposed a 
republic as the only mode of securing responsible rulers ; 
Megabyzos recommended an oligarchy, on the ground 
that the insolence of the mob is as hateful as that of any 
despot, while Dareios, arguing that no system can be 
so good as that of monarchy if the ruler be perfect as he 
ought to be, insisted that the customs of the Persians 
should not be changed. Upon this Otanes, seeing how 
things would go, bargained for his own independence, 
while the rest agreed that, they would acknowledge as 
king, that one of their number whose horse should neigh 
first after being mounted on the following morning. The 
groom of Dareios took care that this horse should be the 
one which bore his master. 

Such was the story which Herodotus received in great 
part from Egyptian informants, whose narrative would 
The record naturally be colored by national antipathy 
of Behistun. t0 ^g foreign conqueror. The great inscrip- 
tion of Behistun, which is at the least a contemporary 
record and probably as truthful as any which a Persian 
could set down, gives an account differing from this tra- 
dition in many important particulars. It affirms that the 
tyrant's brother was murdered long before the army 
started for Egypt ; that Kambyses killed himself pur- 
posely ; that the name of the Magian was not Smerdis 
but Gomates ; and that his usurpation was a religious, 
and not, as has been generally supposed, a national re- 
bellion, its object being to restore the ancient element 



ch. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire, 67 

worship which the predominance of the stricter monothe- 
ism of Zoroaster had placed under a cloud. Of the mu- 
tilation of the Magian, of his betrayal by the daughter 
Otanes, of the conspiracy of the Seven, this monument 
says absolutely nothing. To the version of Herodotus 
who represents Dareios as the last to join the conspiracy, 
it gives the most complete contradiction Dareios asserts 
unequivocally that no one dared to say anything against 
the Magian until he came. To the Seven he makes no 
reference, unless it be in the words that " with his faith- 
ful men " he fell on the Magian and slew him, while the 
story of his election by the trick of his groom is put aside 
by his assertion that the empire of which Gomates dis- 
possessed Kambyses had from the olden time been in 
the family of Dareios. If the incidents peculiar to the 
tale of Herodotus had been facts, the rock inscription 
must have made to them at least some passing allusion, 
if not some direct reference. 

The death of the usurper was followed, we are told, 
by a general massacre of the Magians. This massacre 
seems to point to a state of confusion and Revolt of 
disorder which, according to Herodotus, the Medes - 
prevented Dareios from taking strong measures against 
some refractory or rebellious satraps of the empire. The 
statement is amply borne out by the inscription of Behis- 
tun, which describes the early years of the reign of Dar- 
eios as occupied in the suppression of a series of obstinate 
insurrections against his authority. The slaughter of 
the Magian and his partisans seems in no way to have 
deterred the Medes from making a general effort to re- 
cover the supremacy of which they had been deprived 
by Cyrus. But the fortune of war went Revolt of 
against them. The revolt of Babylon may Babylon, 
have been an event even more serious. It was with 



68 The Persian Wars, [ch. hi. 

great difficulty crushed, and the walls of the great city 
were so far dismantled as to leave the place henceforth 
at the mercy of the conqueror. Babylonia now became 
a Persian province with Zopyros as its satrap. 

Another formidable antagonist Dareios found in 
Oroites, the satrap of Lydia, notorious as the murderer 
of Polykrates, the despot of Samos. Having 
Poiykrates made himself master of this island some 

at Samos. t j me b e f ore ^q Egyptian expedition of 

Kambyses, Polykrates had entered into a close alliance 
with Amasis, the king of Egypt. This alliance Amasis, 
we are told, broke off because he saw in the unbroken 
prosperity of Polykrates the surest token of coming dis- 
aster. In vain he urged his friend to torment himself if 
the gods would not chastise him. Polykrates, following 
his advice, flung his seal-ring into the deep sea ; a few 
days later it was found in the body of a fish which was to 
be served at his supper. Appalled at this unbroken good 
fortune, Amasis, so the story runs, threw up the alliance, 
in order that, when some evil fate overtook Polykrates, 
his own heart might not be grieved as for a friend. It is, 
however, more likely that it was broken off not by Amasis 
but by Polykrates himself, for the next thing related of 
him is an offer to furnish troops for the army of Kam- 
byses. The Persian king eagerly accepted the offer, and 
Polykrates as eagerly availed himself of the opportunity 
to get rid of those Samians whom he regarded as disaf- 
fected towards himself. Of these exiles some hurried to 
Sparta, and their importunities induced the Spartans and 
Corinthians to send a joint expedition to besiege Poly- 
krates in his capital which Herodotus describes as the 
most magnificent city in the world. But Spartan inca- 
pacity in blockade had early become a proverb. At 
Samos they grew tired of the task after having perse- 



ch. in.] Growth of the Persia?i Empire. 69 

vered in it for forty days ; and so came to an end the first 
Spartan expedition into Asia. But according to the re- 
ligious belief of Herodotus and his generation, the time 
was come when the man, whose prosperity had been thus 
far unclouded and who had received enjoyment as well 
from the friendship of the most illustrious poets of the 
day as from the great works for which he had rendered 
his island famous, should exhibit in his own person the 
working of that law which keeps human affairs in 
constant ebb and flow. This belief was justified by the 
story which ascribed to Oroites the wantonly treacherous 
murder of Polykrates ; but a mere hint given by the his- 
torian reveals the fact that Oroites had taken the part of 
the usurper Gomates, and explains his obstinate defiance 
of Dareios. How far Oroites in his conduct to Polykrates 
observed the rules of honorable warfare, we have no 
means of determining ; all that we need to notice here 
is that Oroites was slain, that after desperate calamities 
Syloson, the exiled brother of Polykrates, remained 
despot of Samos, and that thus the greatest of Hellenic 
cities passed in a state of desolation under the yoke of 
Dareios, who was known among his subjects rather as 
an organizer than as a conqueror, or, as the Persians 
put it, rather as a huckster than as the father of his 
people. 

Under the former kings the several portions of the 
empire had sent yearly gifts ; Dareios resolved that the 
twenty provinces of his empire should pay 
an assessed tribute. The system was a tionofthe 
rough and ready method for securing to P i re under 
the king a definite annual revenue. The Dareios - 
amount raised in excess of this sum would be determined 
by the rapacity or the cruelty of the satraps and their 
collectors who gathered the tribute from the native ma- 



70 The Persian Wars. [ch. hi. 

gistrates of the conquered peoples. Herodotus is naturally 
careful to state the measure of the burdens imposed on 
the Asiatic Greeks. With the Karians, Lykians, and 
some other tribes, the Ionians had to pay yearly 400 
silver talents, the Mysians and Lydians together being 
assessed in the sum of 500 talents. According to the 
account the whole revenue of the empire was about four 
millions and a quarter of English money. A further step 
in advance of his predecessors was the introduction by 
Dareios of coined money, and of the system of royal high 
roads furnished with permanent posting establishments 
at each stage. A journey of ninety days on one of these 
roads brought the traveler from Sardeis to Sousa. But 
although something was thus done for the wealth and 
dignity of the king, the Persian empire remained, as it 
had been, a mere agglomeration of units, with no other 
bond than that of a common liability to tribute and taxa- 
tion, with no common sentiment extending beyond the 
bounds of the several tribes, and with no inherent 
safeguards against disruption from without or decay and 
disorganization within. 

The sequel of the reign of Dareios is made up of two 
stories, each of which brings him into connection with 
the Greeks who were to work dire havoc on 
Demok<3es f *" s empire in the days of his son. The for- 
mer of these tales professes to explain the 
reasons which induced Dareios to despatch an exploring 
expedition to cities so remote as the Hellenic settlements 
in southern Italy. Among the Greeks who accompa- 
nied Polykrates on his last and fatal journey was Demo- 
kedes, a physician of Kroton, who, having the good luck 
to heal the injured foot of Dareios, was treated with roy- 
al honors, but for whom wealth apart from freedom, in 
his interpretation of the word, went for nothing. His 



CH. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 71 

one anxiety was to see his home once more ; and the 
possibility that he might accomplish his purpose flashed 
across his mind, when he was called in to prescribe for 
Atossa the wife of Dareios and mother of Xerxes. In 
return for the exercise of his skill Demokedes insisted 
on one condition ; and by the terms of the bargain 
Atossa appeared before Dareios to reproach him for sit- 
ting idle on his throne without making an effort to extend 
the Persian power. "A man who is young," she said, 
" and lord of vast kingdoms should do some great thing 
that the Persians may know that it is a man who rules 
over them." In reply Dareios said that he was about to 
make an expedition into Scythia. " Nay," answered 
Atossa (and to the Athenians who heard or read the 
narrative of Herodotus the words conveyed a delight- 
ful irony), " go not against the Scythians first. I have 
heard of the beauty of the women of Hellas, and desire 
to have Athenian and Spartan maidens among my slaves : 
and thou hast here one who above all men can show thee 
how thou mayest do this, — I mean him who has healed 
thy foot." Atossa, however, could obtain nothing more 
than an order that some ships should be sent to spy out 
the land and that Demokedes should serve as guide. 
The physician was determined that the voyage should 
be extended to the Italian coast. At Taras [Tarentum] 
he prevailed on the tyrant of the place to shut up the 
Persians in prison while he made his escape to Kroton. 
These luckless men were set free from their dungeon 
only to suffer shipwreck and to be made slaves. Such 
of them as were ransomed made their way back to Da- 
reios with a message from Demokedes explaining that 
he could not fulfil his solemn promise of returning be- 
cause he had married the daughter of Milon the wrest- 
ler. This gross treachery, with the disasters which it 



72 The Persian Wars. [ch. hi. 

brought in its train, might well rouse any despot's rage 
and impel him to take immediate vengeance. But there 
is not even a hint that it spurred Dareios on to the work 
of preparation, or drew from him the least expression of 
anger. The next incident related in his history is not 
the dispatching of an army against the western Greeks, 
but his own departure for that invasion of Scythia which 
Atossa had prayed him to postpone in favor of her own 
plan. The mission of Demokodes is thus, as a political 
motive, superfluous, while his motives in risking the ruin 
of all the Greek states for the sake of securing his own 
return to Kroton are unfathomable. The Persian ships, 
it is true, would have been welcomed at Athens, for there 
the dynasty of Peisistratos was still in power ; but the 
traditions which relate the fall of the Lydian kingdom 
indicate no little indignation among other Greek states 
at the subjugation of their eastern kinsfolk by Cyrus, 
and make it highly unlikely that a Persian squadron 
would be suffered to move safely along the coasts of the 
Peleponnesos. Politically, Dareios would have been 
wise in attacking the Greeks while he still had a sup- 
porter at Athens ; but the fact that he made no attempt 
to do so seems sufficiently to prove that the idea never 
entered his mind, and that the expedition which ended 
in the battle of Marathon was brought about immediately 
by the persistent intrigues of the Peisistratidai after their 
expulsion. The story of Demokedes is superfluous from 
another point of view. The fall of Kroisos had brought 
the Persians into direct conflict with the Asiatic Greeks ; 
and through these a struggle was perhaps from the first 
inevitable with their kinsmen in the west. The desire of 
having Hellenic maidens as her slaves might therefore 
be awakened in Atossa without the intervention of De- 
mokedes : nor could her charge of sloth against the king 



en. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 73 

be maintained without glaring falsehood. Unless Dareios 
lied in the inscription which he carved on the rocks of 
Behistun, no room is left for imputations of military 
inactivity in the first or in any other part of his reign. 

The Scythian expedition of Dareios is an enterprise 
which must be noticed, as it is directly connected with 
the fortunes of Miltiades, the future victor £x ^.^ 
of Marathon, and of some of the most pro- of Dareios 
minent actors in the Ionian revolt which pre- 
ceded the invasion of Attica by Datis and Artaphernes. 
Over a bridge of boats across the Bosporos Dareios 
marched through Thrace to the spot where the Ionians 
had already prepared another bridge of boats by which 
he was to cross the Istros (Danube). This bridge Dareios 
wished at first to break up immediately after his passage : 
but when K6es, the tyrant of Mytilene, warned him of 
the danger (not of defeat in battle, for this he professed 
to regard as impossible, but) of starvation, he ordered 
the Ionians to keep guard for sixty days and then, if by 
that time he should not have returned, to break up the 
bridge. Once in the Scythian land, the Persians, we are 
told, were lured across the Tanais to the banks of the 
Oaros, whence the Scythians who acted as decoys began 
to move westwards. Eagerly pursuing them, yet never 
able to come up with them, Dareios at last in sheer wea- 
riness sent a message to the Scythian king, bidding him 
to submit and give earth and water, or else to come for- 
ward and fight like a man. The reply was that the 
Scythians were only following their usual habits of 
moving about, and that if Dareios wished to see how 
they could fight, he had only to lay hands on the tombs 
of their forefathers. He was thus obliged to go on his 
way, finding his most efficient allies in the donkeys and 
mules of his army which by their braying or by their 
G 



74 The Persian Wars. [ch. in. 

odd looks frightened the Scythian cavalry. The mono- 
tony of his course was at last broken by the arrival of a 
herald who brought as gifts for the king a bird, a mouse, 
a frog, and five arrows. In the king's belief these gifts 
meant that the Scythians yielded up themselves, their 
land, and their water, because the mouse lives on the 
land and the frog in the water, while the bird signified 
the horses of warriors, and the arrows showed that they 
surrendered their weapons. But Dareios was dismayed 
to learn that the signs could be interpreted as a warning 
that unless they could become birds and fly up into 
heaven, or go down like mice beneath the earth, or be- 
coming frogs leap into the lake, they would be shot to 
death by the Scythian arrows. An immediate retreat 
was ordered to the bridge across the Istros; but the 
Scythians, taking a shorter road, arrived before him 
and urged the lonians to abandon their trust, not only 
because by so doing they would free themselves but be- 
cause they had no right to aid and abet a wanton inva- 
der. The advice of Miltiades was to do as the Scythians 
wished; but though the other despots gave at first an 
eager assent, they changed their minds when Histiaios 
of Miletos warned them that only through the help of 
Dareios could they hope to retain their power; and thus 
Miltiades found himself opposed to eleven tyrants, six 
of whom were from the Hellespont while four ruled over 
Ionian cities, the eleventh being the Aiolian Aristagoras 
of KymS. Pretending therefore to follow their advice, 
the Greeks urged the Scythians to go in search of the 
Persian host and destroy it. The Scythians hurried off, 
and were as unsuccessful now in finding the Persians as 
the Persians had been in tracking the Scythians. Mean- 
while Dareios hurried to the bridge : and the Scythians 
on learning how they had been tricked comforted them- 



CH. in.] Growth of the Persian Empire. 75 

selves by reviling the Ionians as cowards who hug their 
chains. 

So ends a narrative in which all that takes place on 
the Scythian side of the Danube is like a bewildering 
dream. The great rivers which water the 
vast regions to the north of the Black Sea at the bridge 
are forgotten in a description of the wander- Danube^ 
ings of a million of men in a country which 
yielded no food and in many places no water. An east- 
ward march of 700 or 800 miles in which no great stream 
is crossed except the Tanais (the Don), and in which 
the Scythians never attack them when to attack them 
would be to destroy them utterly, is followed by a march 
of a like length westward, with the same result. The 
motive assigned for the expedition is the desire of Dareios 
to avenge the wrong done by the Scythians to the Median 
empire about a hundred years before ; but this motive is 
scarcely more constraining than that which is supposed 
to have taken the Persians to Egypt to avenge the 
slaughter of their remote forefathers by Rameses or 
Sesostris. As to the incidents at the bridge, it is enough 
to say that either the Ionians were faithful to Dareios, or 
they were not ; that the Scythians either were, or were 
not, in earnest in their efforts to defend their country 
and to punish the invaders ; and that in either case these 
incidents could not have taken place. Whether the 
Greeks wished to abandon Dareios or to save him, they 
most have urged the Scythians to remain on the bank, in 
the one case that the Scythians might fall victims to the 
Persians, in the other that they might destroy the Persian 
army in the confusion caused by the efforts of an un- 
wieldy multitude caught in a snare. The Scythians, 
indeed, are represented as knowing perfectly well the po- 
sition of the Persian army at every stage of their march ; 



76 The Persian Wars. [ch. ill, 

and therefore, as knowing that Dareios was in full retreat 
for the bridge, they knew that he and his army must 
cross it or speedily perish. Yet they are infatuated 
enough to depart at the bidding of the Ionians to go and 
look for an enemy, whom, if only they remained where 
they were, they might certainly slaughter at their ease. 
They had nothing to do but concentrate their forces on 
the eastern bank, leaving empty a space of a few furlongs 
or miles in front of the bridge, and the Persian host 
must have run into the jaws of utter destruction. 

It is, however, perfectly natural that the Greek tradi- 
tion should represent the defeat of the Persian king as 

more disastrous than it really was, or even 
°P^ rati< ? ns invent a defeat when the enterprise was 
zosin comparatively successful. It is most sig- 

nificant that with the passage of the Danube 
on his return all the difficulties of Dareios disappear. It 
was his wish that the Thrakians should be made his sub- 
jects ; and his general Megabazos bears down all oppo- 
sition with a vigor to which Scythian revenge? it might 
be thought, would offer some hindrance, for we are told 
that they made a raid as far as the Chersonesos and even 
sent to Sparta to propose a joint attack on the Persians. 
But from the Scythians Megabazos encounters no oppo- 
sition ; and his course to the Strymon is one of unin- 
terrupted conquest. Near the mouth of this river was the 
Edonian town of Myrkinos in a neighborhood rich in 
forests and corn-lands as well as in mines of gold and 
silver. Here when the Great King announced his wish 
to reward his benefactors, Histiaios begged that he might 
be allowed to take up his abode, while Koes contented 
himself with asking that he might be made despot of 
Mytilene. The supremacy of the Persian king was at 
this time extended to the regions of the Paionian and 



ch. iv.] The Early History of Athens. 77 

Makedonian tribes as well as to the island of Lemnos. 
But Lemnos was not to remain long under Persian power. 
When a little while later the resources of the empire 
were being strained to suppress the Ionic revolt, the 
Athenian Miltiades made a descent on the island, which 
remained henceforth closely connected with Athens, the 
future bulwark of Greece and of Europe against the law- 
less domination of an oriental despot. 



CHAPTER IV. 



HISTORY OF ATHENS IN THE TIMES OF SOLON, 
PEISISTRATOS AND KLEISTHENES. 

Athens was at this time under the government of ty- 
rants, from whom the Persian King might naturally look 
for something more than indifference or neu- _ , . 

° , . Growth of 

trality in any enterprise for the extension of hereditary 
his empire in Europe. Yet from Athens lmong g the 7 
Dareios was to experience the first steady Greeks - 
resistance to his schemes, and her citizens were to deal 
on his power in his own life-time a blow more serious than 
any which it had yet received. So far as he could see, 
there was nothing in the condition of Athens to distin- 
guish it from the many other Greek cities which either 
were or had been governed by tyrants ; nor can we un- 
derstand why at Athens tyranny should be followed by 
results so different from those which it produced at Co- 
rinth, unless we go back to the earlier state of things 
which rendered such despotism possible. We have al- 
ready seen that the natural tendency of the earnest 
Greek, as of other Aryan society, would be towards an 



78 The Persia?i Wars. [ch. iv. 

oligarchy of chiefs, each of whom ruled his family by 
the most solemn of religious sanctions, as the represen- 
tative of the founder who had become the object of the 
family worship, although his life on earth had been little 
better than that of the beast in his den. If the family, as 
years went on, was extended into a clan, if the clan by 
union with other clans formed a tribe, if an aggregation 
of tribes grew into a city, the principle of authority re- 
mained the same. The city, the tribe, the clan, the 
family, each had its own altar and its own ritual, and in 
each the magistrate was both priest and king. But there 
would always be the temptation for any head of a tribe or 
clan, who had the power, to make himself master of his 
fellow-chiefs, and such a chief would claim from his 
former colleagues the submission which they exacted 
from their own subjects. He would, in short, be the irre- 
sponsible holder of an authority founded on divine right^ 
and as such, he would claim the further right of trans- 
mitting his power to his heir. Thus in the East, where 
slavery seems indigenous, would grow up the servile awe 
of kings, who, as representatives of the deity, showed 
themselves only on rare occasions in all the paraphernalia 
of barbaric royalty, and otherwise remained in the seclu- 
sion of the seraglio, objects of mysterious veneration and 
dread. No such Basileis, or kings, as these established 
themselves beyond the bounds of Asia and Africa; and 
although many, perhaps most, of the Greek cities came 
to be ruled by hereditary sovereigns, the distinction be- 
tween the Basileus or the hereditary chief, and the des- 
pot or tyrant who had subverted a free constitution, 
was never very strongly marked. It is true that for 'the 
former, as such, the Greek professed to feel no special 
aversion, while the latter was a wild beast to be hunted 
down with any weapons and in any way ; but practically 



gh. iv.] Early History of Athens. 79 

the Greek regarded a Basileus as a growth which could 
not well be produced on Hellenic soil, nor could he 
easily be brought to look upon Greek kings with the re- 
spect which he willingly paid to the sovereigns of Sousa, 
Nineveh, or Babylon. When therefore a Greek dynasty 
was set aside and an oligarchy established in its place, 
this was strictly nothing more than a return to the earlier 
form of government. The great chiefs resumed the full 
rights, of which they had conceded, or been compelled 
to yield, some portion to the king. For this reason also 
the change from monarchy to oligarchy seems to have 
been effected generally without any great convulsion and 
even without much disturbance. 

It might be supposed that the Greek cities which were 
thus governed by oligarchies were on the high road to 
constitutional order and freedom. But 
nothing could be further from the truth; tyrannies, 
for though the oligarch could not fail to 
see a large multitude lying beyond the sacred circle of 
his order, yet it was a sacred circle, and beyond its 
limits he recognised no duties. Between him and those 
men whom his forefathers had reduced to subjection or 
to slavery there was no bond of blood, and therefore 
there could be no community of religion. They could 
not therefore share his worship ; and as without worship 
no function of government could be carried on, their 
admission to political power could be only profanation. 
Thus for the subject or inferior classes the change from 
kingship to oligarchy had been in theory no change at 
all ; and the latter state of things differed from the former 
only in this, that even in the ruling class there were per- 
sons who to achieve their own selfish purpose might 
court the favor of the people and enlist their aid by 
promising them justice. This was, in fact, the most po- 



80 The Persian Wars. [ch. iv. 

tent, and perhaps the most frequently employed, of the 
modes by which some ambitious or discontented mem- 
ber of the ruling class succeeded in making himself ab- 
solute. Coming forward in the character of the dema- 
gogue, and declaiming against the insolence and cruelty 
of his fellow Eupatrids, perhaps exhibiting in his own 
person the pretended evidences of their brutality, the 
man who aimed at supreme power induced the people to 
take up arms in his behalf and so surround him with a 
body-guard. The next step was to gain a commanding 
military position ; and if he could gather around him a 
band of foreign mercenaries, his task was at once practi- 
cally accomplished. 

The history of the Peisistratidai at Athens sufficiently 
illustrates the means by which tyrannies were established 
_ . , . and put down : and when we find stories 

Early his- r 

toryofthe m ore or less resembling the Athenian tra- 
peopfe. an ditions told of other Greek cities at the same 

or in earlier times, we may fairly infer that 
throughout Hellas generally the change was going on 
which, by the substitution of oligarchical for kingly rule, 
followed by the usurpation of despots who made the sway 
of one man still more hateful, fostered the growth of the 
democratic spirit, until it became strong enough to 
sweep away every obstacle in its free development. But 
that which distinguished Athens from other cities in which 
these changes were going on was the work which Solon 
began and in great part carried out before Peisistratos 
made himself master of the city. If we may judge from 
the descriptions left to us by Solon himself, the internal 
condition of the country was one of extreme misery. 
The men who bore rule in the state were guilty of gross 
injustice and of violent robberies among themselves, 
while of the poor many were in chains and had been 



ch. iv.] Early History of Athens. 81 

sold away even into foreign slavery. Nay, in the indig- 
nant appeal which, after carrying out his reforms, Solon 
addresses to the Black Earth as a person, he speaks of 
the land itself as having been in some way enslaved and 
as being now by himself set free, by the removal of 
boundaries which had been fixed in many places. Many 
again, he adds, had through his efforts been redeemed 
from foreign captivity, while those who on Attic soil 
were reduced to slavery and trembled before their despots 
were now raised to the condition of freemen. This 
sketch exhibits the Athenian people as divided practical- 
ly into two classes, the one consisting of the Eupatrid or 
blue-blooded nobles who were the owners of the land, 
the other of the Thetes or peasants, known also as Hek- 
temorioi from the sixth portion of the produce of the 
soil which they paid as the terms of their tenure. Failure 
in the performance of this contract left the peasant much 
at the mercy of his lord, who probably noted the defi- 
ciency of the present year as a debt to be paid during 
the following year. Certain it is that when this debt had 
risen to an amount which made payment in kind hope- 
less, the lord might sell the tenant and his family into 
slavery ; and as a hard season might at any time place 
him in this condition of debt, the utter insecurity of his 
position left him but little raised above the level of the 
slave, On land enclosed within the sacred boundary 
stones he could never be more than a tiller of the soil ; 
and that the greater part of the Athenian soil was shut 
in by these landmarks, is asserted by Solon himself. 
Thus we have on the one side a few heads of families 
who might in the strictest sense of the term be spoken of 
as despots, and on the other the dependents who 
trembled before them but who were suffered to draw their 
livelihood from the soil on paying the sixth portion of 



82 The Persian Wars. [ch. iv. 

the produce. It is true that even this fixed payment 
marks a step forward in the condition of the laborer who 
had started without even this poor semblance of right, 
for so long as the tenant's freedom depended on the 
caprice of the lord or the scantiness of a harvest, it was 
but a semblance after all. In short, he had never been 
legally set free from the servile state, and in default of 
payment to that state he reverted. So long as things 
continued thus, Solon might with perfect truth say that 
the land itself was enslaved, for the scanty class of small 
proprietors, even if any such then existed, would be 
powerless against the Eupatrid land-owners. It was not 
less obvious that things could not go on indefinitely as 
they were. Either the half-emancipated peasant must 
become a free owner of the soil, or he must fall back 
into his original subjection. Here then, in dealing with 
grievances which every year must become less and less 
tolerable, Solon had abundant materials for his much- 
discussed measure known as the Seisachtheia or Re- 
moval of Burdens ; and the measures which such a state 
of things would render necessary are precisely those 
which seem to be indicated by his words. From all 
lands occupied by cultivators on condition of yielding a 
portion of the produce he removed the pillars which 
marked the religious ownership of the Eupatridai, and 
lightened the burdens of the cultivators by lessening the 
amount of produce or money which henceforth took the 
shape of a rent. In short, a body of free laborers and 
poor land-owners was not so much relieved of a heavy 
pressure as for the first time called into being. 

This Relief-act was a part only of Solon's 

fidtion of" work. There had grown up in Attica a large 

by e Soion nS population not included in any tribe, — in 

other words, possessing no religious title to 



CH. iv.] Early History of Athens. 83 

political privileges, and therefore in the opinion of the 
Eupatrids incapable of taking part in the ordering of the 
state except at the cost of impiety. But in this popula- 
tion were included men from whose energy and thrift the 
country might derive special benefit ; and it was clear 
that the statesman, if he wished to avail himself of their 
activity, must introduce a new classification which should 
take in all the free inhabitants of the land without refe- 
rence to affinities of blood, and based wholly on property. 
The result of this change which divided the free popula- 
tion into four classes according to their yearly income, 
was that it excluded the poor Eupatrid from offices and 
honors which he regarded as the inalienable and ex- 
clusive inheritance of the old nobility. If this property 
fell short of 500 bushels of wheat annually, he could not 
be a member of the great council of Areiopagos, nor 
could he be elected among the nine archons or magis- 
trates who became permanent members of that body, if, 
at the end of their year of office, their public conduct 
should have been found satisfactory. These high officers 
were thus made accountable for their administration and 
liable to impeachment in case of misbehaviour, while 
they were elected by the whole body of the citizens, in- 
cluding, of course, as the Eupatrids called them, the 
rabble of the fourth class. But if by exclusion of the 
poorer Eupatrids from these great offices the spell of the 
ancient despotism of religion and blood was broken, the 
relations of the tribes to the state continued nevertheless 
unchanged. Unless the citizen belonged to a tribe, he 
could not, even if he belonged to the richest class, be 
either an archon or a member of the Areiopagos, nor 
could he belong to the Probouleutic Council or Senate, 
which determined the measures to be submitted to 
the public assembly, and which consisted of 400 



84 The Persian Wars. [ch. iv. 

members, in the proportion of one hundred for each 
tribe. 

Thus by giving to every citizen a place in the great 
council which elected the chief magistrates and reviewed 

their conduct at the end of their year of 
the S kgisl°a- office, and by securing to all the right of per. 
g 10 , n of sonal appeal to the archon, Solon assured to 

the main body of the people a certain inde- 
pendence of the Eupatrids, which might hereafter be 
' built up into a compact fabric of civil liberty ; but since 
no one who did not possess the religious title, as being 
the member of a tribe, could hold office, Solon prac- 
tically left the constitution, as he found it, oligarchic. 
Still his conviction that he had done much to improve 
the condition of his countrymen generally is attested by 
the condition which represents him as binding the Athe- 
nians for ten, or as some said, for a hundred years, to 
suffer no change to be made in his laws, and then to 
make it impossible that such change might come from 
himself, departing on a pilgrimage which, as we know 
from his own words, took him to Egypt and to Kypros 
(Cyprus). Of a visit to Sardeis the fragments of his 
poems say nothing : nor could they say anything, if the 
fall of Kroisos took place nearly half a century after his 
legislation. When Solon returned to Athens, the tide 
had turned; and the comparative harmony which had 
enabled him to carry his reforms had given place to 
turbulence and faction. The Eupatrid land-owners of the 
plain, called Pediaians, were ranged under Lykourgos ; 
the Paralians, or those of the coast, had sided with the 
Alkmaionid Megakles, while Peisistratos headed the men 
of the hills. In the struggle which ensued Solon, it is 
said, foresaw that Peisistratos must be the conqueror; 
but he strove in vain to rouse the Athenians to combine 



ch. iv.] Early History of Athens. 85 

against the tyranny with which they were threatened. 
To no purpose he stood in his armor at the door of his 
house ; and he could but console himself with the thought 
that he had done his duty, and reply to those who asked 
him on what he relied to save himself from the ven- 
geance of his enemies, " On my old age." Peisistratos, 
we are told, did him no harm ; and the man who had 
done more than any other who had gone before him to 
make his country free died in peace, full of years and 
with a fame which is the purer for the unselfishness 
which refused to employ for his own exaltation opportu- 
nities greater than any which fell to the lot even of 
Peisistratos himself. 

The success of this man is sufficient evidence of the 
slow growth of the democratic spirit among the Athe- 
nians. As the champion of the hill-men, Usur ation 
Peisistratos went to Athens, and declared of Peisistra- 
that he had narrowly escaped from his ene- 
mies, who had fallen upon him in the country. Pointing 
to the wounds, which he had inflicted on his mules and 
on himself, as attesting the truth of his story, he prayed 
the people to grant him a body-guard, for his protection 
against the weapons of the rival factions or parties. His 
request was granted, in spite, it is said, of the strenuous 
opposition of Solon ; and the disguise was thrown off, 
when, with the help of his spear-bearers, he seized the 
Akropolis, and Megakles with the Alkmaionids fled from 
the city. 

Having thus made himself master of Athens Peisis- 
tratos, in the opinion of Herodotus, ruled wisely and 
well, without introducing" a single constitu- „ , 

i , , TT . , , . . , Subsequent 

tional change. With sound instinct he per- fortunes of 
ceived that the Solonian forms were suffi- 
ciently oligarchic in spirit to suit his purposes ; but 



86 The Persian Wars. [ch. iv. 

although Athens had thus the benefit of a despotism 
lightened as it had been lightened in no other Hellenic 
city, the wisdom and other good qualities of Peisistratos 
and his successors failed to make the course of their 
despotism run smoothly. The first disaster, we are told, 
was not long in coming. Peisistratos owed his power to 
the divisions among the people ; and a coalition of the 
men of the plain and of the sea- coast was at once 
followed by his expulsion. A reconciliation with Mega- 
kles the leader of the coast-men brought about his 
restoration, to be followed by a second expulsion when 
that compact was broken. Ten years had passed in 
exile, when Peisistratos contrived to occupy Marathon 
without opposition, and to surprise the Athenian army 
which came out against him. Master of the Akropolis 
for the third time, he resolved to leave no room for the 
combination which had twice driven him away. Mega- 
kles with his adherents left the country ; the rest of his 
opponents were compelled to give hostages whom he 
placed in the keeping of the tyrant of Naxos ; and his 
power was finally established by a large force of Thra- 
kian mercenaries. 

For Peisistratos himself there were to be no more al- 
ternations of disaster and success. He died tyrant of 
Despotism of Athens, 527 B.C., and his sons Hippias and 
pias S and Hip " Hipparchos followed, we are told, the ex- 
Hipparchos. ample of sobriety and moderation set by 
their father. But their political foresight failed to guard 
them against dangers arising from their personal vices. 
In an evil hour Hipparchos sought to form a shameful 
intimacy with the beautiful Harmodios. The fears or the 
wrath of Aristogeiton were roused by this attempt on his 
paramour ; and the Peisistratid dynasty brought on itself 
the doom which for the same reason befell many another 



ch. iv.] Early History of Athens. 87 

dynasty in Hellas and elsewhere. Supported by a body 
of conspirators, Aristogeiton determined to strike down 
the tyrants in the great Panathenaic procession : but 
when the day came, one of his accomplices was seen 
talking familiarly with Hippias. Fearing betrayal, Aris- 
togeiton and his partisans, hurrying away, fell on Hip- 
parchos and slew him. For four years longer Hippias 
remained despot of Athens : but his rule was marked 
henceforth by suspicion and harshness and by the mur- 
der of many citizens. In the time of Thucydides it was 
the almost universal belief at Athens that Hipparchos 
succeeded Peisistratos as his eldest son, and that the 
deed of Aristogeiton and Harmodios not merely avenged 
a private wrong but gave freedom to the land. Not only 
did the popular song hallow with the myrtle wreath the 
sword which had slain the tyrant and given back equal 
laws to Athens ; but the honors and immunities from all 
public burdens granted to their descendants attested the 
strength of the popular conviction that the dynasty came 
to an end with the assassination of Hipparchos. Thucy- 
dides is careful to point out that the belief was a delusion. 
Hippias, not Hipparchos, was the elder son ; and far 
from ceasing to rule when his brother died, he thence- 
forth made Athens feel the scourge of tyranny. But the 
circumstances attending the death of his brother warned 
Hippias that yet more disasters might be in store for 
him, and that he would do well to provide betimes against 
the evil day. His decision led to momentous conse- 
quences in the history of Athens and of the world. His 
thoughts turned to the Persian king, whose power after 
the fall of the Lydian monarchy had been extended to 
the shores of the Hellespont and to whom the Athenian 
settlement at Sigeion had thus become tributary. To the 
Chersonesos or peninsula on which this city was situated 



88 The Persian Wars, [ch. iv. 

Hippias had sent Miltiades, the future victor of Marathon, 
as governor. Here Miltiades maintained himself with 
the aid of a body of mercenaries and married the 
daughter of the Trakian chief Oloros. Hippias also saw 
the advantage of political marriages. The tyrant of 
Lampsakos was in high favor with the Persian king 
Dareios, and Hippias gladly bestowed his daughter on 
his son, although an Athenian might fairly look down 
upon a Lampsakene. In Sigeion, then, he thought that 
he might have a safe refuge, and in the Lampsakene 
despot he found a friend through whom he gained per- 
sonal access to the Persian king. 

While Hippias was thus guarding himself against pos- 
sible disasters, the intrigues of the Alkmaionidai were 
preparing the way for the expulsion which 
mppias°from he dreaded. About five years before the 
Athens. marriage of his daughter the Delphian 

temple had been burnt by accident. Taking the contract 
for its restoration, the Alkmaionids carried out the work 
with a magnificence altogether beyond the terms of their 
engagements ; and availing themselves of the feelings of 
gratitude roused by their generosity, they desired that to 
all Spartans who might consult the oracle one answer 
should be returned, "Athens must beset free." The 
Delphians took care that this should be done ; and the 
Spartans, wearied out by the repetition of the command, 
sorely against their will sent an army by sea. But Hip- 
pias had been forewarned. In the battle fought on the 
Phalerian plain the Spartan leader was slain and his 
army routed. Still urged on by the oracle, the Spartans 
invaded Attica under their King Kleomenes ; but their 
skill as besiegers was beneath contempt, and their disin- 
clination for the task which they had taken in hand was 
fast growing into disgust, when the children of Hippias 



ch. iv.] Early History of Athens. 89 

were taken in an attempt to smuggle them out of the 
country. The tables were turned, and for the recovery 
of his children Hippias agreed to leave Attica within five 
days. Thus, after the lapse of fifty years 
from the establishment of the first tyranny 
of Peisistratos, the last despot of the house betook him- 
self to the refuge which he had prepared on the banks of 
the Skamandros : and a pillar on the Akropolis set forth 
for the execration of future ages the evil deeds of the 
dynasty and the names of its members. 

The expulsion of Hippias was followed almost imme- 
diately by a wonderful development of the principle 
involved in the legislation of Solon. That The reforms 
legislation had acknowledged the right of all of Kleisthe- 
citizens to share in the work of government ; 
but, unless a despotism came in the way, the scant mea- 
sure of power which he granted to the vast majority was 
sure to lead sooner or later to more momentous changes. 
It was not likely that perhaps seven-tenths of the people 
should patiently endure their exclusion not only from the 
archonship and the council of Areiopagos but from the 
senate of the Four Hundred. Such a constitution as this 
a despot, hedged behind the spears of his mercenaries, 
could without difficulty use for his own purposes. With 
the loss of freedom of speech the powers of the general 
assembly of the citizens would fall into abeyance, while 
the archons would become his subservient instruments. 
The story which he tells us that Peisistratos obeyed a 
summons citing him to appear before the archons tells 
us also that his accuser failed to put in an appearance 
on the day of trial. With the expulsion of Hippias the 
Solonian laws nominally resumed their force ; but their 
action was for a time hindered by a renewal of the fac- 
tions which it was the object of the Solonian constitution 
H 



90 The Persia7i Wars. [ch. iv. 

to put down, — the contending parties being the Alk- 
maionid Kleisthenes, who was popularly credited with 
the corruption of the Delphian priestess, and a member 
of a noble house named Isagoras. Kleisthenes was de- 
feated : but when we find that on being thus repulsed he 
took the people into partnership and that his first act 
was to substitute new tribes for the old, we see that the 
contest went to the very foundations of the old social 
order. All the citizens who were not members of phra- 
triai or tribes, and who were therefore, no matter what 
might be their wealth, thrust down into the fourth class, 
ranged themselves necessarily on his side : and thus 
Kleisthenes numbered among his partisans the most in- 
telligent and enterprising men in the land. The discon- 
tent of such men would be a serious and growing danger 
to the state : nor could Kleisthenes fail to see that if he 
wished to put out a fire which was always smouldering 
and might at any time burst into furious flame, he must 
strike at the root of the religious organization which 
effectually hindered the political growth of the whole 
people. To create new tribes on a level with the old 
ones was an impossibility : to add to the number of 
phratries or families contained in them would be equiva- 
lent to the commission of a sacrilege. There was there- 
fore nothing left but to do away with the religious tribes 
as political units and to substitute for them a larger num- 
ber of new tribes divided into cantons taking in the 
whole body of the Athenian citizens. Such a change, 
although it left the houses and clans or phratries un- 
touched as religious societies founded on an exclusive 
worship, would be regarded by the conservative Eu- 
patrid as virtually a death-blow to the old political faith, 
Nothing more is needed to explain the vehement oppo- 
sition of Isagoras. It was the proposal of this change 



CH. iv.] Early History of Athens. 91 

which roused his antagonism, and not the rivalry of 
Isagoras which led Kleisthenes to put forth his scheme 
as a new method of winning popularity. The struggle at 
Athens is reflected in the strife between the patricians 
and the plebeians of Rome, and again between the great 
families of the German and Italian cities in the middle 
ages and the guilds which grew up around them. 

But Kleisthenes had learned by a long and hard ex- 
perience to guard against the outbreak of factions and 
local jealousies. This end he endeavored 
to attain by two means,— the one being the £i h b e es new 
splitting up of the tribes in portions scattered 
over the country, the other being the Ostracism. So 
carefully did he provide that the cantons of the tribes 
should not be generally adjacent that the five Demoi or 
cantons of Athens itself belonged to five different tribes. 
The demos or canton, in short, became in many respects 
like our parish, each having its one place of worship 
with its special rites and watching over its own local in- 
terests, each levying its own taxes and keeping its re- 
gister of enrolled citizens. This association, which was 
seen further in the common worship of each tribe in its 
own chapel, differed from the religious society of the old 
patrician houses in its extension to all citizens ; but it 
served to keep up the exclusiveness which distinguished 
the polity of the most advanced of ancient democracies 
from the theory of modern citizenship. 

If, however, those citizens who had not belonged to 
the old religious tribes would find their interest in the 
new order of things, the genuine Eupatrid 
oligarchs would regard it with indignant T . he ° stra - 

43 & ° cism. 

hatred. For such men there would always 

be a strong temptation to subvert a constitution from 

which they had nothing to expect but constant encroach- 



92 The Persian Wars. [ch. iv. 

ments on their ancient privileges : and if one like Pei- 
sistratos or Isagoras should give the signal for strife, the 
state could look to the people alone to maintain the law. 
In other words, the only way to peace and order would 
lie through civil war. It became, therefore, indispensa- 
bly necessary to provide a machinery by which the plots 
of such men might be anticipated, and which without 
violence or bloodshed should do the work of the mer- 
cenaries or assassins of the despot ; and it was accord- 
ingly left to the citizens to decide, once perhaps in each 
year, by their secret and irresponsible vote, whether for 
the safety of the whole community one or more of the 
citizens should go for a definite period of years into an 
exile which involved neither loss of property nor civil 
infamy. Against the abuse even of this power the most 
jealous precautions were taken. The necessity of the 
measure was fully discussed in the Probouleutic or con- 
sulate Senate which now consisted no longer of 400 re- 
presentatives of the old religious tribes, but of 500, each 
of the ten new tribes being represented by 50 senators, 
elected apparently by lot. Even when it was decided 
that the condition of affairs called for the application of 
ostracism, the people were simply invited to name on 
the shells by which their votes were given the man 
whose presence they might regard as involving serious 
danger to the commonwealth. No one could be sent in- 
to exile unless at least 6,000 votes, amounting to perhaps 
one-fourth of the votes of the whole body of citizens, 
were given against him. The result might be that a 
smaller number of votes demanded the banishment of 
an indefinite number of citizens, and in this case the 
ceremony went for nothing. If more than 6,000 votes 
were given against any man, he received warning to 
quit Athens within ten days ; but he departed without 



ch. iv.] Early History of Athens. 93 

civil disgrace and without losing any property. Thus 
without bloodshed or strife the state was freed from the 
presence of a man who might be tempted to upset the 
laws of his country ; and this relief was obtained by a 
mode which left no room for the indulgence of personal 
ill-will. The evil thus met belonged strictly to a grow- 
ing community in which constitutional morality had not 
yet taken firm root. The remedy therefore was neces- 
sarily provisional, and it fell into disuse just when the 
government of Athens was most thoroughly democratic. 
It was this constitution with its free-spoken Ekklesia 
or council of the people, its permanent senate, and its 
new military organization, which Isagoras opposition of 
resolved, if it were possible, to overthrow. ? sa go ra s end- 

' x ing in the tri- 

With true oligarchical instinct, he saw that umph of 

,,,,,. , . , Kleisthenes. 

unless he could check the impulse given by 
freedom of speech and by admitting to public offices all 
but the poorest class of citizens, the result must be the 
growth of a popular sentiment which would make the 
revival of Eupatrid ascendency a mere dream. The 
Alkmaionids had lain for more than a century under a 
curse pronounced on them for their share in the death of 
Kylon or his adherents after their seizure of the Akro- 
polis. Of the religious terrors inspired by this curse Isa- 
goras, aided by his friend the Spartan King Kleomenes, 
so successfully availed himself that Kleisthenes with 
many others was constrained to leave Athens. Enter- 
ing the city after his departure, Kleomenes drove out, 
as lying under the curse, 700 families whose names had 
been furnished to him by Isagoras. Here his sucess 
ended. The council of Five Hundred refused to dis- 
solve themselves at his bidding. Taking refuge with 
Isagoras and his adherents in the Akropolis, Kleomenes 
was compelled, after a blockade of three days, to make 



94 The Persian Wars. [ch. iv. 

terms for his own departure and that of Isagoras, leav- 
ing the followers of the latter to their fate ; and nothing 
less than the death of these men would now satisfy the 
exasperated people. The retreat of Kleomenes was fol- 
lowed by the return of Kleisthenes and the exiled 
families. 

With Sparta it was obvious that the Athenians now 
had a deadly quarrel, and on the other side they knew 
that Hippias was seeking to precipitate on 
the A^hJnians 1 them the power of the Persian king. It 
satfap a of erneS seemed therefore to be a matter of stern 
Sardeis. necessity to anticipate the intrigues of their 

banished tyrant ; and the Athenians accord- 
ingly sent ambassadors to Sardeis to make an indepen- 
dent alliance with the Persian despot. The envoys on 
being brought into the presence of Artaphernes, the 
satrap of Lydia, were told that Dareios would admit 
them to an alliance if they would give him earth and 
water, — in other words, if they would acknowledge them- 
selves his slaves. To this demand of absolute subjec- 
tion the envoys gave an assent which was indignantly 
repudiated by the whole body of Athenian citizens. 
This memorable incident, is, in itself, of extreme signifi- 
cance ; and it is impossible to lay too great stress upon 
it in connection with the subsequent narrative of events 
directly leading to the great struggle which ended in the 
defeat of Xerxes. 

Foiled for the time in his efforts, Kleomenes was not 
cast down. Regarding the Kleisthenian constitution as 
a personal insult to himself, he was resolved 
effor U ts e of f the e that Isa g oras should be despot at Athens. 
Spartans for Summoning the allies of Sparta, he led them 
of e mpp°ias. 10n as far as Eleusis, 12 miles only from Athens, 
without informing them of the purpose of 



ch. IV.] Early History of Athens. 95 

his campaign. He had no sooner confessed it than the 
Corinthians, declaring that they had been brought away 
from home on an unrighteous errand, went back, fol- 
lowed by the other Spartan King, Demaratos the son of 
Ariston ; and this conflict of opinion broke up the rest 
of the army. This discomfiture of their enemy seemed 
to inspire fresh strength into the Athenians, who won a 
series of victories over the Boiotians and Euboians. 
Speaking of this outbreak of warlike activity, Herodotus 
cannot repress his conviction that freedom of speech is 
a right good thing, since under their tyrants the Athe- 
nians were in war no better than their neighbors, while 
on being rid of them they rose rapidly to pre-eminence, 
the reason being that forced service for a master took 
away all their spirit, whereas on winning their freedom 
each man made vigorous efforts for himself. It was this 
vehement energy which was to turn the scale against 
the Persian King, and, having first won the admiration 
of the Greeks generally, to change into bitter hatred the 
indifference, or perhaps even the sympathy, which led 
the Corinthians to abandon the cause of Kleomenes at 
Eleusis. 

The success of Kleomenes in the expulsion of Hippias 
had awakened in him feelings almost as bitter as his 
failure to effect the ruin of Kleisthenes. The ^. 

Discomfiture 

task of overthrowing the Peisistratids had of the Spartan 
been inexpressibly repulsive to him : and his menes atlleu- 
anger on being discomfited at Eleusis by S1S - 
the defection of his own allies was heightened by indig- 
nation at the discovery that in driving out his friend 
Hippias he had been simply the tool of Kleisthenes and 
of the Delphian priestess whom Kleisthenes had bribed. 
It was now clear to him and to his countrymen that the 
Athenians would not acquiesce in the predominance of 



g6 The Persian Wars. [ch. iv. 

Sparta, and that if they retained their freedom, the 
power of Athens would soon be equal to their own. 
Their only safety lay therefore in providing the Athe- 
nians with a tyrant. An invitation was, therefore, 
sent to Hippias at Sigeion, to attend a congress of the 
allies at Sparta, who were summoned to meet on the ar- 
rival of the exiled despot. 

The words in which these facts are related by the his- 
torian Herodotus show not merely that Sparta regarded 
T . . herself as in some sort the first city in Hel- 

Invitation to . * 

Hippias to at- las, but that among the Greek cities there 

tend a congress , r , , . , . , , 

of Spartan were not a few who were disposed to look 
alhes. U p t0 jjgj. as 5^]^ Her claim to suprema- 

cy is seen in the complaint that Athens was not willing 
to acknowledge it ; and the recognition of this claim in 
certain quarters is proved by the fact that the men of 
Corinth and other cities marched with Kleomenes to 
Eleusis even though they were, as we have seen, kept in 
ignorance of the purpose for which they had been brought 
together. The congress now summoned exhibits Sparta 
still more clearly as the head of a great confederacy, 
able to convoke her allies at will, yet not able to dis- 
pense with the debates in council which implied their 
freedom to accept or reject her plans. The assembly 
in which Hippias appeared to plead the cause of despot- 
ism seems to have gone through all the formalities 
needed to maintain the self-respect of citizens of subor- 
dinate but independent states. The address of the Spar- 
tans to the allies thus convoked was after their wonted 
fashion brief and to the point. In it they candidly con- 
fessed their folly in having been duped by the Pythia at 
Delphoi and in having given over the city of Athens to 
an ungrateful Demos which had already made the Boio- 
tians and Euboians feel the sting of democracy and 



ch. iv.J Early History of Athens. 97 

would speedily make others feel it also ; and not less 
candidly they besought the allies to help in punishing 
the Athenians and in restoring to Hippias the power 
which he had lost. The reply of the Corinthian Sosikles 
is an indignant condemnation of this selfish and heart- 
less policy. "Surely heaven and earth are going to 
changeplaces/'hesaid, " and fishes will live on land and 
men in the sea, now that you, Lakedaimonians, mean to 
put down free governments and to restore in each city that 
most unrighteous and most bloodthirsty thing,— a despot- 
ism. If you think that a tyranny has a single good fea- 
ture to recommend it, try it first yourselves and then 
seek to bring others to your opinion about it. But 
in point of fact you have not tried it, and being religious- 
ly resolved that you never will try it, you seek to force 
it upon others. Experience would have taught you a 
more wholesome lesson : we have had this experience 
and we have learnt this lesson." This moral is enforced 
by some strange stories told of the Corinthian tyrants 
Kypselos and Periandros, the memory of whose crimes 
still made the Corinthians shudder ; and the speaker 
ends with Spartan plainness of speech by confessing 
the wonder which their invitation to Hippias had excited 
at Corinth, and the still greater astonishment with which 
they now heard the explanation of a policy, jn the guilt 
of which the Corinthians at least were resolved that they 
would not be partakers. 

This most important debate, in which the acceptance 
of the Spartan proposal must have wonderfully smoothed 
the path of Xerxes and perhaps have insured Return of 
his triumph without a battle, shows with Hippias to 
great clearness, the nature of the political 
education through which the oligarchical states of Hellas 
were passing, although at some distance in the rear of 



98 The Persian Wars. [ch. iv. 

the democratic Athens. The Corinthians and the Spar- 
tans were agreed in their hatred of any system which 
should do away with all exclusive privileges of the an- 
cient houses, and which, breaking down the old religious 
barriers which excluded all but the members of those 
houses from all public offices and even from all civil 
power, should intrust the machinery of government to 
the herd of the profane. Both also were agreed in their 
hatred of a system which placed at the head of a state a 
man who owed no allegiance to its laws, and whose 
moderation and sobriety at one time could furnish no 
guarantee against the grossest oppression and cruelty at 
another. This horrible system was different in kind 
from the rugged discipline which a feeling of pride ren- 
dered tolerable to Spartans. That discipline was self- 
imposed, and the administration of it was in the hands 
of elected officers, to whom even the kings were account- 
able. Hence Sosikles could say with truth that the 
Spartans had no experience of a tyranny, and therefore 
no real knowledge of its working, which could find a 
parallel only in the crushing yoke of Asiatic despots. 
But the Spartan in this debate differed from the Corin- 
thian, in the clearness with which he saw that there was 
that in the Athenian democracy which, if not repressed, 
must prove fatal to the oligarchical constitutions around 
it. To this point the Corinthian had not yet advanced, 
and he could now insist on the duty of not meddling 
with the internal affairs of an independent community. 
Many years later, in the debates which preceded the 
outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthian 
deputies held a very different language. Their eyes 
had been opened in the meantime to the radical antag- 
onism of the system in which every citizen is invested 
with legislative and judicial powers, and the system in 



ch. v.] The Ionic Revolt. , 99 

which these powers are in the hands of an hereditary 
patrician caste. That the Corinthians would be brought 
to see this hereafter, was the gist of the reply made by 
Hippias. The time was coming, he said, in which they 
would find the Athenians a thorn in their side. For the 
present, his exhortations were thrown away. The allies 
protested unanimously against all attempts to interfere 
with the internal administration of any Hellenic city; 
and the banished tyrant went back disappointed to 
Sigeion. 



CHAPTER V. 

THE IONIC REVOLT. 



In the narrative of the causes which led to the great 
struggle between Athens and Persia, the slightest hints 
given of the movements of Hippias are of 

... Intrigues of 

an importance which cannot easily be exag- Hippias at 
gerated. He had allied himself, as we have ar eis ' 
seen, with the despot of Lampsakos on the express ground 
that the tyrant stood high in the favor of Dareios ; and 
when he was compelled to leave Athens, he departed to 
Sigeion with the definite purpose of stirring up the Per- 
sian king against his countrymen. His intrigues were 
probably as persistent as those of James II. at St. Ger- 
main's, and perhaps more vigorous ; and his disappoint- 
ment at the Spartan congress sent him back to the Hel- 
lespont more determined than ever to regain his power 
by fair means or by foul. To this end we cannot doubt that 
the friendship of the Lampsakene despot was taxed to 
the utmost ; and we have the explicit statement of Hero- 

LofC. 



ioo The Persian Wars. [en. v. 

dotus that from the moment of his return from Sparta he 
left not a stone unturned to provoke Artaphernes, the 
Lydian satrap who held his court at Sardeis, to the con- 
quest of Athens, stipulating only that the Peisistratidai 
should hold it as tributaries of Dareios. The whole course 
of the subsequent narrative shows that the counsels of 
Hippias inspired Artaphernes with the hope of bringing 
Athens, and, if Athens, then every other Greek city, 
under Persian rule ; and the restoration of the tyrant to 
the power which he had lost was desired by the satrap 
as the means not so much of subverting a free constitu- 
tion as of extending the dominion of the Great King. 
Henceforth the idea of Hellenic conquest became a re- 
ligious passion not less than a political purpose. 

The result of the Spartan congress was, of course, im- 
mediately known at Athens ; nor could the Athenians be 

„ , under any doubt of the mode in which Hip- 

Embassy J m x 

fr<m Athens to pias would employ himself on his return 

rap tQ Asia. Their ambassadors accordingly 

appeared a second time before Artaphernes, and laying 
before him the whole state of the case, urged every avail- 
able argument to dissuade the Persian king from inter- 
fering in the affairs of the western Greeks. But the 
words of Hippias had done their work ; and Artaphernes 
charged the Athenians, if they valued their safety, to re- 
ceive him again as w their tyrant. The Athenians retorted 
by a flat refusal, and interpreted the answer of Artaph- 
ernes as a practical declaration of war. 

The relations of the western Greeks with the Persians 
were now to become more complicated. The govern- 
ment of the important city of Miletos had 
tagoras against been placed in the hands of Aristagoras, a 
king PerSian nephew of Histiaios, either by Dareios, 
or by Histiaios himself, who was shortly 



ch. v.] The Ionic Revolt. 101 

afterwards withdrawn from his new settlement at Myr- 
kinos to a splendid but irksome captivity in 
Sousa. The help of Aristagoras was now 
sought by some oligarchic exiles whom the people of 
Naxos had driven out. But although Aristagoras would 
gladly have made himself master of Naxos and of the 
large group of islands to which it belonged, he felt that 
his own power alone was inadequate to the task, and ac- 
cordingly he told the exiles that they must have the 
help of Artaphernes, the brother of the Persian king. 
Beseeching him to stint nothing in promises, the exiles 
in their turn assured him that they would pay him well 
and would also take on themselves the whole costs of 
the expedition. To Artaphernes, therefore, Aristagoras 
held out not merely these inducements but the further 
bait that the conquest of Naxos would bring with it the 
possession of the neighboring islands, and even of Euboia, 
which would give him the command of a large portion 
of the Boiotian and Attic coast. One hundred ships, he 
said, would amply suffice for the enterprise ; but Arta- 
phernes, heartily assenting to the plan, promised him 
two hundred, while Dareios, when his brother's report 
was laid before him, expressed his full approval of the 
scheme. Unfortunately for Aristagoras the Naxians re- 
ceived warning of the intended expedition too soon ; and 
their complete preparation foiled the efforts of their ene- 
mies for four months or more, while these efforts involved 
the waste of a vast amount of money, not a little of 
which Aristagoras had himself undertaken to provide. 
He was thus in a position of serious and immediate dan- 
ger. He had not, indeed, as has sometimes been urged 
against him, deceived Artaphernes, for the result was not 
in his power ; but he had promised to bear the cost of 
maintaining the fleet, and he no longer had the means 



102 The Persian Wars. [ch. v. 

of meeting it. This alone might well seem to him an 
offence which Artarphernes would never pardon ; and 
his mind naturally reverted to thoughts familiar to the 
Asiatic Greeks from the time when they had passed un- 
der the dominion of the Lydian monarchs, and still more 
under the heavier yoke of the Persian kings. His action 
was determined, it is said, by a message received at this 
time from Histiaios bidding him to shave the head of the 
bearer and read what was written on it. The tattooed 
marks conveyed an exhortation to revolt. 

Among the Ionians present at the council which Aris- 
tagoras then convoked was Hekataios, the logographer, 
or, to put it in other words, a man who 
Arfftagoras made it his business to rationalize and inl- 
and Athens P art sometmn g like an historical look to 
the popular traditions. That he made the 
least effort to chronicle events of his own time, there is 
not the slightest reason to suppose ; and therefore it 
could only be from hearsay that Herodotus became ac- 
quainted with the part which he is said to have played 
in that assembly. Warning them plainly, we are told, 
that they could not expect to cope with the Persian 
power, but that, if they resolved to run the risk, they 
should at the least take care that they had the command 
of the sea, he urged them especially to seize the vast 
wealth of the oracle of Branchidai which might otherwise 
fall into the hands of their enemies. His advice was re- 
jected : but a ship was sent to Myous (where the Persian 
armament was encamped after its return from Naxos), 
with orders to seize on such of the Greek tyrants as 
might be found there. Among the despots thus seized 
was Koes of Mytilene who had counseled Dareios not 
to break up the bridge on the Danube (p. 73). These 
were all given up to their respective cities by Aristagoras 



ch. v.] The Ionic Revolt. 103 

who, to insure greater harmony and enthusiasm in the 
enterprise, surrendered, in name at least, his own power 
in Miletos ; and all were allowed by their former sub- 
jects to depart unhurt except Koes, who was stoned to 
death. Thus having put down the tyrants and ordered 
the citizens of the towns to choose each their own 
strategos or general, Aristagoras sailed away in the hope 
of getting help from the powerful city from which 
Kroisos and Hippias had alike sought aid. He carried 
with him, we are told, a brazen tablet on which was 
drawn a map of the world, as then known, with all the 
rivers and every sea. Having reached Sparta, the tale 
goes on to say, he pleaded his cause earnestly before 
king Kleomenes. He dwelt on the enslavement of the 
Asiatic Greeks as a disgrace to the city which had risen 
to the headship of Hellas, and on the wealth as well as 
the glory which with a little trouble and risk they would 
assuredly win. The trousered and turbaned Persians 
who fought with bows and javelins it would be no 
specially hard task to vanquish ; and the whole land 
from Sardeis to Sousa would then be for them one con- 
tinuous mine of wealth. The picture was tempting ; but 
when Aristagoras appeared on the third day to receive 
the final answer, he was asked how far it might be from 
the coast to Sousa. "A three months' journey," said 
the unlucky Aristagoras, who was going on to show how 
easily it might be accomplished, when Kleomenes bade 
him leave Sparta before the sun went down. There 
seemed to be yet one last hope. With a suppliant's 
branch Aristagoras went to the house of Kleomenes. 
Finding him with his daughter Gorgo, the future wife of 
the far-famed Leonidas, he asked that the child, then 
eight or nine years old, might be sent away. The 
king bade him say what he wished in her presence ; and 



io4 The Persian Wars. [ch. v. 

the Milesian, beginning with a proffer often talents, had 
raised the bribe to a sum of fifty talents, when the child 
cried out, " Father, the stranger will corrupt you, if you 
do not go away." Thus foiled, Aristagoras hastened to 
Athens, where to his glowing descriptions he added the 
plea that Miletos was a colony from Athens, and that to 
help the Milesians was a clear duty. The historian 
Herodotus remarks that Aristagoras found it easier to 
deceive 30,000 Athenian citizens than a solitary Spartan, 
for the Athenians at once promised to send twenty ships 
to their aid ; but he forgot that the circumstances of the 
two cities were widely different. The futile threats of the 
Spartan officer who appeared before Cyrus (p. 49) were 
probably no longer remembered ; but the aid of the Per- 
sians had been not only invoked against Athens but 
definitely promised, and the Athenians had been assured 
that they were courting ruin if they refused to submit 
once more to the yoke of Hippias. Athens, therefore, as 
Herodotus himself had asserted, and as we cannot too 
carefully remember, was already virtually at war with 
Persia ; and in pledging themselves to help Aristagoras, 
the Athenians were entering on a course which after a 
severe struggle secured to them abundant wealth and a 
brilliant empire. So runs the story : but we cannot fail 
to note that the whole address of Aristagoras to Kleo- 
menes distinctly rests on the practicability of conquering 
the whole Persian empire and even on the easiness of 
the task. The deliverance of the Ionic cities from a 
foreign yoke is made completely subordinate to the larger 
scheme which is to make the Spartans masters of the 
vast regions lying between the Hadriatic sea and the 
deserts of Bokhara. Such a notion might perhaps have 
arisen in a Greek mind when the Persian tribute-gatherers 
had been driven from the coasts of Asia Minor : but 



CH. v.] The Ionic Revolt. 105 

at the time with which we are now dealing such an idea, 
if put into words, must have appeared a wild and absurd 
dream. 

When at length Aristagoras reached Miletos with the 
twenty Athenian ships together with five others contribu- 
ted by the Eretrians of Euboia, he set in order 
an expedition to Sardeis, which was occu- Ssardeis" 2 
pied without resistance, Artaphernes being 
unable to do more than hold the Akropolis. The acci- 
dental burning of a hut (the Sardian houses were built 
wholly of reeds or had reed roofs) caused a conflagration 
which brought the Lydians and Persians in wild terror 
to the Agora or market-place. The Athenians, fearing 
to be overborne, it is said, by mere numbers, retreated 
to the heights of Tmolos, and as soon as it was dark 
hastened away to their ships. The fire at Sardeis by 
destroying the temple of Kybebe (Cybele) furnished, we 
are told, an excuse for the deliberate destruction of the 
temples of Western Hellas by the army of Xerxes ; but 
a more speedy punishment awaited the Ionians, who 
were overtaken by the Persians and signally defeated in 
a battle fought near Ephesus. The historian is speaking 
of this accidental conflagration when he tells us that 
Dareios on hearing the tidings asked who the Athenians 
might be, and, on being informed, shot an arrow into 
the air, praying the gods to suffer him to take vengeance 
on this folk. About the Ionians and their share in the 
matter he said, it would seem, nothing.* These he knew 
that he might punish when and as he might choose ; but 
so careful was he not to forget the foreigners who had 
done him wrong, that an attendant received orders to 
bid his master before every meal to remember the 
Athenians. Stories such as this would, as we can well 
imagine, highly gratify Athenian pride or vanity ; nor is 
I 



106 The Persian Wars. [ch. v. 

the influence of such feelings to be put out of sight in an 
effort to get at the true history of the time. Not only has 
the historian, from whom it may be said that our whole 
knowledge of this period is derived, told us plainly that 
Hippias had been for years doing all that he could to 
provoke a Persian invasion of his country, but Athenian 
ambassadors had twice appeared before Artaphernes, the 
brother of Dareios, to counteract his intrigues. The de- 
sire to glorify the Athenians could under such circutn- 
stances alone explain the growth of a tale which repre- 
sents Dareios as ignorant of the very name of a people 
whose concerns he had been compelled to discuss or to 
hear discussed for years. Lastly, we must mark the 
significant facts that Dareios set to work at once to 
chastise the Asiatic Ionians, while he made no attempt 
to punish the Athenians for more than eleven years. 

For some reason or other the Athenians had deserted 
the Ionians, refusing absolutely to give them any further 
„ . , help ; but the revolt assumed nevertheless 

Extension of ^ ' 

the revolt to a more serious character. The movement 
and other 1 spread to the city of Byzantion, to Karia, 

Clties * and to Kypros (Cyprus) ; and Histiaios, we 

are told, was sent down to suppress it. The influence 
which he exercised over the mind of Dareios was not 
felt, it seems, by Artaphernes. Histiaios failed to check 
the insurrection: he was even charged with supplying 
fuel for the fire. After a long series of strange adventures 
he was taken prisoner by a troop of Persian cavalry ; and 
Artaphernes, fearing that Histiaios would find no diffi- 
culty in making his peace with Dareios, ordered him to 
be crucified. His head was sent to Sousa, where Dareios 
received it with the ceremonious respect due to a bene- 
factor of the Great King. In short, he refused to believe 
the accusations made against him ; and this circumstance 



CH. v.] The Ionic Revolt. 107 

alone may justify us in suspending our judgment on the 
strange tale which relates his adventures after leaving 
Sousa. If Dareios had really felt the suspicion of 
treachery which Herodotus thinks that he entertained, 
he could never have sent Histiaios to the sea-coast with- 
out placing efficient checks on his movements : nor un- 
less he had ample evidence to warrant his blunt phrases, 
could even Artaphernes have ventured to say, when 
Histiaios appeared before him, " It is just this — you 
stitched the slipper, and Aristagoras put it on." If that 
satrap really believed this, he would have been more 
than justified as a Persian viceroy in ordering him to be 
instantly slain. 

From the situation of their island the Kyprians (Cy- 
prians) had perhaps little chance of success c 
from the first in their attempts to shake off the revolt 
the Persian yoke. Their resistance did (Cyprus)° S 
them credit ; but their gallantry was foiled and Karia - 
by the treachery of one of their despots, who in a battle 
deserted to the Persians, followed by all the Salaminian 
war-chariots. From this time the history of the Ionian 
revolt is little more than a chronicle of disasters. The 
Ionians, seeing that the cause of the Kyprians was lost, 
left them to their fate ; and the island was subdued after 
one year of precarious freedom. Having expelled the 
Ionians from Sardeis, the Persian generals marched 
northwards, reducing city after city, when they were 
compelled to hasten to the south by the tidings that 
Karia was in rebellion. In a battle fought near Labranda 
the Karians, supported by the men of Miletos, under- 
went a terrible defeat ; but their spirit was not yet 
broken, and, laying an ambuscade for their enemy, they 
succeeded, it is said, in cutting off the whole Persian 
force with the three generals in command. But they 



108 The Persian Wars. [ch. v. 

were dealing with a sovereign who could send army after 
army into the field ; and this catastrophe had no influence 
on the general issue of the revolt. The disaster in Karia 
was more than compensated by fresh successes on the 
Propontis and the Hellespont; and the golden visions 
of Aristagoras gave way before the simple desire of 
securing his own safety. He suggested to the allies that 
they ought to be ready, in case of expulsion from Miletos, 
with a place of refuge either in Myrkinos, the settlement 
of his uncle Histiaios, or in the island of Sardo (Sar- 
dinia). But his own mind was really made up before he 
summoned the council ; and leaving Pythagoras in com- 
mand of Miletos, he sailed to Myrkinos, of which he 
succeeded in taking possession. Soon after, he attacked 
and besieged a Thrakian city, but was surprised and 
slain with all his forces. 

The hopes of the Ionians now rested wholly on their 

fleet. It was decided that no attempt should be made to 

oppose the Persian land forces, and that the 

Defeat of Milesians should be left to defend their walls 

the Ionian 

fl -et at against the besiegers, while the ships should 

assemble at Lad6, then an island off the 
Milesian promotory, to which by an accumulation of sand 
it is now attached. But if the Ionians were afraid of the 
Persian armies, the Persians were scarcely less afraid of 
the Ionian fleet, and this want of confidence in them- 
selves, and even, it would seem, in their Phenician 
sailors, led them to resort to a policy which might cause 
division and disunion among their adversaries. The 
Greek tyrants who were allowed to go free by their 
former subjects, when the Mytilenian K66s was stoned 
to death, were instructed to tell them that immediate 
submission would win for them a complete amnesty to- 
gether with a pledge that they should not be called upon 



ch. v.] The Ionic Revolt. 109 

to bear any burdens heavier than those which had 
already been laid upon them, but that if they shed Per- 
sian blood in battle, the punishment inflicted upon them 
would be terrible indeed. These proffers were conveyed 
to the Greek cities by messengers who entered by night ; 
and the citizens of each town, thinking that the overtures 
were made to themselves alone, returned a positive re- 
fusal. For a time the debates at Lade took another turn. 
The Phokaian general Dionysios, warning the Ionians 
that for them the issue of slavery or of freedom hung on 
a razor's edge, told them plainly that they could not 
hope to escape the punishment of runaway slaves, unless 
they had spirit enough to bear with present hardship 
for the sake of future ease ; but at the same time he 
pledged himself that, if they would submit to his direc- 
tion, he would insure to them a complete victory. The 
acceptance of his proposal was followed by constant and 
systematic maneuvering of the fleet, while, after the daily 
drill was over, the crews, instead of lounging and sleep- 
ing in their tents on the shore, were compelled to remain 
on board their ships, which were anchored. For seven 
days they endured this tax on their patience ; but at the 
end of the week Ionian nature could hold out no longer, 
and the issue of the revolt was left to be decided by a 
battle of which the historian Herodotus admits that 
he knows practically nothing. Charges and counter- 
charges of cowardice and treachery were mingled with 
the story that, as soon as the fight began, all the Samians, 
according to an arrangement made with their deposed 
tyrant Aiakes, sailed off homewards, with the exception 
of eleven ships whose trierarchs or captains refused to 
obey the orders of their generals. This treacherous de- 
sertion led to the flight of the Lesbians, whose example 
was speedily followed by the larger number of the ships 



no The Persian Wars. [ch. v. 

composing the Ionian fleet. With this dastardly beha- 
viour the conduct of the Chians stands out in honorable 
contrast: but although with their hundred ships they 
succeeded in taking many of the enemy's vessels, their 
own numbers were at last so far reduced that they were 
compelled to abandon an unavailing contest. 

Whatever points in it may be confused or uncertain, 
the narrative lays bare an astonishing lack of coherence 
_. . among the confederates. Almost every- 

Disumon ° J 

and weak- where we see a selfish isolation, of which 
Asiatic distrust and faithlessness are the natural 

Greeks. fruits ; and as in the intrigues of Hippias 

we have a real and adequate cause for Persian interfer- 
ence in Western Greece, so this selfishness and obsti- 
nacy of the Asiatic Greeks explains fully the catastrophe 
which followed the enterprise too hastily taken in hand 
by Aristagoras. The old strife between patricians and 
plebeians, which had crushed for a time the political 
growth of Athens, paralyzed the Eastern Greeks in their 
struggle with Persia. The tyranny which left even 
Athenians spiritless, until their chains were broken, 
compelled the Samian commons to take part in a 
treachery which they loathed and against which some 
protested by an act of mutiny. The fate of the insur- 
rection was sealed by the partizans of the banished des- 
pots ; and Dionysios, the Phokaian, determined to quit 
his country forever. With three war-ships taken from 
the enemy he sailed straight to Phenicia, and swooping 
down on an unguarded port, sunk some merchant vessels 
and sailed with a large booty to Sicily. Here he turned 
pirate, imposing on himself the conditions that his pil- 
lage should be got from the Carthaginians and Tyr- 
rhenians and not from the Italiot or Sikeliot Greeks. 
The ruin of the Ionic fleet left Miletos exposed to 



ch. v.] The Ionic Revolt. in 

blockade by sea as well as by land. The Persians now 
set vigorously to work, undermining the 
walls and bringing all kinds of engines to capture of 
bear upon them : and at last, in the sixth 
year after the outbreak of the revolt under Arista- 
goras, the great city fell. The grown men, 
we are told, were for the most part slain ; 
the rest of the people were carried away to Sousa, 
whence they were sent by Dareios, to take up their 
abode in the city of Ampe at the mouth of the Tigris. 
Miletos with the plain surrounding it was occupied by 
the Persians ; the temple at Branchidai was plundered 
and burnt, and the treasures which Hekataios had 
advised the Ionians to use to good purpose became the 
prey of the conqueror. We must suppose, however, 
that new Greek inhabitants were afterwards admitted 
into the city, for Miletos, shorn though it was of its 
ancient greatness, continued to be, as it had been, Hel- 
lenic. In the following year the chief islands 
of the groups nearest to the Asiatic coast t he P ?evoit 0n0 
were one after another taken ; and thus was TWrdconquest 

' of Ionia, 

brought about that which Herodotus speaks 

of as the third conquest of Ionia,— the first being its sub- 
jugation by the Lydian kings, the second its absorption 
along with the empire of those sovereigns into the ocean 
of Persian dominion. 

From the conquest of the Ionic cities the Persian 
commanders sailed on against the towns on the north- 
ern shores of the Hellespont. The task 

, r , , , * Retreat of 

before them was not hard. Many towns sur- Miltiades 
rendered at once ; the inhabitants of Byzan- 
tion and of Chalkedon on the opposite Asiatic promontory 
fled away and found a new home on the coast of the 
Euxine sea. The deserted cities, we are told, were burnt 



H2 The Persian Wars, [ch. vi. 

to the ground by the Phenicians, who took all the towns 
of the Thrakian Chersonesos except Kardia. Here 
Miltiades, the future victor of Marathon, still lingered, 
until, hearing that the Phenicians were at Tenedos, he 
loaded five ships with his goods, and, setting sail for 
Athens, reached that city safely, although he lost one of 
his vessels in an encounter with the Phenician fleet off 
the promontory of Elaious. 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE INVASION OF DATIS AND ARTAPHERNES. 

The threats of vengeance by which it is said that the 
Persians sought to chill the courage of the Asiatic Greeks 

were not fulfilled. Whatever may have 
tionTf Ana- been their motives, we find them, after the 
lonia CS m complete subjugation of the country, adopting 

a policy which does credit to their humanity, 
although perhaps not to their prudence ; and the satrap 
Artaphernes comes before us as an administrator en- 
gaged in placing on a permanent footing the relations of 
these Greeks with their master. The method of his re- 
forms certainly struck at the root of the evils which had 
arrested or distorted their political growth ; and for so 
doing it might be thought that he would deserve blame 
rather than praise at the hands of a despot who could 
scarcely be expected to look with favor on a system 
likely to make his enemies more formidable. By com- 
pelling these Greek tribes to lay aside their incessant 
feuds and bickerings, and to obey a law which should 
put an end to acts of violence and pillage between Hel- 



ch. vi.] Invasion of Datis and Artaphernes. 113 

lenic cities, he was enforcing changes which could 
scarcely make them more obedient and tractable sub- 
jects, and which the historian rightly regarded as a vast 
improvement on their former condition. These changes, 
Herodotus significantly adds, he compelled them to 
adopt whether they desired them or not, while, after 
having the whole country surveyed, he also imposed on 
each that assessment of tribute which, whether paid or 
not (and during the whole period of Athenian supremacy 
it was not paid), remained on the king's books as the 
legal obligation of the Asiatic Greeks, until the Persian 
Empire itself fell before the victorious arms of Alexan- 
der the Great. As the amount of his assessment was 
much what it had been before the revolt, the Persians 
cannot be charged with adding to their burdens by way 
of retaliation. 

Still more remarkable, in the judgment of Herodotus, 
were the measures of Mardonios, who arrived at the 
Hellespont in the spring of the second year 
after the fall of Miletos. This man, who Mardonios. 
had maried a daughter of Dareios, and who 493 B * c * 
was now in the prime of manhood, had come expressly 
for the purpose of extending the Persian empire over the 
whole of western Greece ; but before he went on to take 
that special vengeance on Athens which was the alleged 
object of his expedition, he undertook and achieved, 
it is said, the task of putting down the tyrants and of 
establishing democracies in all the Ionic cities. The 
work was one which, as Herodotus truly remarks, was 
little to be looked for from a Persian ; yet it can scarcely 
mean more than that he drove away, or possibly killed 
(as the more effectual mode of dealing with them), the 
Hellenic tyrants, on whose deposition the people would 
at once return to the constitution subverted by these des- 



H4 The Persian Wars. [ch. vi 

pots ; nor is it easy to see wherein this task differed from 
that which the historian has just ascribed to Artaphernes. 
In his account of the changes enforced by that satrap no 
mention is made of tyrants. The cities are compelled 
to enter into permanent alliance with each other, where- 
as, if these cities had each its sovereign, the engagements 
must have been made in the names of these rulers : nor 
could Artaphernes have failed to perceive that unless all 
the towns had tyrants or rulers, or were made to govern 
themselves, it would be impossible to maintain peace 
long, and indeed that, unless he expelled the tyrants, in 
whom he could by no means place implicit trust, his 
labor must be thrown away. All therefore that can be 
said is that, if Artaphernes carried' out his measures be- 
fore the arival of Mardonios, nothing more remained for 
the latter than to sanction changes of which he approved. 
But Mardonios was not destined to achieve the greater 
task for which he had been despatched from Sousa. 
^. „ The work of conquest was indeed carried 

Discomn- 

ture of Mar- beyond the bounds reached by Megabazos 
Thrace!" (P- ?6). But when, having left Akanthos 

492 b. c. (?) tne f| eet was coas ting along the peninsula 
of Akte, a fearful storm dashed his ships on the iron- 
bound coast of Mount Athos (p. 32), while many thou- 
sands of his men were killed either by the force of the 
waves beating against the rocks or by the sharks which 
abounded in this part of the sea. On land his army was 
attacked by a native tribe, who caused a great slaughter, 
but who nevertheless were compelled to submit to the Per- 
sian king. Still the disaster which had befallen his fleet 
made it impossible to advance further south, and Mar- 
donios, accordingly, returned home, where during the 
reign of Dareios he is heard of no more. 

The failure of Mardonios seems to have made Dareios 



ch. vi.] Invasion of Datis and Ariaphernes. 115 

more than ever resolved to ascertain how far he might 
count on the acquiescence of the Greeks in . 

the extension of his empire. In the step the envoys 
taken by the king we may fairly discern the ° Q the r Greek 
influence of Hippias, who left nothing un- Clties * 
done to fan the flame which he had kindled (p. 93). The 
way would be in great measure cleared for the complete 
subjugation of Hellas if the king could, without the 
trouble of fighting, learn how many of the insular and 
continental Greeks would be willing to enroll themselves 
as his slaves. Heralds were accordingly sent, it is said, 
throughout all Hellas, demanding in the king's name 
the offering of a little earth and a little water. The sum- 
mons was readily obeyed, we are told, by the men of all 
the islands visited by the heralds, and probably also by 
those continental cities which we find afterwards among 
the zealous allies of Xerxes. Among the islanders who 
thus yielded up their freedom were the Aiginetans, who 
by this conduct drew down upon themselves the wrath 
of the Athenians with whom they were almost continu- 
ally at war. Their commerce in the eastern waters of 
the Mediterranean may have made them loth to run the 
risks of a struggle with such a power as Persia ; but 
hatred of Athens may with them, as with the Thebans, 
have been a motive not less constraining. Athenian 
envoys appeared at Sparta with a formal complaint 
against the Aiginetans. They had acted treacherously, 
the ambassadors asserted, not towards the Athenians or 
towards any Greek city in particular but against Hellas ; 
and the charge shows not merely the growth of a certain 
collective Hellenic life, but also that Sparta was the re- 
cognized head of this informal confederacy. It is, more- 
over, urged on the ground, not of inability on the part 
of the Athenians to punish the men of Aigina if they 



n6 The Persian Wars. [ch. vi. 

chose to do so, but of the duty of the Spartans to see 
that no member of the Greek commonwealth betrayed 
the interest of the society of which it formed a part. The 
harmony here exhibited between the Athenian and 
the Spartans is due probably to the presence of a com- 
mon danger, which threatened the latter only in a less 
degree than it pressed upon the former. A strange story 
is told that when the heralds appeared at Athens and at 
Sparta they were in the former city thrown into the 
Barathron, a chasm into which the bodies of criminals 
were hurled, and in the latter into a well, having been 
told first to get thence the earth and water which they 
wished to carry to the king. The maltreatment of 
heralds was a crime alien to the Greek character gener- 
ally ; in the eyes of Athenians and Spartans it was a 
crime especially heinous, and the subsequent conduct of 
the latter people is by no means in accordance with this 
outburst of unreasoning vehemence. Nor can it well be 
supposed that Dareios would send messengers to the 
Spartans who had espoused the cause of the Lydian king 
Kroisos, had sent an imperious message to Cyrus himself 
(p. 49), and had been warned by Cyrus that they should 
smart for their presumption. But that any overtures 
should be made to the Athenians, is to the last degree 
unlikely. If any such were made, they would have 
taken the form of a demand that they should receive 
again their old master Hippias. But in truth Artapher- 
nes had long since taken their refusal to receive him as 
a virtual declaration of war (p. 94) ; and it is hard to 
think that a summons designed to test those with whom 
the Persian king had not come into conflict should be 
sent to men who were his open and avowed enemies. It 
is obvious that, if these two great cities were exempted 
from the number of those who were bidden to acknow- 



cu. vi.] Invasion of Datis and Artaphernes. 117 

ledge the supremacy of Persia, they would be as much 
driven to make common cause with each other as if they 
had slain the officers of Dareios. On the other hand the 
zeal with which the Athenians in spite of all discourage- 
ments maintained the contest against Xerxes would 
readily account for the growth of a story which seemed 
to pledge them to such conduct from the first. As soon 
as it grew up, one of the additions made to the tale repre- 
sented Themistokles as desiring that the interpreter who 
came with them should be put to death, because he had 
profaned the Greek language by making it the vehicle 
of a summons to slavery. By another version the pro- 
posal to slay the heralds was ascribed to Miltiades who 
had acquired a reputation for supposed service to the 
Greek cause at the bridge over the Danube (p. 73). 

The appeal of the Athenians imposed on the Spartans 
the necessity of asserting their jurisdiction over the Aigi- 
netans, if they cared to maintain at all the „ 7 , 

* J War be- 

theory of their supremacy ; but probably tween Argos 
even this need would not have stirred them 
to action, if Argos, the old rival of Sparta, had not been 
already humbled. This ancient city, which in times pre- 
ceding the dawn of contemporary history appears as the 
predominant power in Peloponnesos, and which had 
probably from the first regarded with instinctive jealousy 
the growth of its southern neighbors, was now staggering 
under a blow fatal to all hopes of her continued headship 
in Hellas. Two or three years before the ar- 
rival of the Persian heralds a war had broken 
out in which the Spartan king Kleomenes had inflicted 
on the Argives a defeat which left them practically at 
the mercy of their conquerors. This humiliation of Argos 
justified Kleomenes in making an effort to seize those 
Aiginetans who had been foremost in swearing obedi- 



n8 The Persian Wars. [ch. vi. 

ence to Dareios ; but there remained other hindrances 
in his path which were not so easily put aside. To his 
demand for the surrender of these men the reply was 
returned that no attention could be paid to the words 
of a Spartan king, who was acting illegally, as having 
come without his colleague (p. 22) Demaratos, the future 
companion and adviser of Xerxes, in the wonderful epic 
of the Persian War. The point of law thus raised was 
not to be lightly disregarded. Kleomenes went back to 
Sparta, fully resolved to bring about the downfall of the 
man who had thwarted and foiled him in his march to 
Athens, (p. 94) ; and he found the means in the stories 
Deposition of t°ld about his birth. Old scandals were 
Demaratos. stirred afresh, and Demaratos, deposed 
from his office on the score of illegitimacy, made his 
way into Asia, where, we are told, that Dareios assigned 
him a territory with cities to afford him a revenue. 
Some time after his flight, the conspiracy which had 
pulled him from his throne, was brought to light, and 
Kleomenes, to avoid a public trial fled into Thessaly, 
whence he returned with an army sworn to follow him 
by the awful sanction of the waters of the Styx. Such 
an army the Spartans dared not face. Kleomenes was 
restored to his office and its honors; but his mind now 
gave way. He insulted the citizens whom he met in the 
streets, and on being put under restraint, obtained a 
knife from his keeper and cut himself to pieces. 

Against tribes thus agitated by the turmoil of inces- 
„ ,, . ,. sant intrigues, and habituated to an almost 

Expedition of ° 

Datis and complete political isolation, the Persian king 

Artaphernes . -,. -, ,1 j. 

against Naxos was now preparing to discharge the prodi- 
and Eretna. gious forces at his command. He had some 
old wrongs probably to avenge in addition to the burn- 
ing of the temple of Kybebe in Sardeis : but Hippias, 



ch. vi.] Invasion of Datis and Artaphernes. 119 

the fallen despot of Athens was at hand to urge him on 
by still more importunate pleading. The command of 
the expedition he intrusted, not to the disgraced Mardo- 
nios, but to his brother Artaphernes, and to a Median 
named Datis, who, announcing himself, it is said, as the 
representative of Medos, the son of the Athenian Aigeus, 
and of his wife, the Kolchian Medeia, claimed of right 
the style and dignity of king of Athens. Their mission 
was to enslave the men of that city together with the in- 
habitants of the Euboian Eretria, and to bring them into 
their master's presence. For this purpose a vast army 
was gathered in Kilikia (Cilicia) ; and the first work of 
this mighty host was to punish the Naxians, who had 
foiled the scheme suggested by the Milesian Arista- 
goras, (p. 100). The task was now by comparison easy. 
The suppression of the Ionic revolt had struck terror 
into the hearts of the Greeks generally ; and the Naxians, 
at the approach of the Persians, fled to the mountains. 
Those who remained in the town were enslaved ; and 
the city with its temples was burnt. The Delians alone 
among the islanders were otherwise treated. These also 
had sought refuge on the heights : but Datis bade the 
holy men return to their homes without fear, as he had 
been strictly charged by his master not to hurt the lands 
of the Twin Gods. The first opposition to the Persian 
force came from the people of Karystos, the southern- 
most town of Euboia; but the blockade of their city 
and the ravaging of their lands soon showed them the 
hopelessness of resistance. From Karystos the fleet 
sailed northward to Eretria, which for six days withstood 
the assaults made upon it. On the seventh the place 
was lost by the treachery of two of its citizens; the 
temples were burnt, and the inhabitants partially reduced 
to slavery. 



1 20 The Persian Wars. [ch. VI. 

Thus far the Persians might well have fancied that to 
the end of their voyage they were to sail upon a sum- 
mer sea. Their enemies had given way before them 
. ,. P like chaff before the wind; and Hippias 

Landing of . . l i 

the Persians at probably nattered their vanity by assurances 
that they would encounter no more serious 
resistance even at Athens or at Sparta. But meanwhile 
they must advance with at least ordinary care : and his 
knowledge of the land which he had once ruled, might 
now serve his Persian friends to good purpose. The best 
ground which it contained for the movements of cavalry 
was the plain of Marathon, bounded by the north-eastern 
Chersonesos or promontory of Attica (p. 20) : and at 
Marathon accordingly the banished despot 
of Athens landed with his Persian support- 
ers to fight the battle which was to determine the future 
course of the history of his country. Nearly half a 
century had passed away since in his early youth he 
had accompanied his father, Peisistratos, from the same 
spot on his march to Athens, (p. 85). At that time 
the Athenians had learnt no other political lesson than 
to submit to the man who surrounded himself with a 
hedge of mercenary spears, or else to keep themselves 
traitorously neutral, while the nobles wasted their own 
powers and the strength of the state in feuds and fac- 
tions. But those days were happily now gone forever. 
The indifference, which Solon had denounced as the 
worst crime of which a citizen could be guilty, had given 
place to a determined resolution to defend the laws 
which gave to each man the right of free speech, free 
voting, and free action, and which filled him with the 
consciousness that he was working for himself, and not 
for masters, who looked on his efforts as on the move- 
ments of mere machines. If they had learnt to regard 



490 B.C.] Invasion of Datis and Artaphernes. 121 

one thing more than another with aversion and dread, 
that thing was the irresponsible rule of one man who 
was at once law-giver and judge ; and in this conviction, 
which inspired them with an energy and perseverance 
never yet seen in any Hellenic community, lay a 
hindrance to his schemes, and to the ambition of the 
Persian king which Hippias had not taken into account. 
During the twenty years which had passed since his 
flight to Sigeion, the spell of the old despotism had been 
broken. The substitution of geographical in place of 
the old religious tribes, (p. 90) had swept away the ser- 
vile veneration which had once been felt for the Eupa- 
trid houses : and every citizen had been taught that he 
was a member of an independent and self-governed 
society. This radical change had not only brought 
forward a new class of statesmen from the middle, or 
even from the lower orders of the state, but it had roused 
to a more generous and disinterested patriotism, some 
who had grown up under the influence of the old tradi- 
tion ; and thus by a strange course of things, the exiled 
despot of Athens, in setting foot once more on Attic 
ground, was confronted by the very man -whom, as an 
apt pupil in his own school, he had sent to govern the 
Thrakian Chersonesos (p. 87). 

A still more formidable hindrance to the plans of 
Hippias and Dareios was involved in the rise of states- 
men at Athens like Themistokles and Aris- Early career 
teides. Neither of these men belonged to and ^arac- 

ter of Ans- 

the old Eupatnd nobility: and the wife of teides and 
Neokles, the father of Themistokles, was tokles! S " 
even a foreigner from Karia or Thrace. But 
although neither wealthy nor by birth illustrious, these 
two men were to exercise a momentous influence on 
the history not only of their own city but of all western 
K 



122 The Persian Wars, [ch. vi. 

civilization. Singularly unlike each other in temper and 
tone of thought, they were to be throughout life rivals 
in whom the common danger of their country would 
nevertheless suppress for a time the feeling of habitual 
animosity. It would have been happier for themselves, 
happier for Athens, if they had been rivals also in that 
virtue which Greek statesmen have commonly and 
fatally lacked. Unfortunately Themistokles never at- 
tempted to aim at that standard of pecuniary incorrupti- 
bility which won for Aristeides the name of the Righteous 
or the Just. The very title implies the comparative cor- 
ruption of the leading citizens. Of his rival Themis- 
tokles it would be as absurd to draw a picture free from 
seams and stains as it would be to attempt the same 
task for Oliver Cromwell or Warren Hastings. That 
he started on his career with a bare competence and 
that he heaped together an enormous fortune, is a fact 
which cannot be disputed. That, while he was deter- 
mined to consult and to advance the true interests of his 
country, he was resolved also that his own greatness 
should be secured through those interests, is not less 
certain. Endowed with a marvelous power of discern- 
ing the true relations of things and with a knowledge, 
seemingly instinctive, of the method by which the worst 
complications might be unraveled, he went straight to 
his mark, while yet, as long as he wished it, he could 
keep that mark hidden from every one. With the life 
of such a man popular fancy could not fail to be busy ; 
and so the belief grew up that he knew every Athenian 
citizen by name. However this may have been, he was 
enabled by his astonishing powers of apprehension and 
foresight to form the truest judgment of existing things 
and without toilsome calculation to forecast the future, 
while yet no man was ever more free from that foolhardy 



490 B.C.] Invasion of Datis and Artaphernes. 123 

temper which thinks that mere dash and bravery can 
make up for inexperience and lack of thought. There 
was no haphazard valor in Themistokles. No man ever 
had a more clearly defined policy, and no man could 
enforce his policy with more luminous persuasiveness. 
But Themistokles did not always choose to do this ; and 
at a time when it was impossible to organize into a sin- 
gle compact body an army made up of men almost 
fatally deficient in power of combination, he was com- 
pelled to take many a step which, to the free citizens 
serving under him, might seem to be but scantily justi- 
fied in law. He knew what was good and hurtful for 
them better than they could know it themselves ; and he 
was not the man to allow technical or legal scruples to 
deter him from measures which must be carried out at 
once and decisively or not at all. But his genius was 
not yet to shine out in its full lustre. He certainly fought 
at Marathon ; but there is no adequate reason for think- 
ing that he was the general of his tribe in that momen- 
tous battle. 

In the peril which now threatened their city the 
Athenians dispatched, it is said, an earnest entreaty for 
help to the Spartans by the runner Pheidip- Preparations 
pides. By an exploit surpassing altogether sfansTju*" 
the feats of Persian or Indian runners, the Marathon, 
man traversed, we are told, a distance of not less than 
150 miles between the morning of the day on which he 
set out from Athens and the evening of the following day 
when he reached Sparta. But his toil was thrown away, 
In vain he told the Spartans that the Euboian Eretria 
had fallen and that its inhabitants were enslaved. They 
must obey the traditions of their fathers, and they would 
not move until the moon should be full. Meanwhile on 
the Persian side Hippias was busy in drawing up his 



124 The Persian Wars. [ch. VI. 

allies in battle array on the field of Marathon. He had 
seen a vision which seemed to portend the recovery of 
his former power ; but a violent fit of coughing forced 
one of his teeth from his jaw, and his hopes at once gave 
way to despondency. The accident was much like that 
which is said to have befallen William the Conqueror as 
he landed on the shore of Pevensey, and which the Nor- 
mans had sense and readiness enough to interpret at 
once as a presage of victory. Hippias could only bewail 
among his friends the fate which assigned to him no 
larger a portion of Attic soil than might suffice to bury a 
tooth. On the Athenian side the sign of coming success 
was furnished by the arrival of the Plataians, with the 
full military force of their city. These Boiotians, wishing 
to sever themselves from all connection with 

509 B.C. 

Thebes, had applied to the Spartan king 
Kleomenes for permission to enroll themselves as mem- 
bers of the Spartan confederacy. Kleomenes was then 
on his march through Boiotia to Sparta, after his unsuc- 
cessful attempt to effect the ruin of Kleisthenes at Athens 
and to destroy his constitution. Irritated at his failure, 
he was in the mood which made any opportunity wel- 
come for doing an ill turn to the Athenians. Such an 
occasion he thought that he had found in this offer of the 
Plataians. If he accepted it for his own city, he might 
involve Sparta in quarrels or even in wars with Thebes ; 
the same result might follow for Athens if the alliance 
were made with her, and thus by recommending the 
Plataians to apply to her, he should be placing a thorn 
in the side of the Athenians, as he heartily wished to do« 
His anticipations were only in part justified by the event. 
The Plataians followed his advice, and the alliance 
with Athens was made. To the latter, if it did no good, 
it did little harm ; but it w T as destined to bring about the 



49 o b . c. ] Invasion of Dads and Artaphernes. 125 

ruin of Plataia, against which Kleomenes had no special 
grudge. 

For the present all things looked well, and the Platai- 
ans approached Marathon with an unselfish devotion 
which dared the risk of bringing on themselves the ven- 
geance of the Persian king in case of defeat, and which 
must have convinced the Athenians that rm „ 

The Plataians 

there was that in Hellas for which it was and the Athe- 
worth while to fight stoutly. From this time 
forth the zeal which they now displayed cemented the 
friendship which had already existed between the two 
cities for nearly twenty years ; and in the solemn quin- 
quennial sacrifices at Athens the herald invoked the 
blessing of heaven on Athenians and Plataians alike. 

Probably not more than two days had passed from the 
moment when Militades and his colleagues left Athens 
to the hour when they returned from Mara- „ ', . . 

J m Real designs 

thon, winners of a victory for which they ofHippiasand 
could scarcely have dared to hope. There 
had been a delay of many days before they set out on 
their march ; but the promptitude of their movements, 
when once they left the city, disconcerted the plans not 
only of their open enemies but of traitors within their 
walls, for by this name only can the partisans of Hippias 
rightly be described. The banished tyrant had devised 
a scheme which did credit to his military sagacity. The 
Persian fleet was drawn up by the shore, and the tents 
of the invaders lined the edge of the Marathonian plain 
which by the lower road between Hymettos and Penteli- 
kos lay at a distance of about twenty-five miles from 
Athens. To all appearance it seemed that the Persian 
commanders meant to fight there the decisive battle, and 
there in fact it was fought : but such was not their real 
intention. The landing on Marathon was a feint to 



126 The Persiait Wars. [ch. vi. 

draw off the Athenian land force from the city, while the 
real attack should be made from the Phaleric Plain by 
troops hastily landed from the Persian ships ; and it had 
been agreed between Hippias and his partisans that this 
movement should be made so soon as a white shield, 
raised probably on the heights of Pentelikos, should 
give warning that the Athenian army was fairly on its 
way to Marathon. If the raising of this signal should 
precede the departure of the army, the purpose of raising 
it would be frustrated ; for the Athenian leaders would in 
this case refuse to leave the city exposed to unknown 
dangers. If again it were delayed long after their de- 
parture, the raising of it would go for nothing. It was of 
the utmost consequence that the tidings should be con- 
veyed to the Persian generals before the Athenians 
should themselves be able to see the sign, and that thus 
the Persian ships should have the start of many hours, or 
rather of two days, in their voyage to the Athenian har- 
bor. A bolder or more sagacious plan for furthering the 
interests of Hippias, and Dareios could scarcely have 
been formed ; and although the details of this scheme 
might remain unknown to the Athenian generals, they 
could not but be aware that within the walls of the city 
the cause of Hippias was favored by a minority by no 
means insignificant. The consciousness of the intrigues 
going on around them could not fail to produce hesita- 
tion in their councils and uncertainty in their action. 
There were traditions which transferred this hesitation to 
the field of Marathon at the cost of rendering almost the 
whole narrative inexplicable ; but there was also another 
version which ascribed the delay to a time preceding the 
departure of the army from the gates of Athens. The 
story told by Herodotus represents Miltiades, who with 
four others wished for immediate battle, as appealing to 



490 b. c. ] Invasion of Datis and Artaphemes. 127 

the military archon (p. 82) or polemarch Kallimachos to 
give his casting vote against the five generals who wished 
to postpone it. The appeal was made in stirring lan- 
guage ; but although Kallimachos decided to fight at 
once, nothing it seems, came from his resolution. The 
four generals who had all along agreed with Miltiades 
handed over to him the presidency which came to each 
in his daily turn : still Miltiades, we are told, would not 
fight until his own presidency came in its ordinary course. 
Unless we hold that the Athenian generals would deprive 
the city of its main military force before they had made 
up their minds for immediate battle, and that they pre- 
ferred idleness on the field of Marathon while their ene- 
mies might be occupied in attacking the city which they 
had deserted, we can scarcely resist the conclusion that 
the scene of this inaction was not Marathon but Athens. 
If the purpose of the signal was, as it is expressly said 
to have been, to inform Hippias that the Athenian army 
was on its march, or in immediate preparation for it, the 
token was superfluous when that army had already de- 
filed into the plain in sight of the Persian leaders ; and 
it is least of all likely that the latter would, while Miltiades 
and his army lay inactive before them, delay to carry out 
the plans of Hippias and his party, when the very thing 
which they wanted was that which had actually hap- 
pened. 

At length Miltiades and his colleagues set forth at the 
head of their men. The manifest caution and wariness 
of the generals had probably tended greatly 
to disconcert the partisans of Hippias ; and theAthe- 
the divisions thus introduced into their Marathon 
councils must have delayed the raising of the 
signal for some hours after the army had set out on its 
march. When at length the white shield flashed in the 



128 The Persian Wars. [ch. vi. 

dear air from the summit of Pentelikos, the token came, 
as Herodotus tells us too late. Indeed the historian 
candidly confesses that of this mysterious transaction 
he knows nothing beyond the fact that the shield was 
raised and that it was raised to no purpose. The Per- 
sians were already in their ships, not in readiness for 
sailing around cape Sounion to Phaleron, but hurrying 
from the field on which they had undergone a terrible 
defeat. Thus we have before us a picture in which, 
after a long time of uncertainty and fear the Athenian 
generals determine on vigorous action, and hastening to 
Marathon engage the enemy with a speed and enthusi- 
asm which defeats not merely the Persians but the 
schemes of the Athenian oligarchs. Doubt and hesita- 
tion are left behind them as they quit the gates of the 
city and their encampment on the field of Marathon 
preceded probably by one night only the battle which 
decided the fate of the expedition. 

The geography of Marathon is simple enough. To the 
east of the broad plain run the headlands of Rham- 
The plain of nous ' to tne nortn an d northwest the ridges 
Marathon. f Parmes, Pentelikos and Hymettos. At 

either end of the plain is a marsh, the northern one being 
still at all seasons of the year impassable, while the 
smaller one to the south is almost dried up during the 
summer heats. Something has been said of the vines 
and olives of Marathon : but the utter bareness of the 
plain at the present day may lead us to suppose that 
these trees were on the slopes which descended to the 
plain rather than on the plain itself. 

On the level surface between the hills which gird it in 
and the firm sandy beach on which the Persians were 
Victory of drawn up, stood, in the simple story of He- 

rnan^' rodotus, the Athenian army. The polemarch 



4 9 o b . c . ] Invasion of Datis and A rtaphernes* 129 

Kallimachos headed the right wing : the Plataians 
were posted on the left. But as with their scantier 
numbers it was needful to present a front equal to 
that of the Persian host, the middle part of the Greek 
army was only a few men deep and was consequently 
very weak, while the wings were comparatively strong. 
At length the orders were all given, and the Athenians, 
beginning the onset, went running towards the bar- 
barians, the space between the two armies being not less 
than a mile. The Persians, when they saw them coming 
made ready to receive them, at the same time thinking 
the Athenians mad, because, being so few in number, 
they came on furiously without either bows or horses. 
Coming to close quarters, they engaged in a conflict, 
both long and furious, of which none could foresee the 
issue. Victorious in the centre, the Persians and Sakians 
broke the Athenian lines and drove them back upon the 
plain ; but the Athenians and the Plataians had the best 
on both the wings. Wisely refusing to go in chase of the 
barbarians who had been opposed to them, these closed 
on the enemy which had broken their centre, put them 
to flight after a hard struggle, and drove them with great 
slaughter to the sea, where they tried to set the ships of 
the Persians on fire. Seven ships were thus taken : with 
the rest the barbarians beat out to sea, and taking up the 
Eretrian captives whom they had left on an islet bearing 
the name Aigilia, sailed round Sounion, hoping still to 
succeed in carrying out the plan arranged between Hip- 
pias and his partisans. But they had to deal with an 
enemy whose vigor and discipline far surpassed their 
own. Hastening back with all speed from Marathon, 
the Athenians reached the city first ; and the barbarians 
thus foiled lay for a while with their fleet off Phaleron, 
and then sailed back to Asia. 



130 The Persian Wars. [ch. vi. 

So ended the first great conflict of Persians with Greeks 

who had not yet passed under the yoke of a foreign 

master. During their revolt the Asiatic 

Importance of , . , , , , , , 

the battle of Ionians had shown some valor and made 
Marathon. some se if_ sacr ifi ces ; but there can be little 

doubt that the yoke of the Lydian kings, light as it was, 
tended to weaken the political union of cities fatally dis- 
posed by all their ancient associations and traditions to 
mutual jealousy, suspicion, and even hatred. In the west 
the headship of Sparta had done something towards 
kindling a sentiment which may be regarded as in some 
faint degree national ; and the constitutional changes of 
Solon and Kleisthenes had done more to create at Athens 
feelings to which the idea of irresponsible power exer- 
cised by an instrument of the Persian king was alto- 
gether revolting. The conduct of the Athenians at 
Marathon was the natural result of this political educa- 
tion, and it decided the issue not only of the present 
enterprise of Dareios but the subsequent invasion of 
Xerxes. 

In this memorable conflict the polemarch Kallimachos 

fell fighting bravely ; and here too the great tragic poet 

^schylos won renown as a warrior, while his 

Popular tradi- _ , __ . - . r r 

tions of the brother Kynegeiros was slam after perform- 
ing prodigies of valor. Nor was the number 
of combatants confined to men then living in the flesh. 
The old heroes of the land rose to mingle in the fray ; 
and every night from that time forth might be heard the 
neighing of phantom horses and the clashing of swords 
and spears. Thus were prolonged the echoes of the 
old mysterious battle ; and the peasants would have it 
that the man who went to listen from mere motives 
of prying curiosity would get no good to himself, while 
the Daimones or presiding deities of the place bore no 



490B.C.] Invasion of Datis and Artaphernes. 131 

grudge against the wayfarer who might find himself ac- 
cidentally belated in the field. 

The sequel of the popular tradition, running in the 
same simple vein, tells us how Datis and Artaphernes, 
sailing away to Asia, led their Eretrian 
slaves up to Sousa, where Dareios, though of the reign 
he had been very wroth with them because of Dareios - 
they had, as he said, begun the wrong, did them no 
harm, but made them dwell in the Kissian land in his 
own region which is called Arderikka. There, Hero- 
dotus adds, they were living down to his own time, 
speaking still their old language : and their descendants 
helped in their measure to further the work of Alexander 
the Great when he swept like a whirlwind over the 
empire of the Persian kings. As to the Spartans, they 
set out in haste when the moon was full, but they were 
too late for the battle although they reached Attica, it is 
said, on the third day after they left Sparta. Still, 
wishing to look upon the Medes, they went to Marathon 
and saw them, and having praised the Athenians for all 
that they had done, went home again. For the Persian 
monarch the tidings had a more poignant sting. The 
capture of Sardeis had made him bitter enough against 
the Athenians ; but the story of the battle of Marathon 
kindled in him a fiercer wrath and a more vehement 
desire to march against Hellas. Sending his heralds 
straightway to all the cities, he bade them make ready 
an army, and to furnish much more than they had done 
before, both ships and horses and men. While the 
heralds were going about, all Asia was shaken, as the 
historian phrases it, for three years ; but in the fourth 
year the Egyptians, who had been made slaves by 
Kambyses, rebelled against the Persians, and then the 
king sought only the more earnestly to go both against 



132 The Persian Wars, [ch. vi. 

the Egyptians and against the Greeks. So naming his 
son Xerxes to be king over the Persians after himself, 
he made ready for the march. But in the year after the 
revolt of Egypt Dareios himself died ; nor was he suf- 
fered to punish the Athenians, or the Egyptians who had 
rebelled against him. 

But if all these traditions commended themselves 
equally to the faith of Herodotus, there were ^, 

\ , . , , , .,.,. Charges 

others which he was by no means so willing brought at 
to receive. Rumor laid on the Alkmaionids against the 
the guilt of raising the white shield which Alkmai °nidai. 
was to bring the Persians round Sounion to Phaleron, 
while Miltiades was leading the Athenian army to the 
plain of Marathon. The charge attests the strength of 
the popular superstition which regarded this great family 
as lying under a permanent curse and taint for their 
share in the suppression of the conspiracy of Kylon (p. 
92) ; but Herodotus dismisses it with emphatic scorn. 
Whatever may have been the merit or the fault of those 
who had to deal with Kylon, to the Alkmaionidai, he in- 
sists, the Athenians practically owed their freedom and 
their very existence. By means certainly not the most 
scrupulous they had brought about the expulsion of the 
Peisistratidai, while to Kleisthenes they were indebted 
for the political reforms without which that change in 
the Athenian character would never have been effected 
which raised an unexpected and insuperable barrier to 
the schemes and hopes of Hippias. As to Harmodios 
and Aristogeiton the historian treats their miserable con- 
spiracy with contempt. They had succeeded only in 
exasperating the surviving kinsmen of Hipparchos, 
whereas the Alkmaionidai had, throughout, shown not 
the spirit which acts only when stirred by a personal 
affront, but the patriotism which renders all attempts at 



490 B.C.] Invasion of Datis and Artaphernes. 133 

corruption or intimidation impracticable, and which 
Herodotus quaintly compares to that of Kallias, who was 
bold enough to buy at auction the property which Hippias 
left behind him when he went into exile. 

For Miltiades the battle— in which he had won an 
imperishable name — laid open a path which led to ter- 
rible disaster. His reputation, already great Exoedition 
since his reduction of Lemnos (p. 76) was of Miltiades 

, , , iii« c to ^aros. 

immeasurably enhanced by the victory of 
Marathon. Never before had any one man so fixed on 
himself the eyes of all Athenian citizens ; and the con- 
fidence thus inspired in them he sought to turn to account 
in an enterprise which, he insisted, would make them 
rich for ever. He would say nothing more. It was not 
for them to ask whither he meant to lead them : their 
business was only to furnish ships and men. These they 
therefore gave ; and Miltiades, sailing to Paros, an island 
lying a few miles to the west of Naxos (p. 99), laid siege 
to the city, demanding the payment of 100 talents, under 
the threat that he would destroy the place in case of re- 
fusal. The alleged motive for attacking the Parians was 
their treachery in furnishing a ship for the Persian fleet 
at Marathon ; but in the belief of Herodotus Miltiades 
was actuated by private grudge against a Parian who had 
slandered him to the Persian general Hy- 

_ t - . . ^ , J 489 B. C. 

darnes. The matter might seem to be one 
about which Miltiades could not feel strongly, or which 
after his achievement at Marathon he might regard even 
with some pride and satisfaction. But like the men of 
Andros when Themistokles came to them on a like 
errand ten years later, the Parians had not the means 
of payment, and they put him off under various pre- 
tences, until by working diligently at night they had so 
strengthened their walls as to be able to set him at de- 



134 The Persian Wars. [ch. vi. 

fiance. The siege therefore went on to no purpose ; and 
after a blockade of twenty-six days Miltiades was obliged 
to return to Athens with his fleet, having utterly failed 
of attaining his object, and with his thigh, or, as some 
said, his knee severely strained. The Parians, Herodotus 
adds, accounted for this wound by the tale that Miltiades, 
perplexed at the long continuance of the siege, entered 
into treaty with the priestess Timo, who promised hirn 
victory if he would follow her counsels ; that in order to 
confer with her he went to the hill in front of the town, 
and being unable to open the gate leaped the hedge of 
the goddess Demeter; and that on reaching the doors of 
the temple he lost his presence of mind, and rushing 
back in terror hurt his thigh as he jumped from the stone 
fence. The Parians wished to requite Timo by putting 
her to death ; but asking first the sanction of the Delphian 
god, they received for answer that Timo was but a ser- 
vant in the hands of the Fate which was dragging 
Miltiades to his doom. The Parians, therefore, let the 
priestess go : the Athenians were less merciful to Miltiades. 
No sooner had he reached Athens than the indigna- 
tion of the people who professed to have been deceived 

Trial and anc ^ cneate< ^ by nml found utterance in a 

death of capital charge brought against him by Xan- 

thippos, the father of the great Perikles. 
Miltiades was carried on a bed into the presence of his 
judges, before whom, as the gangrene of his wound 
prevented him from speaking, his friends made for him 
the best defence, or rather perhaps offered the best ex- 
cuses, that they could. The charge of misleading the 
people was one that could not be rebutted directly, and 
before a court of democratic citizens they had not the 
courage to say that in being misled the people were the 
greater offenders. But if an adverse verdict could not 



490 B.C.] Invasion of Dads and Artaphernes. 135 

be avoided, the penalty might by Athenian practice be 
mitigated ; and it was urged that a fine of fifty talents, 
which would perhaps suffice to meet the expenses of the 
expedition, might be an adequate punishment for the 
great general but for whom Athens might now have been 
the seat of a Persian satrapy. This penalty was chosen 
in place of that of death ; but his son Kimon would have 
been a richer man, if, like Sokrates ninety years later, 
Miltiades had maintained that the proper recompense 
for his services to the state would be a public mainte- 
nance during life in the Prytaneion (p. 7). As in the 
case of Sokrates, the judges would in all likelihood have 
sentenced him to die ; and the death which the mortifi- 
cation of his thigh or knee brought on him a few hours 
or a few days later would have left Kimon free from the 
heavy burden which the Athenians suffered him to dis- 
charge. Miltiades died in disgrace, and the citizens 
whom he wished to enrich recovered from his family 
half the sum which he had striven to extort from the 
Parians. But there seems to be no warrant for think- 
ing that they subjected him to the superfluous indignity 
of imprisonment ; and the words of the geographer and 
antiquary Pausanias might almost justify the belief that 
his ashes were laid in the tomb raised to his memory at 
Marathon. 

Much has been said about the strange end of this 
illustrious man : but in the arguments urged on either 
side the charge of fraud and deception conduct of 
brought against the general has been almost the Athe- 
thrust into the background by that of fickle- case of Mil- 
ness and levity advanced against the people tia es ' 
which condemned him. Such a charge will always be 
welcomed by those to whom any form of democratical 
government seems repulsive. Our natural tendency to 



136 The Persian Wars. [ch. vi. 

sympathize with the individual against an aggregate of 
citizens is so strong that we are disposed to forget that 
the most distinguished services can confer no title to 
break the law. A leader who has won for himself a wide 
fame for his wisdom and his success in war cannot on 
the ground of his reputation claim the privilege of break- 
ing his trust with impunity. On the other hand, fickle- 
ness and ingratitude, in the meaning commonly attached 
to these words, are not to be reckoned among the special 
sins of democracy, and least of all, of such a democracy 
as that of Athens. A democratical society is precisely a 
society in which personal influence, when once gained, 
is least easily shaken ; and confidence, once bestowed, is 
continued even in the teeth of evidence which proves in- 
capacity or demerit. But because in a democracy a 
change of opinion, once admitted, must be expressed 
freely and candidly, the expression of that change is apt 
to be vehement and angry ; and the language of indig- 
nation, when this feeling is roused, may be interpreted 
as the result of ingratitude when the offender happens to 
be a man eminent for former services. Nor can it be 
said that the ingratitude and injustice of democracies 
are more frequent or more mischievous than the mis- 
doings of any other form of government. Still in spite 
of all that may be urged on the other side, we cannot 
fail to discern in the Athenian people a disposition to 
shrink from responsibility not altogether honorable, and 
a reluctance to take to themselves blame for results to 
which they had deliberately contributed. When the 
Syracusan expedition had ended in utter ruin (b.c. 413), 
they accused the orators who had urged them to under- 
take it. When, seven years later (b.c. 406), they had 
condemned to death by a single vote the generals who 
had won the victory of Argennoussai, they decreed that 



490 B.C.] Invasion of Datis and Artaphernes. 137 

the men who had entrapped them into passing the sen- 
tence should be brought to trial. Yet in both these 
instances they were finding fault for the result of their 
own verdict or of undertakings to which they had given 
their well-considered and solemn sanction. The case is 
altered when a leader, however illustrious, comes forward 
with enthusiastic hopes and seeks to lead his country- 
men blindfold into schemes of which he will not reveal 
the nature and of which it is manifestly impossible that 
he could guarantee the issue. Such cases leave no room 
for doubt. No state or people can under any circum- 
stances be justified in engaging the strength of the coun- 
try in enterprises with the details of which they have not 
been made acquainted. If their admiration for lofty senti- 
ment or heroic courage tempt them to give their sanction 
to such a scheme, the responsibility is shifted from him 
who gives to those who adopt the counsel, — to this ex- 
tent at least, that they cannot, in the event of failure, visit 
him in any fairness with penal consequences. Dismissal 
from all civil posts, and the humiliation which must fol- 
low the resentment or the contempt of his countrymen, 
may not be for such a man too severe a punishment ; 
but a more rigorous sentence clearly requires purer hands 
on the part of the men who must be his judges. Nor is 
there much force in the plea that Athenian polity was 
then only in the days of its infancy, and that peculiar 
caution was needed to guard against a disposition too 
favorable to the re-establishment of a tyranny. It is 
almost impossible that this could have been the feeling 
of the time ; nor is the imputation flattering to men who 
have lived for twenty years under the Solonian constitu- 
tion as extended and reformed by Kleisthenes. It may 
be true that the leading Greeks could not bear pros- 
perity without mental deprivation, and that owing to this 



138 The Persian Wars. [ch. vi. 

tendency the successful leader was apt to become one 
of the most dangerous men in the community ; but this 
fact cannot divest a people of responsibility for their 
own resolutions. Miltiades may have been corrupted 
by his glory ; but ordinary shame should have withheld 
the hands of the Athenians from one whose folly they had 
not checked and whose honesty they had not paused to 
question. But we are bound to note further that the 
alleged ignorance of the Athenians was rather a veil 
thrown over a line of action which, as being unsuccess- 
ful, they were disposed to regard as discreditable, and 
that in the scheme itself they were the accomplices 
rather than the dupes of Miltiades. In this instance 
the raid against the islanders failed altogether; and 
the unsuccessful general was crushed, A like attempt 
on the part of Themistokles ten years later was crowned 
with a larger measure of success, and was regarded 
as the earnest of a wide empire for Athens in time 
to come. The root of the evil, as shown whether in 
their rash confidence or in their anger against the un- 
successful leader, lay readily at the very foundations of 
Athenian polity, and perhaps at the foundations of all sys- 
tems of government, ancient or modern, so far as the 
world has yet gone. The main objection brought 
against monarchical states, and still more against oli- 
garchies, is that in these the machinery of government is 
employed chiefly or exclusively for the benefit of the 
rulers,— in other words, that government is regarded by 
these rulers as a privilege rather than as a responsibility, 
and is used as such. But this fault is by no means con- 
lined to despotic or aristocratic systems : the same result 
is seen even where political power is granted to the 
whole people. The corruption goes on although all may 
vote, because enormous majorities are anxious to ad- 



49 o B.C.] Invasion of Datis and Artafihernes. 139 

vance their own interest without regard to the interest of 
their neighbors. But at Athens political power was at 
no time granted to all the people, if this term is to be 
taken in the sense now generally attached to it. The 
great body of resident foreigners, known as the Metoikoi, 
was excluded, while the slaves were of course never 
thought of: and thus every political change, every mili- 
tary enterprise, was considered solely with reference to 
the benefit which might accrue to the Demos, — in other 
words, to the governing class, and not to the great aggre- 
gate of all the inhabitants of Attica. It might thus be 
said that incompetence and corruption are necessary re- 
sults of democracy ; and they certainly are so in the 
sense which would make them likewise the result of all 
other forms of government. Really unselfish rule can- 
not be found except where power is regarded not at all 
as a privilege but wholly as a responsibility ; and except 
in a few isolated statesmen this idea has never been 
found to act as a constraining motive. Among the first 
results of such an idea would be the growth of a convic- 
tion that no enterprise shall be undertaken which may 
not after a close scrutiny seem likely to promote the in- 
terest of every class in the land without exception. The 
blind eagerness with which (to put the matter in the best 
light) they are represented as following Miltiades, proves 
only that the greed of a supposed self-interest had not 
yet been counteracted by an unselfish regard to the 
general good of the country. The Athenians sinned, 
not so much by placing an undue trust in Miltiades as 
by neglecting the duty of examining the plans on which it 
was necessary to stake the credit and power of the State. 



140 The Persian Wars. [ch. vn. 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE INVASION AND FLIGHT OF XERXES. 

We now approach the history of the great struggle be- 
tween Xerxes and the Western Greeks, — a history the 
general features of which stand out with 
General sufficient clearness, but which, as related by 

cn.3.r3.ct6r 01 

the narra- Herodotus, is also one of the most splendid 

tcTthe^xpe? of epic poems. From the beginning to the 
Xerxes f enc * °*" *^ s narrative we can trace an ethical 

or religious purpose overlying or even put- 
ting out of sight political causes and motives, and sub- 
stituting appeals to exploits done in the mythical ages 
for less fictitious and more substantial services. Nation- 
al struggles which are beyond doubt historical are en- 
livened by imaginary combats of well-chosen cham- 
pions ; and in the sequence of events every step and 
every turn is ushered in by tokens and wonders or by 
the visible intervention of gods and heroes. In not a few 
narratives the credulous spirit of the age breaks out into 
wild exaggerations and absolute fictions, which yet exhi- 
bit pictures of marvelous power and beauty. The his- 
torian must give these pictures as he finds them, while he 
traces to the best of his power the threads, often faint 
and broken, which show the real course of events in this 
most momentous war. 

According to the account given by Herodotus, Xerxes 
had at first no wish to carry out his father's design 
Preparations against the Western Greeks, (p. 104). During 
sionof Eu- a " two years his preparations tended not to the 
rope. invasion of Europe but to the re-conquest 



484 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 141 

of Egypt. At the end of that time he marched into that 
devoted land, and having riveted more 

° 484 B.C. 

tightly the fetters which had been forged for 
it by Kambyses, left it under the rule of his brother 
Achaimenes. But before he set out on this Egyptian 
journey, Mardonios, of whom during the reign of Dareios 
we lose sight after his failure in Makedonia (p. 112), had 
urged upon him the paramount duty of chastising Athens 
and thus of getting a footing on a continent which, for 
its beauty, its fertility, and vast resources, ought to be the 
possession of the Great King alone. The motive of 
Mardonios, we are told, was the wish to be himself vice- 
roy of Europe ; but there were not wanting others to 
bear out his words. The Thessalian chieftains (p. 20), 
who belonged to the family of the Aleuadai offered their 
aid against their kinsfolk ; and the Peisistratidai were 
still at hand to plead their cause with eager importunity. 
Hippias himself may have fallen, (although the fact 
cannot be stated with any certainty), on the field of 
Marathon ; but his children, backed by a retailer of po- 
pular prophecies, prevailed on Xerxes to summon a 
council of his nobles. In this assembly the King, we are 
told, reminded his hearers that the Persian power could 
only stand so long as it remained aggressive ; he insisted 
that no European tribes or nations could, for strength of 
will, or keenness of mind, or readiness in resource, be 
compared with the Greeks ; and he argued that if these 
could be conquered, nothing could stay his triumphant 
progress until he had made his empire commensurate 
with the bounds of the Ether itself. The decisiveness of 
this speech seems to leave little room for discussion ; but 
Mardonios is said to have regarded it as an invitation to 
the chiefs to express their independent opinion. He ac- 
cordingly takes it up as an admission of faint-hearted- 



142 The Persian Wars. [ch. vii. 

ness on the part of Xerxes. There was really no need 
for diffidence. Nowhere could a people be found who 
invited others to attack them so sedulously as the Greeks. 
Without any principle of union, they seemed to have no 
other object in life than to fight out their quarrels in the 
most fertile spots of their several territories ; and the 
sight of the Persian fleet would at once be followed by 
their submission. The deep silence which followed the 
speech of Mardonios was at length broken by Artabanos, 
a brother of Dareios and uncle of Xerxes, who urged the 
need of careful circumspection. Every forest, he said, 
was eloquent with its warnings. Everywhere the tree 
which would not bend to the blast was snapped or up- 
rooted, while the pliant sapling escaped. No sooner 
had Artabanos sat down than Xerxes declared that Ar- 
tabanos should be punished for his timidity by being 
kept at Sousa with the women and children. His lan- 
guage was, however, more resolute than his mind. 
During the night which followed the council, the dream- 
god came as he had come to Agamemnon in the Iliad, 
and standing over his couch, warned him that it would 
be at his peril if he gave up the enterprise on which he 
had set his heart. But just as in the Iliad Agamemnon 
obeys the words of Zeus by giving a command in direct 
opposition to it, so Xerxes tells his nobles that they may 
remain quietly at home since the idea of invading Greece 
has been definitely abandoned. Again the dream-god 
warns the king that, if he resists, his glory shall pass 
away ; and Xerxes in his perplexity begs Artabanos to 
put on his crown, and don the royal robes, and lie down 
on his couch, since, if the dream-god be worth notice at 
all, he would come to the occupant of the throne, who- 
ever he might be. The old man lies down, assuring the 
king that dreams can generally be traced to matters 



48 1 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes, 143 

which have occupied the mind previous to sleep ; he 
starts up resolved to make up for his former advice by 
twofold zeal in carrying out the king's will. The dream- 
god had drawn near to him with hot irons, manifestly 
for the purpose of searing out his eyes ; and this threaten- 
ing movement probably prevented him from applying 
to his own dream the theory by which he had accounted 
for that of Xerxes. 

The demoniac impulse (so Herodotus phrases it) had 
now driven Xerxes to the point from which there was no 
retreating. The whole strength of the empire Progress of 
was to be lavished on one supreme effort, Xerxes from 

r ' bousa to 

and that empire extended now from the Sardeis. 
eastern limits which it had reached under Cyrus, to the 
cataracts of the Nile and the shores and islands of the 
Egean Sea. The campaigns of Megabazos and Mardo- 
nios had accomplished the subjugation of many Thra- 
kian and Makedonian tribes ; throughout Thessaly the 
chiefs were full of zeal in the cause of the Great King ; 
and in Hellas itself there were some states not less eager 
to submit themselves to him. The Expedition of Datis 
which had ended in the disaster of Marathon, was 
strictly a maritime invasion. It was the design of 
Xerxes to overwhelm the Greeks by vast masses poured 
into their country by land, while a fleet hugely larger 
than that of Datis should support them by sea. For the 
passage of the former across the Eosporos and the 
Strymon wooden bridges were constructed ; to save the 
latter from the catastrophe which befell the ships of Mar- 
donios (p. 112) orders were given, it is said, to convert 
Athos (p. 32) into an island which might enable the fleet 
to avoid its terrible rocks. At length the host set out 
from Sousa in a stream which gathered volume as it 
went along. The several nations met at Kritalla in 



144 The Persian Wars. [ch. vii. 

Kappadokia, and having crossed the Halys, marched to 
Kelainai, where Pythios, who had bestowed on Dareios 
a golden plane tree and a golden vine, welcomed the 
Persians with a magnificence which excited the aston- 
ishment of Xerxes. In the rivalry of munificence 
Xerxes was not to be outdone, and Pythios left his pres- 
ence a proud and happy man : but when in the follow- 
ing spring, Xerxes set out from Sardeis, an eclipse of the 
sun so frightened the wealthy Phrygian, that he besought 
the king to let him keep one of his five sons at home. 
The answer was a stern rebuke for the presumption 
which demanded exemption from military service for 
the slave of a king who was taking the trouble to go 
all the way to Hellas himself. His own life and that 
of his four sons he should have for the sake of his 
former munificence : but the limbs of the child whom 
he wished to keep, should be hung up on each side of 
the road along which the army must pass. 

On reaching Sardeis, Xerxes had sent heralds to all 

the Greek cities except Athens and Sparta; and the 

reasons which forbid us to suppose that 

The bridges . * r r 

across the those exceptions were now made for the 
Hellespont. firgt time haye been a i rea( jy no ted (see p. 

113). But before this host was to cross into Europe, a 
stream of blood was to flow on the shores of the Helles- 
pont. In making their bridges of boats, the Phenicians 
had used hempen ropes, while the Egyptians employed 
ropes made from the fibre of papyrus. A severe storm 
shattered the work of both. Xerxes ordered the engi- 
neers of the bridges to be beheaded, and passed sen- 
tence that the Hellespont, having received three hun- 
dred lashes of the scourge, should be branded by men 
who were bidden to inform it that whatever it might 
choose to do, the king was determined to cross over it. 



48 1 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 145 

His commands were obeyed ; but Xerxes took the fur- 
ther precaution of having the new bridges constructed 
with greater strength and care. It is, however, of far 
more importance to note that in the belief of the West- 
ern Greeks, Xerxes was the first who attempted to 
accomplish this task, and that thus the bridge attributed 
to Dareios, (p. 73) seems to fade away into the impene- 
trable mists which shroud his doings in the Scythian 
land. 

The march of Xerxes from Sardeis is presented to us 
in a series of impressive pictures. Between the cloven 
limbs of the son of Pythios advances first _, , „ 

, , . .-,,•, r , , March of 

the baggage tram with the beasts of burden, Xerxes from 
followed by half the force supplied by the 
tributary nations, all in confused masses. Separated 
from these after a definite interval by a thousand picked 
Persian horsemen and a thousand spear-bearers, came 
ten of the sacred horses from the Median plains of Nisa, 
followed by the chariot of Ahuromazdao (Ormuzd) or 
Zeus, on which no mortal might place his foot, the reins 
of the horses being held by the charioteer who walked 
by the side. Then on a car drawn by Nisaian steeds 
came the monarch himself, followed by a thousand of 
the noblest Persians, then by a thousand horsemen and 
ten thousand picked infantry with golden and silver 
apples and pomegranates attached to the reverse end of 
their spears, followed lastly by a myriad cavalry, behind 
whom after an interval equal to that which separated the 
vanguard from the household troops came the remaining 
half of the disorderly rabble of tributaries. Keeping on 
the left the heights of Ida, the army journeyed on to the 
Ilian land. On the lofty Pergamos the king offered a 
sumptuous sacrifice, and at length on reaching Abydos 
he had the delight of sitting on the throne of white stones 



146 The Persian Wars, [ch. vii. 

which had been raised for him by his orders. Beneath 
him his fleet was engaged in a mimic battle, in which 
the Sidonians were the victors. Surveying the hosts 
which he had thus brought together, Xerxes first pro- 
nounced himself the happiest of men and then presently 
wept ; and in answer to the wondering question of Arta- 
banos confessed that the thought of mortality had sud- 
denly thrust itself upon him, and that the tears found their 
way into his eyes because at the end of a hundred years 
not one of all this great host should remain alive. 
"Nay," said Artabanos, "there are more woful things 
than this. The sorrows that come upon us and the dis- 
eases that trouble us make our short life seem long, and 
therefore from so much wretchedness death becomes the 
best refuge." " Let us speak no more of mortal life," 
said Xerxes ; " it is even as thou sayest. It is well not 
to bring evil things to mind when we have a good work 
in our hands. But tell me this. If thou hadst not seen 
the dream-god clearly, wouldst thou have kept thine own 
counsel, or wouldst thou have changed ? Tell me the 
truth." Artabanos could not but express the hope that 
all things might go as the king desired ; but he added 
" I am still full of care and anxious, because I see that 
two very mighty things are most hostile to thee." " What 
may those things be ?" asked the king ; " will the army 
of the Greeks be more in number than mine, or will our 
ships be fewer than theirs ? for if it be so, we will quickly 
bring yet another host together." " Nay," answered 
Artabanos, " to make the host larger is to make these 
two things worse ; and these are the land and the sea. 
The sea has no harbor which in case of storm can shelter 
so many ships. The land too is hostile ; and if nothing 
resists thee, it becomes yet more hurtful the further that 
we go, for our men are never satisfied with good fortune, 



48 1 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 147 

and so the length of the journey must at the last bring 
about a famine." "You say well," answered Xerxes: 
" yet of what use is it to count up all these things ? If 
we were always to be weighing every chance, we should 
never do anything at all. It is better to be bold and to 
suffer half the evil than by fearing all things to avoid 
suffering." But Artabanos, still unconvinced, besought 
the king at all events not to employ the Asiatic Ionians 
against their kinsfolk. " If they so serve," he argued, 
" they must be either most unjust in enslaving their own 
people, or most just in setting them free. If they are 
unjust, our gain is little; if they be just, they can do us 
great harm." But the king would have it that in this 
he was most of all deceived, since to these Ionians at 
the bridge across the Danube Dareios owned not merely 
his own life but the salvation of his empire ; and with 
this assurance he dispatched Artabanos to Sousa. 

On the next day, as the sun burst into sight, Xerxes, 
pouring a libation into the sea, greeted the god with the 
prayer that he would suffer nothing to check „ 

, . ., , , , , , .... Passage of 

his course until he should have carried his the Heiies- 
conquests to the uttermost bounds of Europe. pont * 
From the bridges rose the odor of frankincense : the 
roads were strewed with myrtle branches. With the same 
pomp which had marked his departure from Sardeis 
Xerxes passed from Asia into Europe. But special 
signs were not wanting to show that this seeming god 
was marching to his ruin. A mare brought forth a hare, 
— a manifest token, as Herodotus believed, that the expe- 
dition begun with so much confidence would end in 
disaster and ignominy. 

Thus, without thought of coming woes, the fleet sailed 
westward from Abydos, while the land forces, marching 
eastwards, and passing on the right hand the tomb of 



148 The Persian Wars. [ch. vn. 

the maiden who gave her name to the Hellespont, at 
last reached Doriskos. Here on the wide plain through 
The review which the Hebros finds its way to the sea, 
at Doriskos. Xerxes numbered his army by bringing a 
myriad of men into the smallest possible space and round 
this raising an inclosure into which other myriads were 
successively brought until the infantry alone were found 
to number 1,700,000 men. In such vast round numbers 
has the tradition of this mighty armament come down to 
us. We should have scarcely more reason to wonder if 
we were told that it numbered 17,000,000 ; but it is at first 
sight surprising to be told that the number of the Persian 
ships was not 500 or 1000, but 1,207. We find the nume- 
ration, however, not only in Herodotus, but in the great 
drama of the Persians by ^Eschylos ; and the familiarity 
of Herodotus with that drama will probably be not gene- 
rally questioned. But there is little doubt or none that 
iEschylos believed or asserted the number of the Persian 
ships to be not 1,207, but precisely, as we should expect, 
1,000. He adds indeed that the number of ships noted 
for swift sailing amounted to 207 ; but he certainly does 
not say that these 207 were to be added to the grand total 
of 1,000. Even thus, however, the simple enumeration 
of the total by ^Eschylos stands on a very different foot- 
ing from the list of factors which in Herodotus are made 
to yield the same result. With the exception of the 17 
ships which the Egean islanders are said to have contri- 
buted, not a single uneven number is to be found among 
them. The Phenicians furnish 300, the Egyptians 200, 
the Kilikians 100, the cities along the shores of the 
Euxine 100, the Pamphylians 3}, the Lykians 50, the 
Kyprians 150, the Karians 70. But if the grand total, as 
given by iEschylos, was well known to Athenians gene- 
rally, there is nothing to surprise us in the fact that some 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 149 

one who misunderstood the lines in which he sums up the 
numbers made out the several factors which were to yield 
the desired result, and that Herodotus accepted these 
factors as historical. It is, however, quite possible that 
a spurious or forged list may contain factors which are 
accurately given ; nor need we hesitate to say that the 
contingents of the Persian fleet which would be 'best 
known to the Western Greeks would be those of their 
Asiatic kinsfolk, together with the ships furnished by the 
islanders. The greatest stress must therefore be laid on 
the fact that the number of ships supplied by these 
Eastern Greeks together with the islanders amounts to 
precisely the 207 which ^Eschylos gives as the number 
of the fast-sailing ships in the service of Xerxes, — the 
Ionians contributing 100 ships, the Aiolians 60, the Do- 
rians 30, the islanders 17. These ships would probably 
be the only vessels of which .^Eschylos would even pre- 
tend to have any personal knowledge ; and his statement 
seems to lead us to the conclusion that this historical fac- 
tor was merged in the artificial total of 1,000, while a 
certain Hellenic pride may be traced in the implied fact 
that the Greek ships in the Persian fleet far surpassed in 
swiftness the vessels even of the Phenicians. But although 
in these 207 ships we have a number undoubtedly his- 
torical, it is most remarkable that the 1,000 vessels of 
which they formed a part make up in the drama of 
^Eschylos the Persian fleet which fought at Salamis, 
whereas according to Herodotus this was the number 
which Xerxes reviewed with his land forces at Doriskos. 
In the interval the Persians, as Herodotus affirms, lost 
647 ships, and gained only 120; and thus we see that 
the grand total in either case was suggested by Eastern 
ideas of completeness. When then we are informed 
that Xerxes led as far as Thermopylai 5,280,000 men be- 



150 The Persian Wars. [ch. vii. 

sides a vast throng of women, we take the statement 
simply as evidence that the Persian host left everywhere 
by its size an impression of irresistible force. The great 
historian Thucydides confesses that he could not learn the 
exact number of the few thousand men engaged in the 
battle of Mantineia, of which he was probably himself an 
eye-witness : it would be strange indeed, therefore, if we 
had a trustworthy census of the Persian hordes at Doriskos. 
But in truth, Herodotus, although convinced that in 
speaking of these millions he was speaking of an histori- 
~ . cal fact, had an object in view of a higher 

Conversation ° 

of Xerxes with and more solemn kind, which he sets forth 

Demaratos. . , , , . 

in a singularly characteristic narrative. 
When after the great review Xerxes sent for Demaratos 
and asked him if he thought that the Greeks would dare 
to resist him, the Spartan exile replied by asking whether 
the king wished to hear pleasant things or only the truth. 
Receiving a pledge that no harm should befall him, he 
went on to tell him that the Greeks owed the courage by 
which they kept off both poverty and tyranny to their 
wisdom and to strength of law, and that even if no 
count were taken of the rest, that the Spartans would 
fight him to the last even though they might not be able 
to muster a thousand men. "What?" said Xerxes 
laughing, " will a thousand men fight my great army ? 
Tell me now, thou wast once their king, wilt thou fight 
straightway with ten men ? Come, let us reason upon it. 
How could a myriad, or five myriads, who are all free, 
and not ruled by one man , withstand so great a host ? Be- 
ing driven by the scourge they might perhaps go against 
a multitude larger than their own : but now, left to their 
freedom, they will do none of these things. Nay, even 
if their numbers were equal to ours, I doubt if they could 
withstand us, for among my spear-bearers are some who 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 151 

will fight three Greeks at once ; thus in thine ignorance 
thou speakest foolishly." In plain-spoken and simple 
style Demaratos expressed his consciousness that the 
truth was not likely to be palatable, and reminded 
him how little he was likely to exaggerate the virtues of 
men who had robbed him of his honors and dignity, and 
driven him to a strange land. "I say not indeed that I 
am able to fight with ten men or with two, nor of my own 
will would I fight with one. So, too, the Spartans one by 
one are much like other men ; but taken together they 
are the strongest of all men, for, though they are 
free, they are not without a lord. Law is their master 
whom they fear much more than thy people fear thee. 
Whatever law commands that they do ; and it commands 
always the same thing, charging them never to fly from 
any enemy, but to remain in their ranks and to conquer 
or die." The value of this conversation lies wholly in 
the truth of the lesson which it teaches ; and this lesson 
enforces the contrast between the principle of fear and 
the principle of voluntary obedience. It is profoundly 
true that brute force driven by the lash cannot be trusted 
in a conflict with minds moved by a deep moral impulse. 
The tyranny of few men has equaled that of Napoleon 
Bonaparte ; but Bonaparte knew perfectly well that 
mere numbers and weapons were of little use, unless 
his soldiers could be stirred by a fierce enthusiasm. Not 
a little of his power lay in his ingenious use of claptrap 
to stir up this enthusiasm ; and the point of the conver- 
sation between Xerxes and Demaratos is that to such a 
height even as this — the standard of mere deception — 
it was impossible for a Persian despot to rise. Nay, 
Cyrus, if not Dareios, might have reminded Xerxes that 
the foundations of the Persian empire were not laid by 
men driven to battle by the scourge. He was making the 



IS 2 The Persian Wars. [ch. vn. 

confusion which Eastern kings are apt to make, between 
the force of hardy warriors urged on by the impulse of 
conquest, and the force of multitudes, whose object is to 
do as little work, and to do it as badly, as they can. 

Of the land march of the Persians from Doriskos it is . 

almost enough to say that the army passed through the 

several places which lay naturally in its 

the Persfan P ath - witn little annoyance, except from 

army to some clans of Thrakian mountaineers, it 

1 herme. 

reached the city of Eion, on the Strymon, 
then governed by the Persian Boges whom Megabazos 
(p. y6) had probably left in charge of it. The Strymon 
was bridged over for their passage : but Xerxes could 
not leave the spot called Ennea Hodoi (the Nine Roads), 
the site of the future Amphipolis (p. 34) without burying 
alive for luck's sake nine boys and nine girls taken from 
the people of the country. At length, after journeying 
on through the lands watered by the Echedoros, the 
army halted on the ground stretching from Therme 
to the banks of the Haliakmon, from Therme, as 
he looked westwards and southwards, the eyes of Xerxes 
rested on that magnificent chain of mountains which 
rises to a head in the crests of Olympos and Ossa, and, 
leaving between these two hills the defile through which 
the Peneios flows out into the sea, stretches under the 
name of Pelion along the coast which was soon to make 
him feel the wrath of the invisible gods. Here gazing in 
wonder at the mighty walls of rock which rose on either 
side, he is said to have asked whether it were possible 
to treat the Peneios as Cyrus had treated the Gyndes. 
Among the tribes who stooped to give him earth and 
water, the Aleaud (p. 28) chieftains of Thessaly had been 
the most prominent and zealous. From these the ques- 
tion of Xerxes drew out the fact that they lived in a mere 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 153 

basin where the stoppage of the one outlet of its streams 
would make the whole land sea, and destroy every soul 
within its mountain barriers. Xerxes was not slow, we 
are told, in appreciating the true meaning of Thessalian 
ardor. People who live in a country which can be taken 
without trouble do wisely, he said, in allying themselves 
betimes with the invader. 

Returning from the pass of Tempe, Xerxes was obliged 
to remain for some time at Therme while his pioneers 
were cutting a path across the densely wood- 
ed hills ; and from Therme eleven days after the Persian 
his own departure with the land army for MagneJan 
Gonnos, the fleet sailed in a single day to coabt * 
the Magnesian coast under Pelion, there to feel in a few 
hours the wrath of the wind-god Boreas. Thus far the 
enterprise had been carried on, and it is said, with un- 
broken good fortune ; but we shall see presently in the 
narrative of his retreat signs which seem to show that 
the statement is, to say the least, questionable. 

In Western Greece the course of events had been for 
some time determining the parts which Athens and 
Sparta were severally to play in the coming Development 
struggle. The long and uninteresting feud of tn « Athe- 

1 at 1 a- • 11 niannavy. 

or war between Athens and Aigma had at 
least one good result in fixing the attention of the Athe- 
nians rather on their fleet than on their army. The 
quarrel was concerned with the old strife between the 
oligarchic nobles and the Demos or people, of whom 
nearly 700 were murdered by the former, who in their 
turn were defeated by an Athenian force. By sea the 
Aiginetan oligarchs were more fortunate. The Athenian 
fleet, being surprised in a state of disorder, lost four ships 
with their crew. This rebuff could not fail to bring 
home to the Athenians the lesson which, from the very 

M 



154 The Persian Wars. [ch. vn. 

beginning of his career, Themistokles had been straining 
every nerve to teach them. The 'change of policy on 
which, in order to develop the Athenian navy, he was 
led to insist, embittered the antagonism which had 
Ostracism of already placed a gulf between himself and 
Aristeides. Aristeides ; and the political opposition of 
these two men involved so much danger to the state, 
that Aristeides himself, it is said, confessed that, if the 
Athenians were wise, they would put an end to their 
rivalry by throwing both into the Barathon (p. 114). 
The Demos, so far taking the same view, sent him into 
exile by a vote of ostracism (p. 91). This vote affirmed 
the adoption of the new policy in preference to the old 
conservative theory which regarded the navy as the 
seed-bed of novelty and change ; and Themistokles 
would not fail to strengthen this resolution by dwelling 
on the certainty of fresh effort on the part of the Persian 
king to carry out the design on which, as they knew, his 
father Dareios had set his heart, and by assuring them 
not only that the power of the Persian empire was to be 
directed chiefly against themselves, but that it was as 
necessary to be prepared against the formidable Phenician 
fleet as against any armies which might assail them by 
land. It was a happy thing both for Themistokles and 
for Athens that the proposed expedition of 
weaiXof Dareios was delayed first by the revolt of 

Athens. Egypt, then by his death, and lastly by the 

long time which Xerxes allowed to pass before he left 
Sousa. Meanwhile the internal resources of Athens 
were being enormously increased by the proceeds of the 
silver mines of Laureion. During the military despotism 
of the Peisistratidai the wealth of these mines had been 
used scantily or not at all : but the impulse given to 
enterprise by the constitutional reforms of Kleisthenes 



480 B.C.] The Invasion mid Flight of Xerxes, 155 

had already been rewarded by a harvest of silver suffi- 
cient to furnish ten drachmas for every Athenian citizen. 
This petty personal profit Themistokles induced them to 
forego; and by his advice this sum of perhaps 300,000 
drachmas was devoted to the building of 200 ships to be 
employed nominally in that war with Aigina which in 
the forcible words of Herodotus was nothing less than 
the salvation of Greece. 

It can scarcely be said that the patriotic resolution of 
the Athenians was shared by the other Greek states ; 
some among them, it is true, began to see that they 
were not enacting wisely by wasting their 
years in perpetual warfare or feud ; and in a thTSthmus 
congress held at the isthmus of Corinth they ^iTc th * 
admitted the paramount need of making up 
existing quarrels in presence of a common danger. But 
although the men of Aigina were thus constrained to lay 
aside for a time their quarrel with the Athenians, the 
Hellenic character was not changed. Of all the Greek 
cities the greater number were taking the part of the 
Persians, or, as it was phrased, Medizing, while those 
who refused to submit dreaded the very thought of a 
conflict with the Phenician fleet. In this season of 
supreme depression the great impulse to hope and vigor- 
ous action came from Athens. It is the emphatic judg- 
ment of Herodotus (p. 3) that if the Athenians had 
Medized it would have been impossible to withstand the 
king by sea, while the Spartans would have been left to 
carry on an unavailing contest by land. Hence the 
Athenians are with him pre-eminently the saviours of 
Hellas ; and his assertion has all the more value, because 
he declares that it was forced from him by a strong con- 
viction of its truth, although he knew that in many 
quarters it would give great offence. 



156 The Persian Wars. [ch. vii. 

For the present the general aspect of things was 
gloomy enough. The three men sent by the congress 
at Corinth to spy out the army of Xerxes at 
tion ofthe" Sardeis had returned with a report which 
Sades ian we m ight suppose would be superfluous. 

All Asia, it is said, had for years resounded 
with the din of preparation ; and the inhabitants of the 
Greek towns along the line of march could furnish accu- 
rate accounts of the quantities of corn laid up in their 
magazines. The three spies were caught, but Xerxes 
had them led round his camp and sent away unhurt ; 
and their story came in to heighten the superstitious 
terrors inspired by signs and omens of approaching dis- 
aster. On entering the shrine at Delphoi, the Athe- 
nian messengers were greeted with a pitiless response. 

O wretched people, why sit ye still ? Leave your homes and your 
strongholds, and flee away. 

Head and body, feet and hands, nothing is sound, but all is 
wretched ; 

For fire and water, hastening hither on a Syrian chariot, will pre- 
sently make it low. 

Other strong places shall they destroy, not yours only, 

And many temples of the undying gods shall they give to the flame. 

Down their walls the big drops are streaming, as they tremble for 
fear; 

But go ye from my holy place, and brace up your hearts for the 
evil. 

Dismayed by these fearful warnings, the messengers 
received a glimmer of comfort from a Delphian who 
bade them take olive- branches and try the god once 
more. To their prayer for a more merciful answer they 
added that, if it were not given, they would stay there 
till they died. Their entreaty was rewarded with these 
mysterious utterances. 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 157 

Pallas cannot prevail with Zeus who lives on Olympos, though she 
has besought him with many prayers, 

And his word which I now tell you is firmly fixed as a rock. 

For thus saith Zeus that, when all else within the land of Kekrops 
is wasted, the wooden wall alone shall not be taken ; and 
this shall help you and your children. 

But wait not until the horsemen come and the footmen ; turn your 
backs upon them now, and one day ye shall meet them. 

And thou, divine Salamis, shalt destroy those that are born of wo- 
men, when the seed-time comes or the harvest. 

These words the messengers on their return to Athens 
read before the people. The very ease with which they 
were made to coincide with the policy of Themistokles 
points to the influence which called them forth. The 
mind of the great statesman had been long made up 
that Athens should become a maritime power ; and his 
whole career supplies evidence that he would adopt with- 
out scruple whatever measures might be needed to carry 
out his purpose. Thus, when the answer was read out, he 
could at once come forward and say, " Athenians, the 
soothsayers, who bid you leave your country and seek 
another elsewhere, are wrong ; and so are the old men 
who bid you stay at home and guard the Akropolis, as 
though the god were speaking of this when he speaks of 
the wooden wall, because long ago there was a thorn 
hedge around it. This will not help you : and they are 
all leading you astray when they say that you must be 
beaten in a sea-fight at Salamis, and that this is meant 
by the words in which Salamis is called the destroyer of 
the children of women. The words do not mean this. If 
they had been spoken of us, the priestess would certain- 
ly have said " Salamis the wretched," not " Salamis the 
divine." They are spoken not of us, but of our enemies. 
Arm then for the fight at sea, for the fleet is your wooden 



158 The Persian Wars. [ch. vii. 

wall." When we remember the means by which the re- 
sponses were produced which bade Kleomenes drive the 
Peisistratidai from Athens (p. 87), we can scarcely sup- 
pose that Themistokles would fail to make use of an in- 
strument so well fitted to further his designs. That to the 
grounds of encouragement thus obtained from Delphoi 
he added the expression of his own conviction that 
Athens must conquer if she confined herself to her own 
proper path, is certain from the results which he brought 
about. It was only the mental condition of his time 
which threw into the background arguments better suited 
for a later generation. 

But, although, by adopting the policy of Themistokles, 

Athens insured her ultimate supremacy, the time was 

not yet come for its general recognition. The allies 

assembled in the congress at the Corinthian isthmus 

declared bluntly that they would rather with- 

Neutrahty or J J . 

indifference of draw from the confederacy, than submit 
KorkyfaUms. to any rule except that of Sparta; and 
Greeks lhan w ^ g enume patriotism the Athenians at 
once waived a claim on which they might 
fairly have insisted. They alone were ready to see 
their families exiled, their lands ravaged, and their city 
burnt, rather than suffer the ill-cemented mass of Hel- 
lenic society to fall utterly to pieces. From Argos and 
from Boiotia generally they had nothing to hope. The 
Argives, sprung from the hero Perseus, professed to re- 
gard the Persians as their kinsfolk, and insisted on re- 
maining neutral in the contest, while the Boiotian chiefs, 
keeping down a discontented population committed them- 
selves to an anti-Hellenic policy and clung to it with a 
desperate zeal. The Korkyraians met the messengers from 
the congress with assurances of ready help ; but the sixty 
ships which they sent were under officers who were 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 159 

charged to linger on their voyage. They acted from 
the belief that the Greeks must inevitably be over- 
whelmed, and in this case they were to claim credit with 
Xerxes for not exerting against him a force which might 
have turned the scale the other way. If the Greeks 
should be the victors, they were to express their regret 
that adverse winds had baffled all their efforts to double 
the southern promontories of the Poloponnesos. The 
messengers sent to Gelon, the despot of Syracuse, met with 
not much better success. To their warning that if he failed 
to help his eastern kinsfolk he would leave the way open 
for the absorption of Sicily into the Persian empire, he 
replied by an indignant condemnation of their selfish- 
ness in refusing to help him when he was hard pressed by 
the Carthaginians. Still he promised to send them a vast 
force and to meet practically the whole expenses of the 
war, if they would recognize him as chief and leader 
of the Greeks against the barbarians. This was more 
than the Spartan envoy could endure. " In very deed," 
he cried, ''would Agamemnon mourn, if he were to hear 
that the Spartans had been robbed of their honor 
by the Syracusans. Dream not that we shall ever yield 
it to you." But Gelon was not to be put down by high words. 
" Spartan friend," he answered, " abuse commonly makes 
a man angry ; but I will not repay insults in kind. So far 
will I yield, that if ye rule by sea I will rule by land, and if 
ye rule by land then I must rule on the sea." But here 
the Athenian envoy broke in with a protest that, although 
his countrymen were ready to follow Spartan leadership 
on land, they would give place to none on the sea ; and 
Gelon closed the debate by telling them that they seemed 
likely to have many leaders but few to be led, and by 
bidding them go back and tell the Greeks that the 
spring time had been taken out of the year. But 



i6o The Persian Wars. [ch. vn. 

Herodotus, while he seems to give credit to this story, 
candidly admits that there were other versions of the 
tale, and that the genuine Sicilian tradition represented 
Gelon as prevented from aiding the Greeks not by 
Spartan claims to supremacy, but by the attack of a 
Carthaginian army under Hamilkar, equal in number 
to the unwieldy force of the Persian king. As therefore 
he could not help them with men, this version speaks 
of him sending in their stead a sum of money for their 
use to Delphoi. 

Amidst all these discouragements the Greeks who 
were not disposed to Medize fully felt the paramount 
Abandon- need of guarding the entrances into the 

pa^o / 1 * 16 country, and thus of placing all possible 
Tempe. hindrances in the invader's path. The first 

and apparently the most important of those passes was 
that of Tempe ; and the wisdom of guarding this defile 
seemed to be proved by the eagerness with which this 
measure was urged by the Thessalian people. Along 
this pass for five miles a road is carried, nowhere more 
than twenty and in some parts not more than thirteen, 
feet in width ; and when it was occupied by Themistokles 
with a force of 10,000 hoplites or heavy armed soldiers, 
it might have been thought that the progress of the bar- 
barians was effectually barred. But they were soon 
reminded that a way lay open to the west by the Perrhai- 
bian town of Gonnos, and that they might thus be them- 
selves taken in the rear and starved into submission. 
They were compelled therefore to abandon the pass ; 
and the Thessalians, now left, as they had warned 
Themistokles that in this case they must be left, to the 
absolute dictation of their chiefs, became, perhaps from 
a natural feeling of irritation at the conduct of their allies, 
zealous partisans of the Persian king. But the resolution 



480 B.C.] The Invasio?i and Flight of Xerxes. 161 

to retreat from Tempe was accompanied by a determina- 
tion to fall back on Thermopylai, while the fleet should 
take up its station off Artemision or the northernmost 
coast of Euboia, facing the Malian gulf. 

The accumulation of mud at the mouth of the Sper- 
cheios has so changed the form of the Malian gulf since 
the time of Herodotus, that some of the most 
material features in his description no longer ©f Thermo- 
apply to this memorable pass. The mouth titles* the 
of the Spercheios which then flowed into the under Leo- 

, _ .. . r . . nidas. 

sea about five miles to the west of the pass is 
now shifted to a distance nearly four miles to the east of 
it. We look therefore in vain for the narrow space where 
the ridge of Oita, bearing here the name Anopaia, came 
down above the town of Anthela so close to the water as 
to leave room for nothing more than a*cart-track. Between 
this point (at a distance of perhaps a mile and a half to 
the east) and the first Lokrian hamlet Alpenoi, another 
spur of the mountain, locked in the wider space within 
which the army of Leonidas took up its post, but which, 
for all practical purposes was as narrow as the passes at 
either extremity known as the Gates or Hot Gates, Pylai 
or Thermopylai. This narrow road was hemmed in by 
the precipitous mountain on the one side and on the 
other by the marshes produced by the hot springs which, 
under the name of Chytroi, or the Pans, formed a resort 
for bathers. To render the passage still more difficult 
than nature had made it, the Phokians had led the 
mineral waters almost over the whole of it and had also 
built across it near the western entrance a wall with 
strong gates. Much of this work had fallen from age ; 
but it was now repaired, and behind it the Greek army 
determined to await the attack of the invaders. Here, 
about the summer solstice, was assembled a force not 



164 The Persian Wars. [ch. vii. 

all along the beach as far as Kasthanaia. For four days 
the storm raged furiously. The shore was strewn with 
costly treasures of Eastern art and luxury; and the 
goblets of silver and gold gathered by the fortunate 
owner of this bleak domain made him a man of enormous 
wealth. Meanwhile the Greeks, who on the approach 
of the Persian fleet had retreated to the Euripos, heard 
on the second day of the storm how the Persians were 
faring at sea, and, plucking up courage, sailed* back 
through the comparatively smooth waters of the Euboian 
sea to Artemision. Their enemies, however, were not so 
much crippled as the Greeks had hoped to find them. 
When the storm abated, their ships, drawn down from 
the shore, sailed to Aphetai, at the entrance of the 
Pagasaian gulf (p. 18) and took up their position pre- 
cisely opposite to the Greek fleet at Artemision. Some 
hours later, a Persian squadron, mistaking the Greek fleet 
for their own, sailed straight into the trap and were cap- 
tured. From the prisoners, among whom was the satrap 
Sandokes, the Greeks obtained useful information of the 
movements and plans of the Persian king. 

Xerxes, in the meanwhile, had advanced through 
Thessaly, and encamped in the Malian Trachis, distant 
a few miles only from the ground occupied by the de- 
fenders of the pass. Here, as we are told 

The struggle . .... ... . r 

m Thermo- in the exquisitely beautiful narrative of 
pyiai. Herodotus, the Persian king sent a horse- 

man on to see what the Greeks might be doing. To the 
west of the old Phokian wall, the messenger saw the 
Spartans with their arms piled, while some were wrestling 
and others combing their hair. His report seemed to 
convict them of mere folly ; but Demaratos assured him 
that the combing of hair was a sign that the Spartans 
were preparing to face a mortal danger. " How can so 






480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 165 

few men ever fight with my great army?" asked the 
king ; and for four days he waited, thinking that they 
must run away. At last he ordered his army to advance ; 
but their efforts were vain. Troop after troop was hurled 
back, until the Immortals were bidden to carry the pass. 
But their spears were shorter than those of the Greeks ; 
linen tunics were of little use in an encounter with iron- 
clad men ; and mere numbers were a hindrance in the 
narrow pass. Pretending to fly, the Spartans drew the 
barbarians on, and then, turning round, cut them down 
without mercy. Thrice the king leaped from his throne 
in terror during that terrible fight : but on the following 
day he renewed the onset, thinking that the enemy must 
be too tired to fight. The Greeks were all drawn out in 
battle array, except the Phokians, who had been detached 
to guard the path which led over the ridge Anopaia. 
The scenes of the day before were repeated, and Xerxes 
was well-nigh at his wits' end when a Malian named 
Ephialtes told him of this mountain pathway. Having 
received the king's orders, Hydarnes set out from the 
camp as the daylight died away ; and all night long 
with his men he followed the path, the mountains of 
Oita rising on the right hand and the hills of Trachis 
on the left. The day was dawning with the deep stillness 
which marks the early morning in Greece, when they 
reached the peak where the thousand Phokians were on 
guard. These knew nothing of the approach of the 
enemy while they were climbing the hill which was 
covered with oak-trees ; but they knew what had hap- 
pened as soon as the Persians drew near to the summit. 
Not a breath of wind was stirring, and they heard the 
trampling of their feet as they trod on the fallen leaves. 
The barbarians were on them before they could well put 
on their arms. Dismayed at first, for he had not ex- 



1 66 The Persian Wars. [ch. vn. 

pected any resistance, Hydarnes drew out his men for 
battle ; and the Phokians, covered with a shower of 
arrows, fell back from the path to the highest ground, 
and then made ready to fight and die. But the Persians 
had come with no notion of attacking them, and without 
taking further notice they hastened down the mountain. 
In the Greek camp the tidings that Hydarnes was at 
hand were received with mingled feelings. Among the 
Spartans they excited no surprise, for the soothsayer 
Megistias had told them the day before that on the mor- 
row they must die. In some of the allies they created 
an unreasoning terror ; and Leonidas, wishing that the 
Spartans might have all the glory, resolved on sending 
all away. The Thebans and Thespians alone remained, 
the former because Leonidas insisted on keeping them 
as pledges for their countrymen, the latter because they 
would not save their lives by treachery to the cause to 
which they had devoted themselves. When the sun 
rose, Xerxes poured out wine to the god, and by the 
bidding of Ephialtes, tarried till the time of the filling of 
the market (about 9 a.m.). The battle, which began 
when the signal was given for onset, was marked by 
fearful slaughter on the side of the barbarians, who were 
driven on with scourges and blows. Many fell into the 
sea and were drowned ; many more were trampled down 
alive by one another. At length, overborne by sheer 
weight of numbers, Leonidas with other Spartans fell, 
fighting nobly ; and a desperate conflict was maintained 
ove.r his body, until Hydarnes came up with his men. 
Finding themselves thus taken in the rear, the Greeks 
went back into the narrow part within the wall, and here, 
after performing prodigies of valor, the Thespians and 
Spartans were all cut down, the bravest of the latter 
being, it was said, Dienekes, who hearing from a Tra- 



480 b. c. ] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 167 

chian, just before the battle that when the Persians shot 
their arrows the sun was" darkened by them, answered 
merrily, " Our friend from Trachis brings us good news : 
we shall fight in the shade." All were buried where they 
fell : and in after days the inscription over the allies re- 
corded that 4,000 Peloponnesians fought here with 300 
myriads. Over the Spartans was another writing, which 
said : 

Tell the Spartans, at their bidding, 
Stranger here in death we lie. 

Two only of the 300 Spartans who came with Leonidas 
were lying sick at Alpenoi. The one, Eurytos, calling 
for his arms, bade his guide lead him into the battle (for 
his eyes were diseased), and plunging into the fight was 
there slain. The other, Aristodemos, went back to 
Sparta and was avoided by all as the dastard. But he 
got back his good name when he flung away his life at 
Plataia. As to the Thebans, they took the first oppor- 
tunity of hastening to the king with a story which Hero- 
dotus calls the truest of all tales, saying that they were 
the first to give earth and water, and that they had gone 
into the fight sorely against their will. The issue of the 
battle set Xerxes pondering. Summoning Demaratos, 
he asked how many Spartans might be left and received 
for answer that there might be about 8,000. To the 
question how these men were to be conquered Demaratos 
replied that there was but one way, and this was to 
send a detachment of the fleet to occupy the island of Ky- 
thera, off the southernmost promontory of Poloponnesos. 
This suggestion was received with vehement outcries by 
some of the Persian generals. Four hundred ships had 
already been shattered by the storm on the Magnesian 
coast : if the fleet were further divided, as it would be 



1 68 The Persian Wars. [ch. vn. 

by this proposal, the Greeks would at once be a match 
for them. The advice of the exiled Spartan king was re- 
jected, and Xerxes applied himself to the task of turning 
to good purpose his victory at Thermopylai. His order 
to behead and crucify the body of Leonidas was followed 
by a proclamation inviting all who might choose to do 
so to visit the battle-ground and see how the great king 
treated his enemies. The trick was transparent even to 
Eastern minds. In one heap were gathered the bodies 
of 4,000 Greeks, in another lay those of 1,000 Persians. 
One more incident points the great moral of the story of 
Thermopylai. Some Arkadian deserters, on being asked 
by Xerxes what the Greeks were doing, answered that 
they were keeping the feast at Olympia, and looking on 
the contests of wrestlers and horsemen. A further ques- 
tion brought out the fact that the victors were rewarded 
with a simple olive wreath. "Ah! Mardonios," ex- 
claimed Tritantaithmes, with emotion which Xerxes as- 
cribed, to cowardice, " what men are these against whom 
you have brought us here to fight, who strive not for 
money but for glory ?" 

Beautiful as this stoiy of the battle may be, it is easy 
to see that it is not an accurate narrative of the events as 
Value of the they occurred. With a force numbering not 
history of much more than 8,000 men, Leonidas is said 

the struggle to have kept in check the whole Persian 
army for ten or twelve days, and to have inflicted on 
them very serious loss. Nothing can show more clearly 
that he might have held his ground successfully, had he 
chosen to place an effectual guard on the ridge of 
Anopaia, and to keep under his own standard all who 
were not needed for that duty. The conduct of the 
Phokians destroyed, we are told, all chances of ultimate 
success, but it still left open the possibility of retreat, 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 169 

and more than 4,000 troops were accordingly dismissed 
and got away safely. This, so far as we can see, seems 
impossible. Within an hour from the time of his leav- 
ing the Phokians at the top of the hill, Hydarnes, with 
his men must have reached the Eastern Gates through 
which these 4,000 would have to pass ; and it is absurd 
to suppose that, within a few minutes of the time when 
they learnt that the Persians were at hand, so large a 
force could have made its way along a narrow strip of 
ground, in some parts scarcely wider than a cart-track. 
It is clear that if under such circumstances the retreat 
was effected at all, it must have been accomplished by 
sheer hard fighting ; but the narrative speaks of a 
peaceable and even of a leisurely departure. Nor can we 
well avoid the conclusion that Leonidas would have 
taken a wiser course had he sent these 4,000 along with 
the Phokians to guard Anopaia, with orders that they 
were to hold it at all hazards. Nor is the story told 
of the Thebans in his camp less perplexing. Their 
behaviour cannot be explained on the theory that they 
were citizens of the anti-Persian party, and that after 
the fall of Leonidas, they were glad to take credit for a 
Medism which they did not feel. Distinctly contradict- 
ing any such supposition, Herodotus maintains that their 
profession of Medism was the truest of all pleas ; nor 
would the Thessalians have vouched for the credit of 
men of whose Hellenic sympathies they must on this 
theory have been perfectly aware. But if they were 
thus kept in the Greek camp wholly against their will, it 
is strange indeed that they should forego all opportunities 
of aiding the cause of Xerxes, whether by openly joining 
Hydarnes or passively hindering the operations of 
Leonidas. When further, we see that the special object 
of the whole narrative is to glorify the Spartans, we are 

N 



170 The Persian Wars. [ch. vn. 

justified in inferring that the care taken by the com- 
manders of the Athenian fleet to obtain early tidings 
from the army of Thermopylai, indicates the presence 
of an Athenian force within the pass, and that the re- 
sistance to Xerxes was on a far larger scale than Hero- 
dotus has represented. A compulsory, and still more a 
disastrous, retreat of the allies might be veiled under the 
decent plea that they were dismissed by the Spartan 
chief; and if they were conscious of faint-heartedness, 
they would not care to hinder the growth of a story 
which covered their remissness in the Hellenic cause, 
while it enhanced the renown of Leonidas and his Three 
Hundred. 

Of the disaster which befell the Persian fleet on the 
Magnesian coast, the Greeks on board their ships at the 
The Greek Euripos heard on the second day after the 
fleet at Ar- beginning of the storm ; and no sooner had 

temision. ° ° ' 

they received the tidings than they set off 
with all speed for Artemision. The storm lasted four 
days, and the Greek fleet had thus been stationed on the 
northern shore of Euboia for eight-and-forty hours before 
the Persian ships became visible as they sailed to 
Aphetai. Here the confederate fleet awaited their arrival, 
the whole number being 271 ships, of which Athens 
furnished not less than 127, or it may rather be said 147, 
if we take into account the 20 Athenian vessels manned 
by the Chalkidians. The supreme command of the force 
was in the hands of the Spartan Eurybiades. The other 
cities had insisted on this arrangement as an indispensa- 
ble condition of the alliance ; and, to their lasting credit, 
the Athenians, yielding at once, waited patiently until 
the turn of events opened the way to the most brilliant 
maritime dominion of the ancient world. 

Reaching Aphetai lats in the afternoon of the fourth 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 171 

day after the beginning of the storm, the Persians saw 

the scanty Greek fleet awaiting their arrival 

off Artemision. Their first impulse was to ^ ri Tj al °L 

- 1 trie x crsicin 

attack them immediately : they were re- shi P s at 

-1 ii 1 -ii • Aphetai. 

strained only by the wish that not a single 
Greek vessel should escape. A Persian squadron was 
accordingly sent, the same afternoon, round the east 
coast of Euboia to take the enemy in the rear. Before 
the evening closed, or, at the latest, early the next morn- 
ing, a deserter from the Persian fleet brought to the 
Greeks the news of the measures taken to place them 
between two fires, and it is expressly stated that until the 
Persian fleet became visible off Aphetai they had no in- 
tention of retreating. But a little room, therefore, is left 
for the story which tells us that on seeing the Persian 
fleet, which they had specially come up to attack, the 
Greeks resolved at once to fall back on Chalkis, and 
were prevented from so doing only by Themistokles, 
who bribed Eurybiades with five talents and the Corin- 
thian leader Adeimantos with three, to remain where 
they were until the Euboians should have removed their 
families from the island. These eight talents formed 
part of the sum of thirty talents which the Euboians, it is 
said, bestowed on Themistokles to secure his aid for this 
purpose; and we must note here four points, — (1) that 
Themistokles retained for himself the huge sum of 
twenty-two talents ; (2) that although they must in an 
hour or two have learnt that their bribe was a useless 
waste of money the Euboians never sought to recover 
the whole or any portion of it ; (3) that if they had asked 
redress from the Athenians, the latter would readily 
have given it ; and (4) that although twice or thrice 
afterwards it was a matter of vital moment that Themis- 
tokles should overcome the opposition of his colleagues, 



172 The Persian Wars. [ch. vii. 

there is not even a hint that he ever attempted to bribe 
them again. 

The debate which followed the receipt of the news that 
the Persian squadron had been sent round Euboia, ended 

in the resolution to sail down the strait under 
the°Greeks cover of darkness, for the purpose of en- 
at Arte- gaging the squadron separately ; but finding, 

as the day wore on, that the Persian fleet 
remained motionless, they determined to use the remain- 
ing hours of light in attacking the enemy, and thus gain- 
ing some experience in their way of fighting. As the 
Greeks drew near, the Persians, as at Marathon, (p. 127), 
thought them mad, so it is said, and surrounded them 
with their more numerous and faster-sailing ships, to the 
dismay of the Ionians serving under Xerxes, who looked 
on their kinsfolk as on victims ready for the slaughter. 
But on a given signal, the Greeks drew their ships into 
a circle with their sterns inwards and their prows ready 
for the charge. On the second signal a conflict ensued, 
in which the Greeks took thirty ships ; and the desertion 
of a Lemnian vessel from the Persians showed the dis- 
position of the Asiatic Greeks towards their western kins- 
folk. 

During the following night the storm again burst forth 
with terrific lightning and deluges of rain. The wrecks 
Second bat- anc * ^ e dead bodies were borne by the waves 
tie off Arte- to Aphetai : but the full stress of the tempest 

mision. _ ,, .. . . 

fell on the Persian squadron coasting round 
Euboia for the purpose of cutting off the retreat of the 
Greeks. Almost all were dashed against the rocks ; and 
thus again, the historian adds, the divine Nemesis worked 
to bring their numbers more nearly to a par with those 
of their enemies. The morning brought no cheering 
sight to the barbarians at Aphetai. while the Greeks, 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 173 

elated at the tidings that the Persian ships of Euboia 
were destroyed, were further strengthened by a rein- 
forcement of fifty-three Athenian ships. The allies at- 
tempted nothing more than an attack on the knot of 
ships which they captured, and then came hack to their 
stations ; but even this was presumption not to be en- 
dured, and the Persian leaders, seriously fearing the 
wrath of the king, resolved on fighting. The battle was 
fiercely contested. The Persians with their ships drawn 
out crescent-wise, sought to surround and overwhelm the 
confederate fleet, and they failed, we are told, more from 
the unwieldy numbers of their vessels than from any 
lack of spirit in their crews. Although the Greeks were 
on the whole, the victors, the Spartans and their allies 
were so weakened, that retreat once more 

Victory and 

appeared the only course open to them. retreat of the 
The Euboian money, we might suppose, 
might now have been used with advantage; but we are 
not told that Themistokles offered again to bribe them, 
and all efforts were useless when a scout came with the 
tidings that Leonidas was slain, and that Xerxes was 
master of the pass which formed the gate of Southern 
Hellas. The Greek fleet at once began to retreat, the 
Corinthians leading the way, and the Athenians follow- 
ing last in order. 

It is from this point that the courage of the Athenians 
rises to that patriotic devotion which drew forth the 
enthusiastic eulogies of Herodotus : and it c , 

rises just in proportion as the spirit of their fleet at 
allies gives way. The one thought of the 
latter was now fixed on the defence of the Peloponnesos 
alone. They had convinced themselves that no Persian 
fleet would visit the shores of Argolis and Lakonia ; and 
their natural conclusion was that if they guarded the 



174 The Persian Wars. [cr. vn. 

Corinthian isthmus, they needed to do nothing more. 
Against this plan Themistokles made an indignant pro- 
test; and although we are not told that the Euboian 
money was employed to second his remonstrances, he 
persuaded them to make a stand at Salamis until the 
Athenians should have removed their households from 
Attica. Here then the fleet remained, while the Pelo- 
ponnesians were working night and day in order to 
„ , ,. „ fortify the isthmus. Stones, bricks, pieces 

Building of J ' ?/■*. 

the isthmian of wood, mats full ot sand, brought by 
myriads of laborers, soon raised the wall to 
the needful height ; but the completion of the barrier 
added little, it seems, to the confidence of its builders, 
and none to that of the Peloponnesian seamen at Sala- 
mis. We have, in fact, reached the time of the greatest 
depression on the part of the Greeks ; and this depression 
marks the moment at which the enterprise of Xerxes had 
been brought most nearly to a successful issue. The 
story of Thermopylai seems to indicate throughout that 
Depression ^ e Persian host was not so large, and the 
of the allies. Greek army not so small, as they are repre- 
sented ; and the inaction set down to the score of the 
Karneian and Olympian festivals may be nothing more 
than an excuse invented at a later time to cover the fail- 
ure of really strenuous efforts. To the average Greek 
the glory of the struggle lay in the defeat of millions by 
thousands ; to us the splendor of achievement is vastly 
enhanced, if the power of Xerxes lay not so much in his 
numbers as in the strength and spirit of his genuine 
Persian soldiers. The tales which represent his progress 
as that of a rolling snowball have their origin in the 
vulgar exaggeration of Eastern nations ; and a pardona- 
ble feeling of vanity led the Greeks to regard these ex- 
aggerations as heightening the lustre of their own exploits. 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes, 175 

The real strength of the army of Xerxes lay beyond 
doubt in the men whom Cyrus had led from conquest 
to conquest, and whose vigor and courage remain un- 
subdued after the lapse of five-and-twenty centuries ; nor 
can we rightly appreciate the character of the struggle 
and its issue until we see that the Greeks were fighting 
against men little, if at all, inferior to themselves in any 
except the one point that the Eastern Aryan fought 
to establish the rule of one despotic will, while his Western 
brother strove to set up the dominion of an equal law. 

Western freedom was, in truth, in far greater danger 
than it would have been but for this genuine element of 
strength in the Persian forces. There was 

& : . - Migration of 

now no time for dilatory counsels. Imme- theAthe- 
diately after the arrival of the fleet from Ar- gSJ^AigiS, 
temision, a proclamation was issued, warn- andSaianus. 
ing all Athenians to remove their families from the coun- 
try in all possible haste. How far this order may have 
been obeyed, we cannot say : but from all those parts of 
the country which lay in the immediate path of the invader, 
the inhabitants beyond doubt fled in haste, most of them 
to Troizen in the Argolic peninsula, some to Aigina, and 
some to Salamis. 

Meanwhile, to the north of Attica, Xerxes had over- 
come almost all real resistance. With the exception of 
Thespiai and Plataia (p. 122) all the Boio- 
tian cities had submitted to him, while the Success of 

' Aerxes. 

Thessalians professed a zeal in his cause 

which Herodotus ascribed wholly to their hatred of the 

Phokians' way of revenging old affronts, the 

Thessalians led the Persians through the phSf£ lgof 

narrow little strip of Dorian land, and then 

let them loose on Phokis. The Phokian towns were all 

burnt ; and Abai, the shrine and oracle of Apollo, was 



176 The Persian Wars. [ch. vii. 

despoiled of its magnificent treasures. A little further 
on, the forces were divided. The larger portion went 
on through Boiotia under orders to join 
Delp C hoi 0n Xerxes. The rest marched, it is said, to- 

wards Delphoi, which they hoped to treat 
as they had treated Abai. The tidings of their approach 
so dismayed the Delphians, that they asked the god 
whether they should bury his holy treasures, or carry 
them away. " Move them not," answered the god, " I 
am able to guard them." Then, taking thought for 
themselves, the people fled, until there remained 
only sixty men with the prophet Akeratos. As the Per- 
sian host came into sight, the sacred arms, which hung 
in the holy place, and which it was not lawful for man 
to touch, were seen lying in front of the temple ; and as 
the enemy drew nearer, the lightnings burst from heaven, 
and two cliffs torn from the peaks of Parnassos dashed 
down with a thundering sound, crushing great multi- 
tudes, while fierce cries and shoutings were heard from 
the chapel of Athene. In utter dismay the barbarians 
fled ; and the Delphians, hurrying down from the moun- 
tain, slew without mercy all whom they overtook. The 
fugitives who escaped into Boiotia told how two hoplites, 
higher in stature than mortal man, had chased them with 
fearful slaughter from Delphoi. The rocks which fell 
from Parnassos Herodotus believed that he saw lying in 
the sacred ground of Athene\ 

This inroad on Delphoi marks in the narrative of 
Herodotus the turning point in the enterprise of Xerxes. 
It is the most daring provocation of divine 
relating to wrath by the barbarian despot ; and while 

on G Dei a hoi it is followed immediately by his own hu- 
miliation, it insures also the destruction of 
the army which he was to leave behind him with Mar- 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 177 

donios. But we shall presently find Mardonios denying 
that any such enterprise had been attempted, while the 
narrative of Plutarch represents the Delphian temple not 
only as having been taken by the Persians, but as un- 
dergoing the fate of the shrine at Abai. This tradition 
seems to be set aside by the statement of Herodotus, 
that he had himself seen in the Delphian treasury the 
splendid gifts which bore the names of Gyges and of 
Kroisos ; but it is certain that the story of the enterprise 
of Xerxes is repeated precisely in the story of the attempt 
made on Delphoi by Bran (Brennus) and his Gauls just 
two centuries later ; and the identity of the incidents in 
each seems to show that the form given to the narrative 
was demanded by the religious sentiment of the people. 
In Boiotia Xerxes was still moving on upon the path 
which, as he fancied, was to lead him to his final triumph. 
Four months had passed since his army ^ 

x J Occupation 

crossed over the Hellespont, when the ty- of Athens by 
rant set his foot on Attic soil and found the 
land desolate. The city was abandoned, and on the 
Akropolis there remained only a few poor people and 
the guardians of the temples, who, to carry out the letter 
of the oracle (p. 1 54), had blocked with a wooden palisade 
the only side which was supposed to lie open to attack. 
Once more the Peisistratidai stood in their old home, and 
regarded themselves as practically repossessed of their 
ancient tyranny : but the offers which they made to the 
occupants of the Akropolis were rejected with contempt. 
In vain the Persians discharged against them arrows 
bearing lighted tow ; and Xerxes, thus foiled, gave him- 
self up to one of his fits of furious passion. But a fissure 
in the rock on the northern side enabled some Persians 
to scramble up to the summit. Of the defenders, a few 
threw themselves over the precipice, the rest took refuge 



178 The Persian Wars. [ch. vii. 

in the temple of the goddess. Hurrying thither, the bar- 
barians cut down every one of the suppliants ; and 
Xerxes, now lord of Athens, forthwith sent a horseman 
to Sousa with the news. The streets of that royal city 
rang with shouts of joy when the tidings became 
known, £,nd were strewn with myrtle branches. The 
fears of Artabanos were falsified, and the harems of the 
king and his nobles could now wait patiently the coming 
of the Spartan and Athenian maidens whom Atossa had 
wished to make her slaves (p. 71). 

In revenge for the burning of the temple at Sardeis 
(p. 103) the temples on the Akropolis were set on fire ; 
but the Athenian exiles who had returned „ , 

Resolution 

with him from Sousa were commanded by ofthePelo- 
Xerxes to make their peace with Athene. toretre^to 
Two days only had passed since the rock the lsthmus - 
was taken : but in the meantime the scorched stem of 
her sacred olive tree was seen, it is said by these exiles, 
when they came to offer sacrifice, to have thrown up a 
shoot of a cubit's height. If the Peisistratidai chose to 
see in this marvel a sign of the greeting with which Athene 
welcomed them home, the Athenians drew from it a dif- 
ferent lesson. Some encouragement they assuredly 
needed. The confederate fleet had been stationed at 
Salamis rather to cover the migration of the Athenians, 
than with any purpose of making it a naval station ; and 
the news of the taking of Athens determined the allies 
to retreat to the isthmus, where in case of defeat by sea 
they could fall back on the help of the land-force. One 
man alone felt that this decision must be fatal. Thessaly, 
Boiotia, and Attica had been allowed to fall successively 
into the enemy's hand, under the plea that prudence de- 
manded a retreat to the south or the west. What pledge 
eould the Athenians have that the occupation of the 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 179 

isthmus would be followed by greater harmony of coun- 
sels or greater resolution of purpose ? Convinced that 
the abandonment of Salamis would be a virtual confes- 
sion that common action could no more • 

Opposition 

be looked for, Themistokles resolved of Themis- 
that by fair means or by foul he would 
not allow this further retreat to be carried out. 
Having prevailed on Eurybiades to summon a second 
council, he was hastening, it is said, to address the as- 
sembly without waiting for the formal opening of the de- 
bate, when the Corinthian Adeimantos reminded him 
sharply that they who in the games rise before the signal 
are beaten. " Yes," said Themistokles gently ; " but those 
who do not rise when the signal is given are not crowned." 
Then turning to Eurybiades, he warned him that at the 
isthmus they would have to fight in the open sea, to the 
great disadvantage of their fewer and heavier ships, 
while a combat in the closed waters of Salamis would 
probably end in victory. At this point Adeimantos, again 
breaking in upon his speech, told him rudely, that, as 
since the fall of Athens he had no country, he could have 
no vote in the council, and that thus Eurybiades was de- 
barred from even taking his opinion. The speech was a 
strange one to come from a man who had taken a bribe 
from the speaker ; nor is it easy to see why, with more 
than twenty Euboian talents still in his possession, The- 
mistokles had not again tried the effect of gold on the Corin- 
thian leader before the council began . Telling Adeimantos 
quietly that he had a better city than Corinth, so long as 
the Athenians had 200 ships, Themistokles contented him- 
self with warning Eurybiades plainly that, if the allies 
abandoned Salamis, their ships would convey the Athe- 
nians and their families to Italy, where they would find 
a home in their own city of Siris. The Spartan leader 



180 The Persian Wars. [ch. vn. 

saw at once that without the Athenians the Pelopon- 
nesians would be at the mercy of the enemy, and gave 
orders for remaining. But the formal obedience of the 
allies could not kill their fears ; and when on the follow- 
ing day, after an earthquake by sea and land, they saw 
the Persian fleet manifestly preparing for battle, their dis- 
content broke out into murmurs which made it clear that 

Eurybiades must give way. Without losing 
Themistokles a moment, Themistokles left the council, and 

sent Sikinnos, his slave, and the tutor of 
his children, in a boat to the Persian fleet, bidding him 
tell the king that Themistokles desired the victory not of 
the Greeks but of the Persians, that the Greeks were on 
the point of running away, and that in their present state 
of dismay they could be taken and crushed with little 
trouble. The Persians at once landed a large force on 
the island of Psyttaleia, precisely opposite to the harbor 
of Peiraieus, for the purpose of saving the wrecks of ships, 
and slaying such of the enemy as might be driven thither. 
Towards midnight a portion of their fleet began to move 
along the Attic coast until the line extended to the north- 
eastern promontory of Salamis, thus making it impossi- 
ble for the. Greeks to retreat to the isthmus without fight- 
ing. The leaders of the latter were spending the night 
in fierce discussion, when Themistokles, summoned from 
the council, found his banished rival Aristeides waiting 
to tell him that they were now surrounded beyond all pos- 
sibility of escape. In few words Themistokles informed 
him that the arrangement had been brought about by 
himself. The arrival of a Tenian ship, deserting from 
the Persian fleet, confirmed the news to which, as it 
came from the lips even of Aristeides, they were disposed 
to give little credit. Once more they made ready to 
fight ; and as the day dawned, Themistokles addressed 




gusseU <$• Xtrutliers.N. r 



480 b. c. ] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 181 

not the chiefs, but the crews, laying before them all the 
lofty and mean motives by which men may be stimulated 
to action, and, beseeching them to choose the higher, 
sent them to their ships. 

Early in the morning the Persian king took his seat on 
the great throne raised for him on a spur of Mount Aiga- 
leos, to see how his slaves fought on his be- 
half. The day was yet young when the flaLnd s tle 
Greeks put out to sea and the barbarians 
advanced to meet them. According to the Aiginetan 
tradition a trireme sent to their island, to beseech the 
aid of the hero Aiakos and his children, began the con- 
flict after some hesitation, the form of a woman having 
been seen which cried out with a voice heard by all the 
Greeks, " Good men, how long will ye back water ?" In 
the battle the Athenians found themselves opposed to 
the Phenicians, who had the wing towards Eleusis and 
the west, while the Ionians towards the east and the 
Peiraieus faced the Peloponnesians. Beyond this gene- 
ral arrangement and the issue of the fight, the historian 
himself admits that of this memorable battle he knew 
practically nothing. The issue in his belief was deter- 
mined by the discipline and order of the Greeks ; but it 
may have depended in part on the fact that the Persian 
seamen had been working all night, while the Athenians 
and their allies went on board their ships in the morn- 
ing fresh from sleep, and stirred by the vehement elo- 
quence of Themistokles. But it is especially noted that 
the Persian forces fought far more bravely at Salamis 
than at Artemision, and that few of the Ionians in the 
service of Xerxes hung back from the fight, — a fact 
which would seem to show that the desertion of the 
Spartans and Athenians (p. 103) in the revolt of Arista- 
goras still rankled in their minds. On the other hand, 



1 82 The Persian Wars. [ch. vii. 

there was a tradition that in the course of the battle the 
Phenicians charged the Ionians with destroying the Phe- 
nician ships and betraying their crews. Happily for the 
accused an exploit performed by the Greeks of a Samo- 
thrakian vessel in the service of Xerxes gave instant 
and conclusive proof of their fidelity, and Xerxes in a 
towering rage gave command that the heads of the Phe- 
nicians should be struck off. If the charge was really 
made, the character of the Phenician seamen may fairly 
be taken as proof that it was not altogether groundless. 
So strangely contradictory are the traditions related of 
the same event ; but in some instances the inconsistency 
explains itself. According to the Athenians, Adeiman- 
tos, the Dauntless (such is the meaning of his name), 
fled in terror at the very beginning of the fight, followed 
by his countrymen, and they were already well on their 
way when a boat, which no one was known to have sent, 
met them, and the men in it cried out, " So, Adeimantos, 
thou hast basely forsaken the Greeks who are now con- 
quering their enemies as much as they had ever hoped 
to do." Adeimantos would not believe; but when the 
men said that they would go back with him and die if 
they should be found to have spoken falsely, he turned 
his ship and reached the scene of action when the issue 
of the fight was already decided. This story the Corin- 
thians met with the stout assertion that they were among 
the foremost in the battle ; and it is added that their re- 
joinder was borne out by all the rest of the Greeks. Of 
the two tales both may be false, one only can be true. 

But, as at Marathon, whatever may have been the 
incidents of the battle, the issue was clear enough. The 
Determina- Persian fleet was ruined. Among the slain 
x° rxes to was tne P ers i an admiral, a brother of 

retreat. Xerxes \ on the Greek side the loss was 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes, 183 

small. The Persians, we are told, were, for the most 
part, unable to swim, and the greatest slaughter was 
owing to the confusion which followed the first attempts 
at flight. In the midst of this fearful disorder Aristeides 
landed a large body of hoplites on the islet of Psyttaleia 
and slaughtered every one of its occupants. The Greeks 
drew up their disabled ships on the shore of Salamis, and 
made ready for another fight, thinking that the king 
would order his remaining ships to advance against them. 
But their fears were not to be realized. Xerxes had 
ascended his throne in the morning with the conviction 
that under his eye his seamen would be invincible : their 
defeat made him jump to the conclusion that they were 
absolutely worthless ; and if it be true, as one story ran, 
that during the night which followed the battle the 
Phentcians, dreading his wrath, sailed away to Asia, he 
had sufficient reason for discouragement. Without these 
hardy mariners the idea of carrying on the war by sea 
became absurd ; and for the ships which yet remained to 
him he had a more pressing and immediate task in 
guarding the bridge across the Hellespont. The safety 
of this bridge he professed to regard as the condition of 
his own return home : and although he ordered that a 
mole should be carried from Attica to Salamis, Mardo- 
nios was not to be tricked by commands Engagement 
which deceived others. He knew that the ofMardo- 

nios to finish 

messenger had set out with the tidings the conquest 
which, handed on from one horseman to 
another until they reached the gates of Sousa, were to 
turn the shouts and songs of triumph to cries of grief for 
the king, and of indignation against himself as the 
stirrer-up of the mischief. But if he thus knew that ex- 
cept as a conqueror he could never hope to see Persia 
again, he may well have thought that his own chances 



1 84 The Persian Wars. [ch. vii. 

of success would be vastly increased by the departure of 
a craven monarch who flung up his hands in despair 
while he yet had ample means for retrieving his disasters. 
He knew well with what materials Cyrus had achieved 
his conquests ; and with a proud satisfaction he insisted 
that the Persians had everywhere maintained their old 
reputation, and that if they had failed, their failure was 
to be set down to the rabble which had hindered and 
clogged their efforts. He had therefore no hesitation in 
pledging himself to achieve the conquest of Hellas, if 
Xerxes would leave him behind with 300,000 men. 

Such a proposal would come as a godsend to a 
tyrant quaking in abject terror; but we are told by 
Herodotus that he submitted it to the only woman who 
had accompanied him as the sovereign of a dependent 
city — Artemisia the queen of Halikarnassos, the birth- 
place of the historian Herodotus. Her conclusion agreed 
Artemisia, with his own. His safe return to Sousa was 

Haiikar- f t ^ ie one matter of paramount importance ; 

nassos. an( j }f Mardonios and his men were all 

killed, it would be but the loss of a horde of useless slaves. 
Whatever may have been her advice, there can be not the 
least doubt that she never gave this reason for it. Xerxes 
knew well, as she must have known herself, that in 
leaving with Mardonios his native Persian troops, he was 
leaving behind him the hardy soldiers on whom the very 
foundations of his empire rested ; and the tale throws 
doubt on the narrative of some other scenes in which she 
appears as an actor. If in the council which preceded 
the battle of Salamis she raised her voice against all 
. active operations by sea, she was opposing herself to the 
temper of the king as strongly as after the fight she en- 
couraged him in his determination to retreat. If she 
rested her advice on the opinion that the Egyptians and 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 185 

Pamphylians were, like the rest of his seamen, evil ser- 
vants of a good man, her words were not merely dis- 
paraging, but even insulting to those who heard them, 
and at the time actually unjust. Another tradition is even 
more perplexing, which relates that during the battle 
of Salamis her ship was chased by an Athenian captain 
who was anxious to get the prize of 10,000 drachmas 
promised to the man who should take her alive, — so 
great, we are told, being the irritation of the Greeks that 
a woman should come against Athens ; that Artemisia, 
having before her only ships of her own side, ran into a 
Kalyndian vessel and sank it ; that thereupon her pursuer, 
thinking that her ship was a Greek one, or that she was 
deserting from the Persians, turned away to chase others ; 
and that Xerxes, hearing that Artemisia had sunk a 
Greek ship, cried out, " My men are women and the 
women men." It is enough to remark on this strange 
tale that the whole Kalyndian crew are not reported to 
have perished, while we are distinctly told that other 
friendly ships were checking her flight, and we cannot 
suppose that all were deceived by her manoeuvre, or 
that none would have the courage or the indignation to 
denounce it. 

In fact, from the moment of the defeat at Salamis to 
the hour when Xerxes entered Sardeis, the popular tra- 
dition runs riot in fictions all tending to glo- „,, 

. _ _ ^ _ , , The pursuit 

nfy the Greeks, and to show the utter hu- of- the Per- 
miliation and miserable cowardice of the the* Greeks 7 
Persian king. The general course of events at Xndros* 
is clear enough ; nor is it a specially diffi- 
cult task to disentangle such incidents as are historical. 
The discovery of the flight of the Persian fleet was fol- 
lowed by immediate pursuit ; but the Greeks sailed as 
far as Andros without seeing even the hindermost of the 
o 



1 86 The Persia?! Wars. [ch. vn. 

retreating ships. At Andros a council was called, and 
an order was given for abandoning the chase. The tra- 
dition of a later day averred that Themistokles vehe- 
mently urged the allies to sail straight to the Hellespont 
and destroy the bridge by which Xerxes was to cross 
into Asia, and that he was dissuaded only when Eurybi- 
ades pointed out the folly of trying to keep the Persian 
king in a country where despair might make him formi- 
dable, whereas out of Europe he could do no mischief. 
The same or another tale also related that, being thus 
baulked in his plans, Themistokles resolved on winning 
the good-will of the tyrant by sending Sikinnos, as the 
bearer of a second message, to tell him that after great 
efforts he had succeeded in diverting the Greeks from their 
determination to hurry to the Hellespont and there de- 
stroy the bridge. The story has a direct bearing on the 
disastrous sequel of his history ; but apart from such con- 
siderations, the degree of faith which Xerxes would be 
likely to put in this second message may be measured 
by the caution of the child who has learnt to dread the 
fire by being burnt. Xerxes had already acted on one 
message from Themistokles, and the result had been the 
ruin of his fleet. Any second message he would assured- 
ly interpret by contraries, for the memory of the first 
deadly wrong would be fixed in his mind with a strength 
which no lapse of time could weaken. Still more parti- 
cularly must we mark that the idea of cutting off the re- 
treat of Xerxes is one which could not even have en- 
tered the mind of Themistokles, so long as Mardonios 
with thirty myriads of men remained on the soil of Atti- 
ca to carry out the work which his master had aban- 
doned. To divert the strength of Athens for the sake of 
intercepting a miserable fugitive, and so to leave the 
allies powerless against an overwhelming foe, would be 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 187 

an act of mere madness : and as no charge of folly has 
been so much as urged against Themistokles, it follows 
that no such plan was proposed by him, and therefore 
that it could not be rejected by Eurybiades. 

A few days later Mardonios chose out on the plains 
of Thessaly the forces with which he had resolved to 
conquer or to die. But before he parted from 
his master, a messenger came from Sparta, ^Xerxes? 
it is said, to bid the king of the Medes stand 
his trial for the murder of Leonidas, and make atone- 
ment for that crime. " The atonement shall be made by 
Mardonios," answered Xerxes with a laugh, pointing to 
the general by his side. Thus was the victim marked 
out for the sacrifice. The great king had been told that 
he was a criminal, and that the price of his crime must 
be paid ; and the summons of the Spartan is therefore 
followed by a plunge into utter misery. For five and 
forty days, we are told, the army of Xerxes struggled 
onwards over their road to the Hellespont, thousands 
upon thousands falling as they went from hunger, thirst, 
disease, and cold. A few might live on the harvests of 
the lands through which they passed ; the rest were 
driven to feed on grass or the leaves and bark of trees, 
and disease followed in the track of famine. Eight 
months after he had crossed the Hellespont into Europe, 
Xerxes reached the bridge, only to find it shattered and 
made useless by storms. Boats conveyed across the strait 
the lord of Asia, with the scanty remnant of his guards 
and followers, whose numbers were now still more 
thinned by the sudden change from starvation to plenty. 
Such is the tale which Herodotus gives as the true ac- 
count of his retreat ; but it must not be forgotten that he 
selected it from a number of traditions which he emphati- 
cally rejects as false. Among the latter was the story 



1 88 The Persian Wars. [ch. vii. 

that from Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, he sailed 
for Asia in a ship, and being overtaken by a heavy storm 
was told by the pilot that there was no hope of safety 
unless the vessel could be eased of the crowd within it ; 
that Xerxes, turning to his Persians, told them the state 
of the case ; that the latter, having done obeisance, 
leaped into the sea ; and that Xerxes, on landing, gave 
the pilot a golden crown for saving his life, and then cut 
off his head for losing the lives of his men. This story 
Herodotus pronounces incredible, inasmuch as Xerxes 
would assuredly have saved his Persians, and thrown 
overboard a corresponding number of Phenicians. In 
short, he rejects the whole story of his embarkation at 
Eion ; nor can he have failed to reject, if he ever heard, 
the marvelous tale of the crossing of the Strymon as 
related by ^Eschylos in his drama of the Persians. A 
frost unusual for the season of the year had frozen firmly 
the surface of a swiftly flowing river ; and on this sur- 
face the army crossed safely, until the heat of the sun 
thawed the ice, and thousands were plunged into the 
water. The formation, in a single night, of ice capable 
of bearing large multitudes in the latitude and climate 
of the mouth of the Strymon is an impossibility. The 
story rests on the supposition that the Persians were 
hurrying away in mad haste from an enemy close in the 
rear ; but there was, in fact, no pursuit ; and for many 
years Eion remained a Persian fortress. We have then 
the very significant fact, that there were traditions re- 
lating to this time, to which Herodotus gave no credit 
whatever ; we are bound, therefore, to see whether his 
own story has the merit of likelihood. When Xerxes 
formed his plans for the invasion of Europe, his prepara- 
tions were made not merely for the outward march of 
his vast multitudes, but for their homeward journey, with 



480 B.C.] The Invasion and Flight of Xerxes. 189 

their numbers swollen by crowds of Greek slaves. Vast 
magazines were filled with the harvests of years, while 
on the westward march the inhabitants were also com- 
pelled to contribute to the maintenance of his followers. 
In the story of the retreat not a word is said of these 
huge stores, or of any exactions from the natives. But 
Xerxes took with him no prisoners, and he had left 
300,000 men with Mardonios. The task of maintaining 
those who attended him would therefore be all the more 
easy ; but in point of fact, his army is represented as 
subsisting by plunder, or as dying by famine in a land 
where not an arm was raised against them for all this rob- 
bery and pillage, and where Xerxes could with con- 
fidence intrust his sick to the kindly feeling of the people. 
Still more significant is the narrative of the _ 

; Operations of 

operations of Artabazos, who accompanied Artabazos in 
the king to the Hellespont with 60,000 men. 
No sooner has this general dismissed his master, than 
he appears as a man well able to hold his ground against 
all efforts of his enemies without calling on his troops to 
undergo any special privations. Instead of hearing now 
of men plucking grass and roots, and then lying down 
to die, we find him deliberately resolving to remain 
where he was until the return of spring should allow 
Mardonios to move his army in Boiotia. Whatever may 
have been the sufferings of Xerxes, his own position was 
not without difficulty. The tidings of the victory of 
Salamis and of the hasty retreat of the Persian ships, in- 
duced some of the Greek colonies to revolt after the 
king had passed them on his journey to the Hellespont. 
Artabazos determined to punish them. The 
siege and capture of Olynthos (p. 33) was oiynthos° 
followed by a blockade of Potidaia. His and blockade 

J of Potidaia. 

plans were here foiled by an accident 



190 The Persian Wars. [ch. vit. 

which caused him serious loss ; but even this disaster 
scarcely affected the efficiency of his troops. In short, 
the history of Artabazos conclusively proves that the 
followers of Xerxes in his retreat were not reduced to 
the hard lot of an Arabian caravan in lack of food and 
water. 

By the non-Medizing Greeks the winter was spent in 
attempts to recruit their finances by voluntary or forced 
_i . . contributions from Hellenic cities. At An- 

Ex^ctions of 

the Greek dros Themistokles told the people that they 

drosand " must pay, because the Athenians had come 
elsewhere. under the guidance of two very mighty 
deities, Necessity and Faith (Peitho, the power which 
produces obedience and trust). The Andrians refused, 
under the plea that they likewise had two deities, Poverty 
and Helplessness, which would not leave their islands. 
They added that the power of Athens could never exceed 
their own impotence : and the failure of the siege verified 
their prediction. But while the blockade was still going 
on, Themistokles by threatening the other islands with 
summary measures in case of refusal, collected, we are 
told, large sums of money without the knowledge of the 
other leaders, and kept them for his own use. It is 
enough to say that, though he and his agents might keep 
the secret, there was nothing to stop the mouths of his 
victims, nor was Athens so popular with her allies as to 
make them deaf to charges which accused Themistokles of 
crippling their resources for his own personal advantage. 

The work of a memorable year was now ended. It 
only remained to dedicate the thank-offerings due to 
the gods, and to distribute the rewards and 
paid to honors which the conduct of the confederates 

ties by the might deserve. Three Persian ships were 
Spartans. consecrated, one at Salamis, a second at 



4 7 9 B • c - ] Battles of Plataia and My kale. 191 

Sounion, and the third at the isthmus ; and the first- 
fruits of victory sent to Delphoi furnished materials for 
a statue, twelve cubits in height, bearing in its hand the 
beak of a Persian war-ship. The question of personal 
merit was decided at the isthmus, it is said, by the 
written votes of the generals, each of whom claimed the 
first place for himself, while most of them, if not all, 
assigned the second to Themistokles. The vanity which 
thus deprived the Athenian general of his formal pre- 
eminence had no effect on the Spartans, who paid him 
honors such as they had never bestowed on any before. 
Eurybiades, as commander-in-chief, received a silver 
crown. The same prize was given to Themistokles for 
his unparalleled wisdom and dexterity; and the most 
beautiful chariot in Sparta, the gift of the citizens, con- 
veyed him from that city, three hundred chosen Spartiatai 
escorting him to the boundaries of Tegea. 



CHAPTER VIII. 



THE BATTLES OF PLATAIA AND MYKALE, AND THE 
FORMATION OF THE ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY. 

The efforts of Mardonios to fulfil the promise which he 
had made to Xerxes ended in terrible disasters. If the 
Greeks could be brought to unite in a firm resistance, it 
was impossible that they could end otherwise ; and the 
people of two cities at least, Athens and 
Sparta, were now fully alive to the need of Mardonios 
vigorous action. That Mardonios on his frie^tHp 
side saw not less clearly the hindrances in the °f the Athe - 

J mans. 

way of his success, and that he did his best 



192 The Persian Wars. [ch. viii. 

to remove them is clear from the whole course of the 
narrative. The fact that the decisive struggle between 
the two fleets would, if the decision had rested with the 
Athenians, have taken place at Artemision, not at 
Salamis, had taught him that the real obstacle in his path 
was Athens; and the conviction led him to take a step 
which, after all that had passed since the departure of 
Hippias for Sigeion (p. 87), must have involved a painful 
self-sacrifice. It was true that the desire of vengeance 
against Athens was one of the most powerful motives 
which had urged Xerxes to the invasion of Europe ; but it 
was no time now to follow the dictates of blind passion, 
and the Macedonian chief Alexandros was sent to tell the 
Athenians that the king was willing not merely to forgive 
all their sins against him, if they would become, not his 
servants, but his friends, but to bestow on them, in ad- 
dition to their own land, any territory which they might 
choose, and lastly, to rebuild all the temples which his 
followers had burnt. 

The tidings of this change in Persian policy awakened 
at Sparta the liveliest alarm, which was kept up, it is 
Alarm of the said, by a popular prophecy that the Dorians 
Spartans. were to be driven from the Peloponnesos by 

the combined armies of the Athenians and the Medes. 
Envoys, hurriedly sent, assured the Athenians that 
Sparta would maintain their families as long as the war 
should last, if only they would hold out stoutly against 
Mardonios. Their fears were thrown away. The Mace- 
donian prince was bidden to tell Mardonios that the 
Athenians would never make peace with Xerxes so long 
as the sun should keep the same path in the heavens. 
The Spartans were at the same time rebuked for their 
ignorance of the Athenian mind. " Not all the gold 
throughout all the world," they said, "would tempt us to 



479 B - c -] Battles of Plataia and My kale, 193 

take the part of the Medes and help to enslave Hellas. 
We could not do so even if we would. The whole 
Hellenic race is of the same blood and speech with us : 
we share in common the temples of our gods : we have 
the same sacrifices, and the same way of life : and these 
the Athenians can never betray. For your good-will to 
us we thank you ; but we will struggle on as well as we 
can without giving you trouble. All that we pray you is 
to send out your army with all speed, for Mardonios will 
soon be in our land when he learns that we will not do 
as he would have us, and we ought to stop him before 
he can cross our border." The incidents which follow 
are scarcely consistent with this beautiful picture. The 
reply of the Athenians spurred the Peloponnesians to fresh 
efforts for completion of the wall at the isthmus. With 
its completion the old indifference or remissness came 
back, and Kleombrotos, frightened by an eclipse of the 
sun, retreated with his army to Sparta. On his death, 
which happened almost immediately, his son Pausanias 
was appointed general, as well as guardian of his cousin, 
the young son of Leonidas. 

For Mardonios the aspect of things was more pro- 
mising than it had ever been for Xerxes. He was at 
the head of a manageable army ; his Greek Second oc- 
allies seemed full of zeal for his cause : and Athens by f 
his wisdom was shown in the steadiness of the Persians - 
purpose which made him as intent on winning over the 
Athenians as Xerxes had been on punishing them. There 
was yet the chance that they might give way when they 
saw their soil again trodden by invading enemies, while 
his care in protecting their city must justify their placing 
full trust in his good faith. To carry out this plan he 
crossed the frontiers of Attica. Once more the Athenians 
conveyed their families to Salamis ; and ten months 



194 The Persian Wars, [ch. viii. 

after the capture of the Akropolis by Xerxes, Mardonios 
entered a silent and desolate city. Another envoy sent to 
the Athenians was summarily dismissed, while one of the 
senators, who proposed that his message should be sub- 
mitted to the people, was stoned to death, it is said, 
with his whole family. But another version not merely 
changed the name of the citizen, but transferred the in- 
cident to the time when Themistokles urged the first 
migration to Salamis (p. 173). This horrible story* is, 
however, sufficiently disproved by the fact that almost 
immediately afterwards the Athenians sent to the 
Spartans to tell them that, unless they received instant 
aid, they must devise some means of escape from their 
present troubles. In fact, far from repeating the impas- 
sioned declaration that the sun should sooner fall from 
heaven than Athens would submit to the enemy, the 
Athenian, Plataian, and Megarian ambassadors content 
themselves with the cautious statement that they desire 
heartily the welfare of Hellas, and that they will make 
no paction with the Persians, if they can avoid it. 

The reproaches of the Athenians, we are told, fell for 
the present on deaf ears. The Spartans were keeping 
Departure festival and would not stir ; and now that 

tln h a e rmy ar " tlie Isthmian wall had all but received its 
for Attica. coping stones and battlements, they could 

afford to put off the Athenian envoys from day to day. 
Ten days had thus passed when Chileos of Tegea warned 
them that their wall would be of little use if the Athe- 
nians, accepting the offer of Mardonios, should send their 
fleet to co-operate with his land army. As if this possibility 
had never struck them before, the Spartans on that very 
night, it is said, sent out Pausanias with 5,000 heavy- 
armed citizens, each attended by seven Helots, — 40,000 
in all ; and when on the following morning the envoys 



479 B - c - ] Battles of Plataia and My kale. 195 

said that, having thus far waited in vain, the Athenians 
must make the best terms that they could with the Per- 
sians, the Ephors replied, " They are gone and are al- 
ready in the Oresteion on their march to meet the 
strangers." " Who are gone, and who are the strangers ?" 
asked the Athenians, amazed at these mysterious tidings. 
" Our Spartans have gone with their Helots, t} they an- 
swered, "40,000 in all, and the strangers are the Per- 
sians." Greatly wondering, the envoys hastened away, 
accompanied by 5,000 picked hoplites from the Perioikoi. 
If the story in this its popular form is somewhat per- 
plexing, it is nevertheless substantially true, and the 
explanation of the mystery is found in the 
statement of Herodotus that the Argives Mardonios 

were under a promise to Mardonios to pre- Argives 6 
vent by force, if force should be needed, the 
departure of any Spartan army from the Peloponnesos. 
Feeling that with the submission or the independent 
alliance of Athens his task would be practically ended, 
Mardonios clearly understood that the Athenians would 
be best won over if the pressure put upon them should 
stop short of the devastation of their country and the 
burning of their houses. But there must be pillage and 
plunder, if Attica became a battle-field. Hence it was 
of the utmost importance to him that no Peloponnesian 
force should be allowed to advance beyond the isthmus ; 
and the pledge given by the Argives seemed to assure 
him that from this quarter there was no danger to be 
feared. On becoming acquainted with this recent cove- 
nant, the Spartan Ephors were driven to secrecy on their 
side in any military plans which they might form ; and 
when owing to this secrecy their plans succeeded and 
the Argives sent word to Athens to say that they had 
failed to prevent the departure of the Spartans, Mardoni- 



196 The Persian Wars, [ch. viii. 

os felt that his own schemes had likewise 
AuiSf^nd become hopeless. At once the whole land 
Athensf ° f was abandoned to his soldiers. Athens was 

set on fire ; and any walls or buildings 
which had escaped the ravages of the first invasion were 
thrown down. Nor could Mardonios afford to fight in a 
country ill-suited for cavalry, and from which, if defeated, 
he would have to lead his army through narrow and 
dangerous passes. The order for retreat was therefore 
given, and Mardonios, having entered first the Megarian 
territory, the westernmost point reached by a Persian 
army, soon found himself again on the plain of Thebes. 
Retreat of Here he was obliged to do some mischief to 
Mardonios his zealous friends. Ail their good-will 

into Boiotia. , , . . . 

would be to him a poor compensation in 
case of defeat; and the necessary safeguard could be 
obtained only by making the surrounding land a desert. 
Thus beneath the northern slopes of Kithairon his hosts 
might in case of need find shelter in a camp ten furlongs 
square, which, with its ramparts and stockade might, as 
he hoped, bid defiance to all attacks of the enemy. 

It is at this point Herodotus introduces a well-known 
and beautiful story which tells how a blindness sent by 
The feast of the gods was over the eyes of Mardonios 
Attagmos. while others foresaw the ruin that was 
coming. The tale is the more noteworthy as the historian 
asserts that he heard it from Thersandros, a guest at the 
splendid banquet which Attaginos gave to the Persian 
leaders before the battle of Plataia. At this great feast, 
while all others were growing noisy in their merriment, 
the Persian who shared the couch of Thersandros ex- 
pressed his assurance that, of their fellow-guests and of 
the enemy encamped outside, but few would in a little while 
remain alive. Touched by the grief and tears of the Persian, 



479 B - c »] Battles of Plataia and My kale. 197 

Thersandros said that Mardonios should be told of this ; but 
his companion answered only by asserting the impossibility 
of avoiding destiny, — the Kismet of the modern Mussul- 
man. " Of all the pains which man may suffer," he added, 
" the most hateful and wretched is this, to see the evils 
that are coming and yet be unable to overcome them." 
Whatever may be the pathos of the story, it has mani- 
festly neither force nor meaning, if viewed in reference 
to the duty of Mardonios. To listen to vague presenti- 
ments of coming evil and in obedience to such presenti- 
ments to break up an army of vast strength and fully 
supplied with the materials of war, would in a general be 
an unpardonable offence. If the Persian who conversed 
with Thersandros had any reasons or arguments to ad- 
dress to his chief, Mardonios would certainly be bound 
to hear and weigh them ; but it is of the very essence of 
the story that he had none, and it would be the duty of 
Mardonios to disregard presages and tears which to him 
must appear to have no other source than a diseased 
and unmanly mind. 

When from Eleusis the Spartans and their Pelopon- 
nesian allies, having been joined by the Athenians 
who had crossed over from Salamis, 
marched towards the northern slopes of ^Hes h to- f the 
Kithairon, their appearance as they came in wards Pla- 
sight of the Persians who were encamped 
near the northern bank of the Asopos, created little ex- 
citement or alarm among their enemies. The Persian 
troops were in excellent condition, and, with the single 
exception of the Phokians, full of zeal. But whatever 
may have been the number of the Greeks at the first, 
they were daily rendered more formidable by the arrival 
of fresh forces ; and Mardonios saw that no time was to 
be lost in dislodging them from their vantage ground. 



198 The Persian Wars. [ch. viii. 

On this errand the whole Persian cavalry v/as dispatched 
under Masistios, a leader noted for his 
PeiLn t 6 bravery. Hard pressed by his attacks, the 
llasSios Megarians sent a message to Pausanias to 

say that without speedy support they must 
give way. But even the Spartans, it would seem, held 
back, although the Persian horsemen rode up and re- 
viled them as women. At length 3,000 Athenians ad- 
vanced to the aid of the Megarians, and presently the 
horse of Masistios, wounded by an arrow, reared and 
threw its rider, Masistios was already slain before his 
men, who had fallen back to make ready for another 
charge, were aware of what had happened. The fierce 
conflict which followed ended in the victory of the Athe- 
nians ; and a piercing wail of grief from the Persians 
rent the air, while the body of the fallen general, 
stretched on a chariot, was carried along the ranks of 
the Greeks, who crowded to see his grand and beautiful 
form. 

The Greeks now resolved to move from Erythrai 
nearer to Plataia, as a better position both for encamp- 
ing and for watering. Their road led them 
Inaction of ^y Hysiai to ground stretching from the 

l>jth armies. . . . 

fountain or spring of Gargaphia to the shrine 
of the hero Androkrates and broken by low hills rising 
from the plain. But although the two armies were thus 
brought near to each other, the final conflict was delayed 
by the omens which were interpreted by the soothsayers 
on either side as unfavorable to the aggressor ; and 
Mardonios could do nothing more than dispatch his caval- 
ry to the pass of the Oak Heads (Dryoskephalai) where 
500 beasts laden with corn were cut off with the men who 
had brought them from the Peloponnesos. At last the Per- 
sian leader, thoroughly wearied out, and fearing that his 






479 B - c -] Battles of Plataia and My kale. 199 

men might be cowed with superstitious terror, summoned 
his officers, it is said, and asked them whether there was 
any oracle which foretold the destruction of the Persians 
on Greek soil. All were silent, and he went on : " Since 
you either know nothing or dare not say what you do 
know, I will tell you myself. There is an oracle which 
says that Persians coming to Hellas shall plunder the 
temple of Delphoi and then be utterly destroyed. But 
we are not going against this temple, nor shall we at- 
tempt to plunder it ; so that this cannot be our ruin. All 
therefore who have any good-will to the Persians may be 
glad, for, so far as the oracles are concerned, we shall be 
the conquerors. We shall fight to-morrow." By these 
words, in the belief of the historian, the victim was de- 
voting himself to the sacrifice. If they were uttered, 
the narrative of the attack on Delphoi (p. 174) must be 
set aside as wholly untrustworthy. 

From this point the narrative of Herodotus breaks 
into a series of vivid pictures, the first of which repre- 
sents the Macedonian Alexandros as riding in 
the dead of night to the outposts of the Athe- traditions 
nians and asking to speak with the leaders* tL^TJpIra- 
to whom, after telling them of the resolution ba t n t J e for 
of Mardonios, he reveals his own name. 
The confession can scarcely have been needed. Aris- 
teides at least must have remembered the man who but 
a little while ago had come to them as the envoy of 
Mardonios, and who then as earnestly besought them to 
submit to Xerxes as now he prayed them to hold out. 
Nor was his warning, though kindly, indispensable. The 
Greeks had been watching intently for ten days every 
movement in the enemy's camp ; and the preparation 
for battle would be no sooner begun than they would see 
it. In the second picture the Spartan Pausanias is de- 



200 The Persian Wars, [ch. viii. 

scribed as requesting to change places with the Athenian 
forces on the ground that the latter had encountered 
Persians at Marathon/whereas no Spartan had ever yet 
been engaged with them, and therefore knew nothing of 
their mode of fighting. The change was effected ; but 
Mardonios, seeing what was done, likewise altered the 
disposition of his troops, and thus drove Pausanias to 
lead his men back again to the right wing. This tale is 
the manifest invention of the later time. Spartans had 
fought with Persians at Artemision, at Salamis, and 
Thermopylai ; and the heroism of Leonidas and his men 
had thrice made Xerxes leap from his throne in dismay. 
The purpose of the story is manifestly to glorify Athens. 
If Pausanias could be made to admit the superiority of 
the Athenian forces, this glorification would be secured ; 
and it was most necessary to give to the story a shape 
which would not call forth a protest from the Spartans, 
as it must have done if the changed arrangement had 
been described as the real arrangement of the battle. 
As it now stands, probably few Spartans ever heard the 
tale ; and as it left untouched the only fact of importance 
to them (their position, namely, on the right wing), they 
would not much care to notice it. Hence it became ne- 
cessary to speak of the change as having been made 
before daybreak ; and as it was ascribed to the tidings 
that Mardonios meant to fight on the morrow, a bearer 
must be provided for the news, and for this purpose it 
became necessary, lastly, to invent the night ride of 
Alexandros. 

On the morrow of the eleventh day the battle of 
Plataia may be said practically to have begun. During 

the preceding day the Greek army, which for 
JfPlatoia! some unexplained reason seems to have been 

without any horsemen at all, was severely 



479 B • c - 1 Battles of Plataia and My kale. 201 

pressed by the charges of the Persian cavalry ; and early 
in the day it became clear that a change of position was in- 
dispensably necessary. The Asopos in front of the Greeks 
had all along been useless to them for watering, as it 
was within range of the Persian bowmen ; they were 
obliged therefore to obtain their supplies from Gargaphia, 
distant about two and a half miles from Plataia. This 
spring was now choked and fouled by the trampling of 
Persian horses ; but about half way between Gargaphia 
and Plataia was a spot called the Island, as lying between 
two channels into which for a short space the little stream 
of Oeroe is divided in its descent from Kithairon. Here 
they would have not only an abundant supply of water, 
for the Persian cavalry could not reach the channel in 
their rear, but they would be protected from their at- 
tacks by the stream in front. To this spot therefore the 
generals resolved to transfer the army during the coming 
night ; but from confusion or fear the Peloponnesian al- 
lies, when the time for retreat came, fell back not on 
the Island but on Plataia itself, and thus made it neces- 
sary that the Spartans should follow them. To the exe- 
cution of this plan an unexpected hindrance was of- 
fered by the obstinacy of the Spartan captain Amompha- 
retos, who, taking up a huge stone with both hands, 
declared that thus he gave his vote against the dastardly 
proposals to turn their backs upon the enemy. In this 
dispute the hours of the night were wasted ; and the sky 
was already lit with the dawn when Pausanias, wearied 
out with his folly, gave the order for retreat. The Spartans 
fell back, keeping as near as they could to the heights 
of Kithairon : the Athenians moved along the plain. 
Amompharetos soon followed with his company ; but their 
retreat had now become known in the Persian camp, and 
the Persian cavalry at once hastened to harass them. As 
P 



202 The Persian Wars. [en. vm. 

for Mardonios, the hand of the gods was heavy upon 
him. Bidding Thorak of Larissa mark the cowardly flight 
of the Greeks whom he had upheld as brave and hon- 
orable men, he added that in him this opinion might be 
pardoned, but that he could not forgive the fear which 
Artabazos had shown of the Spartans and that the King 
should assuredly hear of it. If this threat was reported 
to Artabazos or heard by him, his conduct later on in the 
day is easily explained. Prudence and caution were now 
thrown to the winds. Hurriedly crossing the Asopos, 
Mardonios hastened with his Persians to the higher 
ground where the Spartan troops might be seen winding 
along the hill-side. Without order or discipline, the 
Persians rushed after him, as though they had nothing 
now to do beyond the butchering of unresisting fugitives. 
Sorely pressed, Pausanias sent to beg instant succor from 
the Athenians on the lower ground ; but the attack of the 
Greeks in the Persian army who now flung themselves 
on the Athenians rendered this impossible. To the Spar- 
tans and Tegeans it was a moment of supreme distress, 
since even now the sacrifices forbade any action except 
in the way of self-defence, and their merely passive re- 
sistance enabled the Persians to make a rampart of their 
wicker-work shields, from behind which they shot their 
arrows with deadly effect. At last Pausanias, looking in 
agony towards the temple of Here, besought the queen of 
heaven not to abandon them utterly. Scarcely had his 
prayer been uttered, when the sacrifices were reported to 
be favorable, and the charge of the Tegeans was followed 
by the onslaught of the Spartans. After a fierce fight the 
hedge of shields was thrown down, and the defeat of the 
barbarian host virtually insured. The Persians fought 
with heroism. Coming to close quarters, they seized the 
spears of their enemies, and broke off their heads ; but 



479 B - c -l Battles of Plataia a?id My kale. 203 

they wore no body armor, and they had no discipline. 
Rushing forward singly or in groups, they were borne 
down in the crush and killed. At length Mardonios was 
slain, and the issue became no longer doubtful. The 
linen tunics of Persian soldiers were of no avail against 
brazen-coated hoplites. Hurrying back to their fortified 
camp, the Persians took refuge behind the wooden walls, 
to which they trusted for keeping out the enemy. They 
were soon to be fatally disappointed. To . 

the Spartans, notoriously incompetent in all the Persian 
siege operations, they opposed an effectual 
resistance : but Athenian skill and resolution effected a 
breach after a terrible struggle. Headed by the Tegeans 
the allies burst like a deluge into the encampment ; and 
the Persians, losing all heart, sought wildly to hide them- 
selves like deer flying from lions. Then followed a car- 
nage so fearful that of 260,000 men not 3,000, it is said, 
remained alive, while all the Greeks together lost little 
more than 1 50. No trust, it is manifest, can be placed in 
the figures on either side. The history of the days pre- 
ceding the last decisive conflict furnishes sufficient evi- 
dence of heavy losses daily incurred by the Greeks, 
while the latter would be tempted to adopt for their own 
glorification the exaggerations dear to Oriental vanity. 

So ended fitly the work begun at Marathon. Of the 
Greek cities represented in the battle each had its own 
hero. But while the Athenians boasted of 
Sophanes of Dekeleia, who caught his J f h t f ie g s at of 1 ring 
enemies with a brazen anchor and then 
smote them down, the Spartans refused to pay any 
honor to Aristodemos, who, having had the ill-luck to be 
absent from the conflict at Thermopylai, fought like one 
who did not care to leave the field alive. The most 
prominent figure in these scenes immediately following 



204 The Persian Wars. [ch. viii. 

the battle is the Spartan leader Pausanias, who replies 
to one who urged him to crucify the body of Mardonios 
in requital of the insult offered to the body of Leonidas, 
that the suggestion better befitted a savage than a Greek, 
and that Leonidas had been amply avenged in the death 
of the myriads whose bodies cumbered the plain. The 
victory had made them masters of vast wealth. The 
brazen manger at which the horse of Mardonios had 
been fed was dedicated by the Tegeans in the temple of 
Athene Alea. The rest of the spoil, tents and couches 
blazing with gold and silver, golden goblets and drink- 
ing vessels, were all brought into a common stock ; but 
the Helots contrived to hide a rich collection of rings, 
bracelets, and jewels of gold, which the Aiginetans, it is 
said, were willing to buy from them as brass, thus laying 
the foundation of the great wealth for which they were 
afterwards conspicuous. The dazzling furniture which 
Xerxes left with Mardonios suggested to Pausanias, we 
are told, the contrast of a banquet prepared after Persian 
fashion to be placed alongside of a simple Lakonian 
meal on another table. The obvious moral, which Pau- 
sanias bade his colleagues take to heart, was the folly of 
the man who, faring thus sumptuously himself, came to 
rob the Greeks of their sorry food. 

The sacrifice of thanksgiving for the great victory was 
offered by Pausanias to Zeus the Deliverer (Eleutherios) 
in the Agora of the Plataians, who were now formally 
- . ., freed from all connection with the Boiotian 

Privileges •- _ . 

granted to the confederacy, while their territory was de- 
clared inviolable, the allies being pledged 
to combine to prevent any invasion of that territory by 
others. At the same time they decreed the maintenance 
of a definite force for carrying on the war, and the as- 
sembling of an annual congress at Plataia, — so far were 



479 B - c -] Battles of Plat at a and My kale. 205 

they from venturing to think that the power of Persia 
was broken, even for purposes of aggression. 

The threats uttered by Mardonios against Artabazos 
may have had something to do with the 
issue of the fight. At least it seems to have ^he retreat 
deprived him of the active help of the very 
large force under the command of that officer. These 
troops received strict orders to look to him only, and to 
follow his movements with the utmost promptness, and 
no sooner had the battle begun than, inviting his men 
verbally to follow him into it, he led them from the field. 
On the first symptoms of defeat shown by the troops of 
Mardonios, he put spurs to his horse and hurried away 
with all speed through Phokis into Thessaly, where the 
chiefs, entertaining him at a banquet, prayed for news 
of the great army in Boiotia. Fearing the consequences 
if the true state of the case should become known to the 
people, he answered that he had been dispatched on an 
urgent errand into Thrace, and begged them to welcome 
Mardonios, who would soon follow him, with their usual 
hospitality. In his onward march through Makedonia 
and Thrace he lost many men ; but he succeeded in 
bringing the bulk of his troops safely to Byzantion, where 
he crossed over with them into Asia, and so well did he 
justify his acts to his master as to obtain from him the 
satrapy of Daskyleion. 

Eleven days after the battle the allies appeared be- 
fore the walls of Thebes, and demanded the surrender 
of the citizens who were responsible for the 
Medism of the country. The refusal of the Thebes' 

Thebans was followed by a blockade and 
by the systematic devastation of the land. On the ninth 
day the men demanded by Pausanias offered to surren- 
der themselves, if the Spartans could not be prevailed 



206 The Persian Wars. [ch. viii. 

on to accept money as the atonement for a policy which 
had received the sanction of all the citizens. The pro- 
posal was made to no purpose. Attaginos, (p. 91) one 
_ . , of the inculpated Thebans, made his escape • 

Punishment . r ♦ 

of the The- and Pausanias refused to punish his inno- 
cent children who were given up to him. 
The rest of the surrendered citizens he took with him to 
the Corinthian isthmus, and there put them all to death. 
The knowledge that the Persian fleet had been serious- 
ly crippled at Salamis, had led Themistokles, it is said, 
(p. 184) to urge on his countrymen the duty 
the y G?eek of immediate pursuit to the Hellespont. If 

Samos. k e cou ld not give expression to such a de- 

sire while Mardonios remained with a vast 
army almost on the borders of Attica, the case was al- 
tered when after the second occupation and burning of 
Athens the Persian leader had withdrawn into Boiotia, 
and been followed by a Greek force fully capable of co- 
ping with him. The Asiatic Ionians were still praying 
for help against the barbarians, and the Western Greeks 
were now free to send their ships to their aid. At Samos 
the commander-in-chief, Leotychides, received some 
Ionian envoys who assured him that the spirit of the Per- 
sian troops was broken ; that the mere sight of their 
western kinsfolk would rouse the Asiatic Greeks ; that 
the Persian fleet was scarcely seaworthy, and at best was 
no match for that of the Greeks, and finally that they 
would surrender themselves as hostages for the truth of 
their report. Leotychides asked the speaker his name. 
" I am called Hegesistratos (the leader of armies) " was 
the reply. " I accept the omen of your name," cried the 
Spartan, "and I ask only for your pledge that the Sa- 
mians will deal truly by us." The promise was eager- 
ly given, and the allied fleet, sailing to Samos, took up 



479 B -C.] Battles of Plataia and My kale. 207 

its position off the southern point of the island. Decli- 
ning the challenge thus given, the Persian admiral deter- 
mined to disembark his men and join Tigranes, who 
with a large army had been keeping guard in Ionia dur- 
ing; the winter. Sailing- therefore to the „ 

• 1 n 1 . mi- 1 Retreat of the 

mainland, barely ten miles distant, he drew Persian fleet 
up his ships on the shore beneath the heights to y 
of Mykale, and behind a rampart of stones strengthened 
by stout stakes made ready to sustain a siege and, as he 
felt sure, to win a victory. The retreat naturally raised 
the hopes and the courage of their enemies : and with 
their gangways ready for landing the men, the Greeks 
sailed towards Mykale. As he approached the shore, 
which was lined with Persian troops, Leotychides or- 
dered a loud-voiced herald to pray the Ionians in the 
coming fight to strike boldly, not for their oppressors 
but for their own freedom. Probably the suspicions of 
the Persian leaders had already been fully excited. By 
their orders the Samians were accordingly disarmed, 
while, to get them out of the way, the Milesians were 
sent to guard the paths leading to the heights of Mykale. 
Having taken these precautions, the Per- 
sians awaited the attack of the Greeks be- Mykate. 
hind the hedge of wicker shields which for 
a time sheltered the troops of Mardonios at Plataia. The 
Athenians were now advancing along the most level 
ground nearer the sea : the Spartans with more difficulty 
were making their way on the slopes of the mountain. 
Here, as at Plataia, the Persians fought with a bravery 
worthy of the warriors of Cyrus ; but in both places they 
had to face orderly and disciplined ranks, and here the 
Athenians were spurred to redoubled efforts by their 
eagerness to decide the day before the Spartans could 
come up and share the fight. After a desperate struggle 



2o8 The Persian Wars. [ch. viii. 

the shield wall was broken, and the Athenians burst in ; 
but the Persians still fought on, until they were borne back 
to the wall of wood and stone which sheltered the ships 
of the fleet. Behind this last rampart they again made 
a stand; but Athenian determination and discipline 
burst this barrier also, and the main body of the barba- 
rians fled in dismay. Still the Persians maintained the 
conflict, and in small knots strove to stem the iron 
torrent which was bursting through the breached wall. 
But the Spartans had now joined in the fight. The dis- 
armed Samians, probably seizing the weapons of the 
dead, fell on the Persians, who, it is said, had intended 
in case of defeat to entrench themselves on the heights. 
The position would have been perilous or desperate for 
men who could obtain no supplies while their enemies 
held the land beneath them ; but to such straits they 
were never to be put. The Milesians, to whom they had 
trusted for guidance, led them by paths which brought 
them down among their enemies, and at last, turning 
fiercely upon them, massacred them without mercy. So 
ended a battle fought, it is said, on the very day which 
saw the destruction of Mardonios and his people at 
Plataia. The story went that, when the Greeks were 
making ready for the fight, there passed instantaneously 
through the whole army a Rumor (Pheme, the Latin 
fama) that at that very moment their kinsmen were 
winning a victory in Boiotia, while a herald's staff lying 
on the sea beach attested the truth of the impression. 
The battle at Plataia had been fought early in the morn- 
ing ; that of Mykale did not begin till the afternoon, and 
there was thus time for the voyage of the staff from the 
Boiotian shore to the strand on which they stood. The 
faith which fed on such marvels delighted to think that 
Gelon was smiting the Carthaginians at Himera at the 



479 B - c -3 Battles of Plataia and My kale. 209 

very time when Xerxes from his throne on Geraneia 
witnessed the ruin of his hopes in the gulf of Salamis. 

The Persian ships were all burnt. With the booty, 
which included some hoards of money, the allies sailed 
to Samos ; and here arose the grave ques- 

, . , -, , , r r Burning of 

tion which determined the future course of the Persian 
Athenian history. The Asiatic Ionians were Slips * 
again in revolt against their Persian conquerors : how 
were the Western Greeks to defend them ? To the 
Peloponnesian leaders the task seemed altogether be- 
yond their powers ; and the remedy which they pro- 
posed was the transference of the Asiatic Hellenes to 
the lands which the Medizing states of Thessaly and 
Boiotia had forfeited. With this plan the Athenians 
would have nothing to do. They could not bear to 
abandon Ionia to barbarians, and they denied the right 
of their allies to settle the affairs of Athenian colonists. 
Their protest furnished just the excuse which 
the Spartans wanted for withdrawing from the Spartans 
all interference in the matter. The Athe- fa,mftSher 
nians were left to guard their kinsfolk, as concern in 

. . the war. 

best they might, against the aggression or 
vengeance of the Persians ; and the oath of faithful and 
permanent alliance immediately sworn by the Samians, 
Chians, Lesbians, and other islanders, laid the founda- 
tion of the maritime empire of Athens. 

From Samos the fleet departed on the special errand 
which had brought it eastwards ; but on reaching the 
Hellespont they learned that winds and storms had 
shattered the bridges which they had come m 

& J The allies at 

to destroy, and had rendered them useless the Heiles- 
before the Persian king presented himself pon * 
on its western shore. To Leotychides it seemed plain 
that here he had nothing more to do. In the eyes of the 



2io The Persian Wars. [ch. viii. 

Athenians the case had quite another aspect. Through- 
out the Chersonese Persian conquest had thrust the 
Athenian occupants out of their possessions. Their 
heirs would now be anxious to recover them ; nor could 
the Athenians fail to see the vast importance of making 
themselves masters of the highway of trade between 
Western Hellas and the corn-growing lands of the Dan- 
ube and the Euxine. Schemes such as these could not 
be realized, so long as Sestos remained in the hands of 

a Persian garrison ; and the Athenians, we 
lestos° f are t0 ^' were mr ther stirred by a feeling of 

personal hatred for the satrap Artayktes. 
When Xerxes passed from Asia into Europe, Artayktes 
had requested from him as a gift the house of a man who 
had been killed, he said, in invading Persian territory. 
This man was the hero Protesilaos who had been the 
first to land on the soil of Asia when the Achaians came 
to avenge the wrongs and woes of Helen ; and his house 
was the shrine surrounded by its sacred Close or Teme- 
nos, which the satrap defiled. For this crime he found 
himself blockaded at Sestos. He had made no prepara- 
tion for a siege : but he held out so stoutly that the 
Athenian leaders were able to keep their men quiet only 
by telling them that they would not give up their task 
until they should have received from Athens the order 
to do so. The end, however, was near. The people 
were fast dying off from famine, when Artayktes made 
his escape by night with the Persian garrison ; but they 
had not gone far when they were intercepted by the 
Athenians, and defeated after a hard fight. Artayktes, 
taken back to Sestos, offered to atone for his sin against 
Protesilaos by devoting a hundred talents at his shrine, 
and to pay a further sum of two hundred talents for his 
ransom. But the men of Elaious to whom the shrine 



4 7 9 B • c - ] Battles of Plataia and My kale. 211 

belonged would be satisfied with nothing less than his 
death ; and Artayktes, given up by the Athenian leaders 
probably against their will, was led out to the western 
end of the shattered bridge, or to the hill above the city 
of Madytos. Here his son was stoned to _ , , . 

3 Death of the 

death before his eyes ; and Artayktes, hung satrap 

on some wooden planks nailed together, 
was left to die of hunger, looking down on the scenes of 
his former pleasures. Protesilaos was indeed amply re- 
venged : and the Athenian fleet sailed home loaded with 
treasure, and with the huge cables of the broken bridges, 
to be dedicated in the temples as memorials of the 
struggle thus gloriously ended. 

There remained yet, however, some more work to be 
done, before it could be said that the barbarians had 
been fairly driven back into Asia. Sestos 
had fallen; but Byzantion and Doriskos, ^llS^o^ 
with Eion on the Strymon (p. 153) and many j^ ypr r ° s s N 
other places on the northern shores of the 
Egean, were still held by Persian garrisons when, in the 
year after thebaitle of Plataia, Pausanias, as 
commander of the confederate fleet, sailed 
with twenty Peloponnesian and thirty Athenian ships to 
Kypros (Cyprus), and thence, having recovered the 
greater part of the island, to Byzantion. The resistance 
here seems to have been as obstinate as at Sestos; but 
the place was at length reduced, and Sparta stood for the 
moment at the head of a triumphant con- 
federacy. But, to do her justice, her present Byzantion. 
position had been rather thrust upon her 
than deliberately sought, and she had no statesman, like 
Themistokles, capable of seizing on a golden opportunity 
while in her own generals she found her greatest enemies. 
The treachery of Pausanias alienated utterly the Asiatic 



212 The Persian Wars. [ch. viii. 

Greeks, and these, apart from the alienation thus caused, 

had been brought to see clearly that they 

oAh^Athe- must look f° r real protection, not to Sparta, 

nianCon- but to Athens. The work thus imposed on 

federacy. r 

Athens carried her immediately to imperial 
dominion ; but the events which led to this result belong 
to the history of her empire, not to that of the moment- 
ous struggle which had been practically brought to an 
end with the fall of Sestos and Byzantion. Persian 

tribute-gatherers probably no longer plied 
end C ofthe tne ^ r tas ^ m tne cities of the Asiatic Greeks, 

with p C r ' an< ^ t ^ ie P ers i an fleets certainly no longer 

exacted tribute in the waters of the Egean. 
Here and there an isolated fortress might still remain in 
Persian hands ; but the conquest of Europe was no longer 
a vision which could cheat the fancy of the lord of Asia. 
The will and energy of Athens, aided by the rugged 
discipline of Sparta, had foiled the great enterprise 
through which the barbarian despot sought to repress in 
the deadly bonds of Persian thraldom the intellect and 
freedom of the world. 



INDEX 



ABA 

A BAI > ** 
Jr\. Abydos, 34, 145 
Achaia, 20 
Achaimenes, 141 
Adeimantos, corruption of, 171 ; 

Themistokles, 179 
Adoption, 6 
Adrastos and Atys, 44 
iEgina [Aigina] 153 
^Eginetans [Aiginetans] 15, 153 
^olus [Aiolos] 17 
./Eschylos, 130, 148 
Africa, Greek colonies in, 16 
Agbatana, the Median, 2, 39, 40 
Agora, 105 
Ahuromazdao, 145 
Aiakes, 109 
Aiakos, 58 
Aigaleos, 181 
Aigeus, 119 
Aigina, 153 
Aiginetans, 115, 153 
Aigiplanktos, 19 
Aiolos, 17 
Aitolians, 20, 30 
Akarnanians, 19, 30 
Akerat s, 176 
Akrokorinthos, 19 
Ak? e, 32 
Alalia, 63 
Aleuadiai, 20, 152 
Alexander the Great, 131 
Alexandros the Macedonian, 192 
Alkmaionidai, 81, 132 
Alyattes, 38 
Amasis, 60, 68 
Ammon, Araoun, 61 
Amompharetos, 201 
Ampe, in 
Amphipolis, 27, 34 



and 



ASS 

Ancestors, worship of, 6 

Androkrates, 198 

Andros, 133, 185, 190 

Anopaia, 169 ; march of Hydarnes 
over, 168, 169 

Aphetai, 170, 171 

Apis, 64 

Apries, 60 

Arados, 63 

Araxes, 53 

Archons at Athens, 84 

Archon Polemarchos, 127 

Areiopagos, council of, 83, 85 

Argives, neutral in the Persian war, 
158, 195 

Argos, 21, 117 

Ariabignes, 182 

Aristagoras of Ryme, 74 

Aristagoras of Miletos, 100; and the 
Naxian exiles, 101 ; mission of, to 
Sparta, 102; at Athens, 105; death ot*io8 

Aristides, 121; ostracism of, 154; at 
Salamis, 180 

Aristodemos, 24 ; Aristodemos at Ther- 
mopylae 179 ; at Plataia, 203 

Aristogeiton, 87, 132 

Aristabanos, 142, 146 

Artabazos, 189, 202 

Artaphernes, 73, 94, 100, 131, 118 

Artayktes,2io 

Artemisia, 184 

Artemision, 170, 172 

Aryan, society, foundation of, 5 ; civili- 
sation, tendencies of early, 7, 77 ; 
conviction of immortality, 6 

Ashdod, [AzotosJ, 59 

Asia Minor, geography of, 33 

Asopos, 197 

Assemblies, primary and representative, 
12 

213 



214 



Index. 



Assyrians, 12, 36 

Astyages 36 

Athenian constitution, slow growth of 
the, as drawn out by Solon, 80; re- 
formed by Kleisthenes, 90, 03 

Athenian dislike of responsibility, 136, 
138 

Athenian. Thetes or Hektemorioi, 8r ; 
tribes set up by Kleisthenes, 90, 130; 
navy, formation of the, 153, 154; citi- 
zens, number of, 102; embassy to Ge- 
lon of Syracuse, 159 ; to Artaphernes, 

94, 101 ; maritime empire, foundation 
of the, 212 

Athenians, 4; their original houses and 
clans, 78 ; their original tribes, 91 ; 
misery of the, in the time of Solon, 
80 ; warlike activity of the, after the 
reforms of Kleisthenes, 94, 154; rela- 
tions of the, with the Persian king, 

95, 102, 100; send twenty ships to aid 
Aristagoras, 100, 101 ; alleged ingrati- 
tude of the, 136 ; emphatic praise of, 
by Herodotus, 3, 155, 173; devotion 
of the, to the Hellenic cause, 3, 130; 
victorious at Marathon, 128 ; absence 
of the, frcm Thermopylai, 163 ; mi- 
gration of the, to Salamis, 175 ; reject 
the proposals of alliance from Mardo- 
nios, 191 ; fictions invented to glorify 
the, 200 ; position of the, after the 
battle of Mykale, 207 

Athens, 6 ; early insignificance of, 27 ; 
results of despotism at, 79 ; first em- 
bassy from, to the Persian king, 99 ; 
second embassy from, to the Persian 
king, 100 ; treatment of the Persian 
heralds at, 116; occupied by Xerxes, 
177; burning of, by Mardonios, 196; 
empire of, 9, 207 

Athos, 32 ; canal under, 143 

Atossa, 71 

Attaginos, 196, 206 

Attica, boroughs of, 9 ; geography of, 19, 
21 

Atys, 44 

Azotos, 59 



BABYLON, 2 ; agriculture of 50 ; 
city of, 57 ; siege of by Cyrus, 52 ; 
revolt of, against Dareios, 67 
Barathron, 116 
Barbarians, 12, 29 
Barke, 60 
Basi'eus, 78 

Behistun, inscription of, 66, 73 
Berytos, 63 
Boges, 152 



Boiotarchs, 22 

Boiotia, 20 

Boiotians, 22 

Boreas, 163 

Boundaries, household, 5, 78 

Bouto, 65 

Bran, 177 

Brancbidai, in 

Brennus, 177 

Byblos, 63 

Byzantion, 32, 106, in, 205 



CAMBUNIAN [Kambounian] Car- 
mel, 63 

Carthage, 62, 159 

Calsenae [ KelainaiJ 143 

Chalkidike, 32 

Chalkis, 27, 32 

Chnonians, 30 

Chaos, 15 

Chersonesos, the Thrakian, 87 

Chileos of Tegea, 194 

Cilicians [Kilikians) 35 

Cithseron [Kitharion] 19 

Citizenship, ancient ideas of, 7 

City, the, 9 

Clan, the, 6 

Coincident events, alleged, 210 

Colonies, Greek, 35 

Corey ra [Korkyra] 27 

Corfu, 29 

Corinth, isthmus of, 19, 179 ; city of, 27, 
29 

Corinthians, opposition of the, to the 
restoration of Hippias, 97 ; their re- 
fusal to interfere in the affaiis of 
Athens, 97 

Croesus [Kroisos] 33 

Crete [KreteJ 20 

Cybele [Kybebe] 105 

Cyprus (Kypros) 106 

Cyrus, 2, 36, 42 ; the mule, 48 



DATMONES, 130 
Danube, 75 
Dareios, 66; his expedition to Scythia, 

70 ; his death, 132 
Datis, the Median, 73 ; king of Athens, 

119 ; defeat of, at Marathon, 129 
Deiokes, 37 
Delian, confederacy, formation of the, 

212 ; hymns, 13 
Delos, 13 ; Datis and Artaphernes at, 

119 
Delphian priestess (Pythia) 90 
Delphoi, rebuilding of the temple of, 174; 

attack on, by Xerxes, 199 



Index. 



215 



demagogue, the oligarchic, 80 
Demaratos, 95, 118, 151, 164 
Democracy, impulse given to the 

growth of, by the Greek despots, 77 ; 

movements of the Solonian reforms 

towards, 84 
Demoi, 9, 91 
Demokedes, 70 
Despots, 12 
Dienekes, 166 

Dionysios of Phokaia, 106, no 
Dorians, 32 
Doris, 71 

Doriskos, 149, 152 
Doros, 17 
Dream-god, 142 
Dryoskephalai, 198 

EGYPT, 22 ; astronomical science of, 
54 ; invasion of, by Kambyses, 
53 ; by Xerxes, 141 
Egyptians, civilization of the, 56 
Eion, 188 

Ekbatano (Egbatana) 
Ekklesia, 93 
Elbruz, 40 
Eleusis, 15 
Ennea Hodoi, 32, 152 
Epeiros, 20 
Epeirotai, 30 
Ephesos, 34 
Ephialtes, 166 
Ephors, 24 
Erebos, 15 
Erectheus, 163 
Eretiia, 26, 32, 119 
Ethiopians, 67 
Euboia, 20 
Eupatridai, 3, 82 
Euphrates, 32 
Eurotas, 22 
Eurybiades, 169, 180 
Eurysthenes, 22 
Eurytos, 166 
Euxine, 17 
Exile, severity of the punishment of, 9 

FAMILY, the Aryan, 5 
Fars and Farsistan, 39 
Festivals, Greek, 12 
Four Hundred, the, 89 

GADES, 63 
Games, GreeK, 13 
Gargaphia, 201 
Ge'on, 159, 208 
Gene, 7 

Geography of Continental Greece, 18 ; 
of Asia Minor, 33 ; of Persia, 39 



Geraneia, 19 

Gerousia, 24 

Gomates, 66, 69 

Gorgo, 103, 162 

Grseci, 17 

Grsecia Magna (Megale Hellas) 17 

Granikos, 33 

Greece, geography of continental. 17 

Greek philosophy, 15; national charac- 
ter, 10; trade in Egypt, 59 

Greeks, 17; religious associations 
among the, 13; Asiatic, 33, 34, no; 
tribute assessed on the Asiatic, by 
Dareios, 56, 172 ; siege of Andros by 
the, 190 (Hellenes) 

Gyges, 48 

Gyndes, 52 

HALYS, 35 
Hamilkar, 160 

Harmodios, 86, 132 

Harpagos, 36 

Hegesistratos, 206 

Hekataios, in 

Hektemorioi, 81 

Helikon, 19 

Hellas, not a definite geographical term, 
16 ; continuous or continental, 17 ; 
Sporadike, x8 

Hellen, 17 

Hellenes, earliest political characteris- 
rics of the, 5 ; effect of maritime com- 
merce on the, 20 ; growth of a common 
sentiment among the, 10; religious 
associations among the, 16 ; centrifu- 
gal tendencies of the, 4 ; never 
formed a nation, 4 ; and barbarians, 
11 

Hellespont, 18, 141 

Helots, 25 

Herakles, 23 

Hermos, 34 

Herodotos, 3, 48,96, 109, 102, 113, 132, 
134, 140, 147, 150, 155, 164 

Hipparchos, 86 

Hippias, 86 ; expulsion of, from Athens, 
89 ; intrigues of, with the Persian 
court, 72, 96,110, 116; invited from 
Sigeion to a Spartan Congress, 96; 
his return to Sigeion, 99 ; at Mara- 
thon, 118, 121, 124, 141 

Histiaios, 74, 76, 125, 107 

Homoioi,24 

House, the primitive Aryan, 7 

Hydarnes, 128, passage of, overAno- 
paia, 166, 169 

Hyperakrioi, 81 

Hypomeiones, 25 

Hystaspes, 66 



2l6 



Index. 



TDA,33 

X Illyrians, 30 

Immortality, ideas of, as affecting the 
ancient Aryan family life, 5 

Ion, 17 

Ionia, 32; first conquest of, 42 ; second 
conquest of, 49 : revolt of, against 
Dareios, 107 ; third conquest of, no 

Ionians, 32, 42, 74, 130 

Iran, 2 

Istros, 74 

Italy, Greek colonies in, 16, 27 

TOSIAH, 60 

KADYTIS, 60 
Kaikos, 34 
Kallias, 133 
Kalli machos, 127 
Kambounian mountains, 16, 18 
Karnbyses, 66 
Karians, 47, 107 
Karystos, 119 
Karaiystros, 33 
Kelain, 143 
Kilikians, 35 
Kimon, 135 
Kings and despots, 77 
Kirkesion, 60 
Kitharion, 19 

Kleisthenes, the Atheniar, 90, 94 
Kleombrotos, 193 

Kleomenes, king of Sparta, 88, 93, 95, 124 
Koes of Mytilene, 73, 76, 108 
Korkyra, 28, 158 
Krete, 20 
Kretalla, 143 
Kroisos, 35, 39 ; and Solon, 44 ; drama 

of the life of, 47 et seq. 
Kroton, 28 
Krypteia, 25 
Ktesias, 48 
Kyaxares, 38, 39 
Kybebe, 105 
Kylon, curse of, 93, 132 
Kynegeiros, 130 
Kypros, 106 
Kypselos, 97 
Kyrene, 60 
Kythera, 20, 167 

LABRONDA, 193 
Labynetos, 38 
Lade, battle of, 108 
Lakrynes, 49 
Language, Greek, 10-n 
Laureion, 154 

Law, voluntary obedience to, 2 
Lebanon, 63 
Lemnos, 32, 77 



Leonidas, 162, 169 

Leotychides, 206 

Lokroi, 20 

Lydia, 2 

Lygdamis, 31 

Lyk'ans, 35, 49 

Lykourgos the Athenian, 84 

MAGIANS, 6 7 
Magna Grsecia (Megale Hellas) 

Magnesia, 20, 170 

Maiandros, 34 

Makedonia, 30 

Malian, 19 

Malian Gulf, 19 

Mandrokles, 70 

Marathon, 19, 86; debates in the 
Athenian camp at, 127; story of the 
battle of, 125-130 

Mardonios, 113, 114, 141, 183, 189; pro- 
posals of alliance from, to the Athe- 
nians, 191 ; reoccupation of Athens 
by, 192 ; pacti n of, with the Argives, 
195; retreat of, into Boiotia, 196; 
death of, 203 

Magdolon, 60 

Marriage, ancient ideas of, 7 

Masistios, 198 

Meander (Maiandros) 

Medes, 2, 45, 67 

Medeia, 119 

Median tribes, 36 

M< J gabazos, 76 

Megabyzos, 66 

Megakles, 84 

Megale Hellas, 17, 28 

Megara, 27 

Megistias, 166 

Megiddo, 57 

Mercenaries, 12, 76, 82 

Messene, 22 

Messogis, 34 

Metapontion, 28 

Metoikoi, 139 

Miletos, no 

Milon, 70 

Miltiades, 73, 88, 117; at the bridge on 
the Istros, 77 ; flight of, from the 
Chersonesos, 112 ; at Marathon, 120 
et seq. ; at Paros, 133 ; trial and con- 
demnation of, 134 

Minos,. 58 

Molossians, 30 

Monarchy, growth of, 79 

Mutilation of the human body, 12 

Mykald, 35 ; battle of, 199 

Mykenai, 162 

Mykonos, 76 

NABOPOLASSAR, 38 
Naukratis, 60, 60 



Index, 



217 



Naxos, 119 

Nebucadnezzar, 38-60 

Necessity, doctrine of, 47 

Neith, 11 

Nemea, 13 

Nemesis, 163, 172 

Nekos, 59 

Night, 15 

Nile, valley of the, 54 

Nine Roads (Ennee Hodot) 

Nineveh, 2, 37, 59 

OASIS, 61 
Oinos, 26 
Oita, 19 

Oligarchs, Thessalian, 21 ; Boiotian, 22 
Oligarchy, origin of, 78 ; a step in the 

direction of freedom, 80 
Oloros, 88 
Olympia, 13 

Olympos, Thessalian, 18 ; Mysian, 38 
Olynthos, 32, 189 
Oracles, 45, 156 
Oreithyia, 163 

Oriental history, character of, 1 
Ormuzd, 145 
Oroites, 68 
Ossa, 18 
Ostracism, 91, 92 
Otanes, 66 
Othrys, 19 

PAGASAIAN Gulf, 19 
Paktolos, 32 

Paktyas, 49 

Pallene, 32 

Paraloi, 84 

Parnassos, 19 

Parnon, 20 

Paros, 133 

Pasargadia, 40 

Patria Potestas, 9 

Pausanias, 192, 199, 200, 203 

Peoxaioi, 84 

Peisistratidai, 80 ; expulsion of the from 
Athens, 3, 89 ; intrigues of the, 72, 90, 
100, 141 ; at Athens with Xerxes, 178 

Peisistratos, 84, 85 

Pelion, 19 

Peloponnesos, 20 

Penrios, 18 

Penestai, 21 

People, rise of the, 9 

Pergamos, 43 

Periaadros, 97 

Perikles, 134 

Perioikoi, 25 

Persephone, 15 

Persia, geography of, 39 ; under Dareios, 
69 

Q 



Persian, tribes, 37 ; heralds, treatment 
of, at Athens and Sparta, 115 

Persian War, causes of the, 2, 72, 115, 
100, 115, 161 

Persians, characteristics of the, 2 ; con- 
spiracy of the Seven, 67 ; bravery of 
the, in the Persian War, 183 ; defeat 
of the, at Marathon, 129 ; at Salamis, 
183 ; at Plataia, 194; and at Mykale, 
207 

Pharaoh, 58 

Pheidippides, 123 

Pheme, 209 

Phenician Tripoli's, 63 

Phenicians, 63, 145, 183 

Philosophy, Greek, 14 

Phokaia, 34 

Phokians on Anopaia, 166 

Phokis, 19, 175 

Phraortes, 38 

Phratria, 7 

Phyle, 7 

Physical Science, Greek, 13 

Pindos, 19 

Plataia, 125 ; allian2e of, with Athens, 
119 ; battle of, 300 

Plataians, 124, 200 

Plebeians, 8 

Polemarchos, 125 

Polis, 9 

Polykrates, 68, 70 

Potidaia, 32, 189 

Prexaspes, 65 

Primary assemblies, 10 

Primogeniture, 6 

Probouleutic Council, 83, 92 

Prokles, 23 

Propontis, 34 

Protesilaos, 211 

Prytaneion, 7, 135 

Psammis, 59 

Psammenitos, 59, 60 

Psammitichos, 59 

Psyttaleia, 180, 183 

Pythagoras of Miletos, 108 

Pythia, bribing of the, 88, 96, 157 

Pythios, 145 

Pytho, 13 

R AMESES, 75 
Rhadamanthys, 58 
Rhamnous, 19 
Religion, character of Ancient Aryan, 

7,8 
Representative assemblies, io 
Rhodes, 34 
Rhone, 17 

Rivers, diversions of, 53, 152 
Romans, 18 
Rome, 17 



218 



Index. 



SALAMIS, 157; battle of, 181 
Samos, 206 

Sardeis, 34, 47, 105 

Sardinia, 17 

Saronic Gulf, 21 

Scythia, 71 

Seischatheia, 82 

Semiramis, 54 

Senate at Athens, 84 

Sesostris, 75 

Sestos, 3, 32, 210 

Seven Persians, the, 67 

Sicily, Greek, colonies in, 17, 27 

Sidon, 63 

Sigeion, 88 

Sikinnos, 180, 186 

Sinope, 17 

Siris, 28 

Sithonia, 32 

Smerdis, brother of Kambyses, 65 ; the 
Magian, 66 

Smyrna, 34 

Solon, 3 ; and Kroisos, 44 ; reforms of, 
as described by himself, 80 ; actual 
measures of, 73 ; timocracy of, 82 ; 
travels of, 85 ; death of, 85 ; oligarch- 
ical elements in the constitution of> 
84, 86, 89 ; imprecation of, 120 

Sophanes, 203 

Sosikles, 97 

Sounion, 191 

Sousa, 70 

Spain, 17 

Sparta, unwalled, 14, 26 ; early great- 
ness of, 22, 102 

Spartan opposition to Athens, 4 ; con- 
stitution's ; Homoioi, 24; Hypo- 
meiones, 24 ; military system, 25 

Spartan kings, 23 

Spartans, 23, 42, 68, 178 

Spartiatia, 24 

Spercheois, 30, 161 

State, growth of the, 7 

Strymon, 27 

Styx, 113 

Sybaris, 28 

Syennesis, 38 

Syloson, 66 

Syrian kings, 48 

TAGOS, 21 
Tainaros, 20 
Tamos, 34 
Tanais, 17, 71 
Taras, 28, 71 
Tarentum (Taras) 28 
Taxiorchos, 26 
Taygetos, 20 
Tempe, 18, 163 



Thebans at Thermopylai, 167 

Thebes, 21, 204 

Themistokles, 117 ; genius of, 123; 
policy of, 154 et seq. ; at Tempe, 160 ; 
and the Euboians, 177; first message 
of, to Xerzes, 186; not the adviser of 
a pursuit of Xerxes, 187; honors 
paid to, at Sparta, 190 

Therme, 152 

Thermopylai, 19 ; geography of, 163 ; 
Greek contingent at, 164, 170; al- 
leged absence of the Athenians from, 
164 

Thesandros, 196 

Theseus, 10 

Thesprotians, 30 

Thessalians, 21, 162 

Thessaly, geography of, 19 

Thetes, 81 

Thorax of Larissa, 202 

Thornax, 21 

Thourioi, 28 

Thrakians, 21, 30, 31 

Thucydides, 14, 87, 150 

Thyrea, 22 

Tigranes, 207 

Timo, 134 

Timocracy of Solon, 87 

Tmolos, 34 

Torone, 32 

Trapezous, 17 

Tribe, origin of the, 7 

Tribes, Attic, in the time of Solon, 121 
Kleisthenean, 90, 121 

Tritantaichmes, 168 

Tymphrestos, 19 

Tyre, 63 

Tyrants, the Greek, 79 

T TILLAGE communities, 5 
TT7HITE Shield, raising of the, 126 

XANTHIPPOS, 134 
Xerxes, accession of, to the Per- 
sian throne, 132 ; council of, 141 ; 
canal of, across the Peninsula of 
Athos, 144 ; march of, from Sardeis, 
145 ; number of the fleet of, 148 ; at 
Athens, 177; at Salamis, 187; flight 
of, 176 

ZAGROS, 40 
Zarex, 22 

Zeus 145 
Zopyros, 68 
Zoroaster, 67 



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knowledge of these subjects, he unites great powers of generalization, a 
vigorous, spirited, and exceedingly graphic style and keen analytical pow- 
ers, which give this history a degree of interest and a permanent value 
possessed by no other record of the decline and fall of the Roman Com- 
monwealth. "Dr. Mommsen's work/' as Dr. Schmitz remarks in the 
introduction, " though the production of a man of most profound and ex- 
tensive learning and knowledge of the world, is not as much designed for 
the professional scholar as for intelligent readers of all classes who take 
an interest in the history of by-gone ages, and are inclined there to seek 
information that mpf guide them safely through the perplexing mazes of 
modern history." 

CRITICAL NOTICES. 

" A work of the very highest merit ; its learning is exact and profound ; its narrative full 
of genius and skill ; its descriptions of men are admirably vivid. We wish to place on 
record our opinion that Dr. Mommsen's is by far the best history of the Decline and FjU 
cf the Roman Commonwealth." — London Times. 

"This is the best history of the Roman Republic, taking the work on the whole — the 
y.ithor's complete mastery of his subject, the variety of his gifts and acquirements, his 
graphic power in the delineation of national and individual character, and the vivid interest 
which he inspires in every portion of his book. He is without an equal in his own sphere. ' : 
— Edinburgh Review. 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New York. 



A New Edition, Library Style. 



%\% IiisfoFg of (Jppprp, 

By Prof. Dr. ERNST OTJETIUS. 

Translated by Adolphus William Ward, M. A., Fellow of St. Peter's College, Can* 
bridge, Prof, of History in Owen's College, Manchester. 

UNIFORM WITH MOMMSEN'S HISTORY OF ROME, 
rive volumes, crown 8vx>, gilt top. Price per set, $10.00. 



Curtius's History of Greece is similar in plan and purpose to Mommsen's 
History of Rome > with which it deserves to rank in every respect as one of 
the great masterpieces of historical literature. Avoiding the minute de- 
tails which overburden other similar works, it groups together in a very 
picturesque manner all the important events in the history of this king- 
dom, which has exercised such a wonderful influence upon the world's 
civilization. The narrative of Prof. Curtius's work is flowing and ani- 
mated, and the generalizations, although bold, are philosophical and 
sound. 

CRITICAL NOTICES. 

** Professor Curtius's eminent scholarship is a sufficient guarantee for the trustworthiness 
of his history, while the skill with which he groups his facts, and his effective mode of narrat- 
ing them, combine to render it no less readable than sound. Prof. Curtius everywhere 
maintains the true dignity and impartiality of history, and it is evident his sympathies are 
on the side of justice, humanity, and progress." —London Athenceum. 

" We cannot express our opinion of Dr. Curtius's book better than by saying that it may 
be fitly ranked with Theodor Mommsen's great work." — London Spectator. 

"As an introduction to the study of Grecian history, no previous work is comparable to 
the present for vivacity and picturesque beauty, while in sound learning and accuracy of 
statement it is not inferior to the elaborate productions which enrich the literature of the 
age." — N. Y . Daily Tribune. 

" The History of Greece is treated by Dr. Curtius so broadly and freely in the spirit of 
the nineteenth century, that it becomes in his hands one of the worthiest and most instruct- 
ive branches of study for all who desire something more than a knowledge of isolated facts 
for their education. This translation ought to become a regular part of the accepted course 
of reading for young men at college, and for all who are in training for the free political 
life of our country." — N. Y. Evening Post. 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New York 



